How going it alone reduces our own sovereignty.
A municipal employee raises the US flag at Sharm el-Sheikh as the town prepares to receive foreign leaders on October 11, 2025.(Khaled Desouki / AFP via Getty Images)
Given the recent flood of news, one could be forgiven for missing the presidential memorandum dated January 7, 2026, announcing the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organizations, conventions, and treaties. But that memorandum, inconspicuous though it may appear on its face, demands careful consideration. It reflects not just another step in the Trump administration’s “Great Undoing” of the postwar international order, but also risks serious and material injury to America’s economic and national security interests. While the memorandum claims its actions will help to “restore American sovereignty,” it will do just the opposite.
The withdrawals (some still to be carried out) risk tangible harm to US interests, from household economic issues like increased energy costs and insurance premiums to national security concerns like counterterrorism and cybersecurity, to public health and the environment. While it will be difficult to ascribe any single outcome directly to any specific withdrawal, this much is clear: Multilateral engagement allows the United States to exert leadership over the rules that shape the world, and withdrawing from these engagements risks forfeiting our influence and leaving gaps for other nations—including those inimical to us—to fill. International affairs abhor a vacuum, and when we exit the scene, we create opportunities for others who will take our place. When we forfeit our international leadership, we reduce our own sovereignty.
Consider a few examples. First, the impending US withdrawal from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This landmark treaty was negotiated and signed by the George H.W. Bush administration in 1992 and unanimously approved by the Senate soon thereafter. Presidents have long claimed the unilateral power to withdraw from Senate-ratified treaties like this one, while many in the Senate disagree, arguing that once the Senate has ratified a treaty, Senate approval is required to exit. Courts, however, have avoided deciding the matter as a political question, and so withdrawal here appears likely.
The convention itself contains a one-year waiting period for withdrawal. Assuming the administration complies with that obligation, the United States is likely to exit sometime in early 2027. What’s more, a future president will not be able to merely announce that the United States is rejoining the convention. Under its terms, a future president would have to again obtain Senate ratification, which requires 67 votes—an extraordinarily high bar in today’s political environment. Once we exit the framework, we are likely to remain outside it for the foreseeable future.
The Framework Convention arose at a different time. Thirty-five years ago, the world sought to build upon the success of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, whose widespread adoption led to the phasing out of CFCs and the recovery of the ozone layer. The Framework Convention aimed to establish a similar process for the far more complicated issue of climate change, laying the groundwork for limiting greenhouse gases and stabilizing global temperatures. While the convention is far from perfect, it provides the best hope for coherent global cooperation to address climate change and the risks it presents to US security and prosperity.
When the United States departs the Framework Convention, it surrenders its leadership role in shaping global climate policy without any clear path for return. Climate policy affects not only environmental resilience but also trade, energy markets, migration, water instability, and geopolitical stability. Moreover, the convention and its processes will continue without the United States. Nearly every other country will remain engaged, potentially leaving America sidelined as competitors consolidate influence.
China has already assumed dominant positions in renewable energy industries. Without the United States present and leading, the global playing field may tilt further away from American economic and strategic interests. Climate instability itself carries national security consequences, including displacement, food insecurity, and conflict. Greater instability abroad ultimately produces greater insecurity at home.
Equally troubling is the domestic parallel: the EPA’s potential withdrawal of its Endangerment Finding. Together, these developments threaten to weaken both America’s international and domestic mechanisms for addressing climate change, potentially in ways that future administrations may struggle to reverse.
Next, consider the withdrawals from the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Both concern areas central to national security. Multilateral forums facilitate coordination, information sharing, and capacity building. While bilateral diplomacy can sometimes substitute, replacing structured multilateral engagement with fragmented bilateral negotiations is inefficient and prone to miscommunication. Collective dialogue strengthens, rather than diminishes, US sovereignty.
Similarly, withdrawal from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) risks weakening international cooperation on maritime security. Piracy disrupts commerce, raises insurance costs, and undermines economic stability. ReCAAP’s information-sharing mechanisms enhance collective security and reduce burdens on US military resources. Withdrawal risks ceding leadership space to strategic competitors.
There are also organizations whose exit directly harms US commercial interests. Groups like the International Lead and Zinc Study Group and the International Cotton Advisory Committee primarily provide market data that supports producers and policymakers. It is unclear how withdrawal benefits domestic industries reliant on accurate global information.
Other departures undermine American values. Institutions addressing violence against children and sexual violence in conflict advance long-standing humanitarian commitments. These are not partisan concerns but moral and strategic ones, reflecting widely shared principles regarding human dignity and international norms.
Viewed collectively, the withdrawals undermine American sovereignty by reducing US influence in shaping global rules and standards. Many institutions will continue without the United States; others may weaken, creating instability that ultimately affects American interests. While some exits may be reversible, others risk long-term or permanent consequences.
When we unilaterally withdraw from these 66 entities, we risk injury to a broad spectrum of US interests. Going it alone does not strengthen American sovereignty—it reduces our influence, constrains our options, and diminishes our role in shaping the world we must inevitably navigate.
Aaron S.J. ZelinskyAaron S.J. Zelinsky is an attorney in private practice. He previously served as an assistant United States Attorney, an assistant special counsel to Robert S. Mueller, III, and as special assistant to State Department legal adviser Harold Hongju Koh. He was a law clerk to Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy, and Judge Thomas B. Griffith on the DC Circuit. He is an adjunct professor at the University of Baltimore Law School.