Democrats have the tools to challenge Trump’s military interventions and electoral interference in Latin America—if they’re willing to use them.
Ecuadoran armed forces patrol the streets in Duran, Guayas province, Ecuador, on March 15, 2026, during preparations for a US-supported military operation. (Marcos Pin / AFP via Getty Images)
As Democrats on Capitol Hill envision regaining control of one or both chambers of Congress in November, they are already gearing up to rein in the Trump administration’s imperial agenda in Latin America.
But beyond seeing the Western Hemisphere through the lens of the issues contributing to Democratic gains in polls nationwide—heavy-handed immigration enforcement, the tariff-fueled affordability crisis, high-level corruption—legislators in Washington should prioritize a robust oversight and accountability agenda that puts the brakes on the Trump administration’s reckless militarism and coercion in the region.
From the lethal boat strikes across the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, joint military operations in Ecuador and beyond, blatant electoral interference from Honduras to Brazil, gunpoint diplomacy in Venezuela, and the military-enforced fuel blockade of Cuba, Democrats can stem the tide of Trump’s so-called Donroe Doctrine—if they are willing to use the tools at their disposal and resist the bipartisan, interventionist consensus on the region that has long plagued Washington.
In response to Trump’s foreign policy in Latin America, Democrats have, by and large, attacked the administration on largely partisan issues, many of which intersect with areas affecting their constituents, including immigration policy, affordability, foreign aid, and corruption.
Democrats have challenged the administration’s mass deportation campaign, “safe third-country” agreements and gutting of asylum and temporary protected status; questioned the basis for imposing levies on Mexico and Brazil and their impacts on the cost of living; bemoaned the impacts of aid cuts on farm communities and the impoundment of funds already appropriated by Congress; and sought answers about the pardoning of the former Honduran narco-president and the security contracts of Blackwater founder Erik Prince in Haiti.
These areas of concern are undoubtedly significant and, because of their impacts on US communities and nexuses to domestic issues, should continue to be pursued if and when Democrats take back the House and/or Senate.
But wielding these select issues for partisan purposes or electoral gain should not overshadow equally pressing foreign policy concerns that many establishment Democrats have long avoided to prevent fissures within the caucus—areas that the administration itself has prioritized and could present significant blowback to long-term US interests if left unchecked.
Atop the agenda for Democrats should be the administration’s lethal boat strikes, which experts say amount to crimes against humanity, having left 240 people dead and cost taxpayers nearly $5 billion. Lawmakers in both chambers say obtaining the secret legal memo justifying the strikes and reasserting congressional authority over them will be among their priorities next year, but much more must be done to uncover the true cost of ongoing operations, sanction those responsible for serial killings on the high seas, and hold third-country collaborators accountable for carrying them out. Congress must clearly articulate that the president cannot direct summary executions against criminal suspects without due process and withhold funds for lethal operations against presumed traffickers in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
Additionally, Democrats will need to obtain concrete information from administration officials about expected joint ground operations across the region under the framework of the US-led Shield of Americas and Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. These operations have already seen US special forces deployed on missions in Ecuador and potential plans to integrate operationally in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and elsewhere. Beyond standard training, intelligence-sharing and military financing programs, lawmakers will need to press the Pentagon and State Department on the authorities under which troops are engaged in combat, the US taxpayer resources being committed, potential civilian abuses US deployments may enable, and measurable impacts on organized crime and US public safety.
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s electoral interference in the region—from issuing ultimatums to voters in Honduras and Argentina, to endorsing a candidate in Colombia, and unleashing a pressure campaign in anticipation of this week’s final vote in Brazil—must also face consequences from Democratic lawmakers. Congress should make abundantly clear that not only do overt US actions or statements that interfere in foreign countries’ elections set a worrying precedent for the future of US statecraft and complicate day-to-day diplomacy with institutional partners; they also establish a hypocritical standard for those critical of intromission into US elections and can unduly tilt the scales in razor-thin contests.
Fortunately, top Democrats are already probing the administration’s shady dealings in Venezuela, an area that should expand to potential conflicts of interest by former administration officials now cashing in on lucrative business deals with Caracas. Not only must Democrats continue to scrutinize the neocolonial arrangement through which the Trump administration has assumed control of Venezuela’s oil revenues but also commission studies linking the Energy Department’s gold deals to organized crime, push the Pentagon on its statutory authority to take equity stakes in Venezuela’s hydrocarbon reserves, demand a return of the country’s sovereignty over its domestic affairs, and lift the comprehensive sanctions still handicapping the country’s full recovery.
Between the reemergence of right-wing red-baiting and Donald Trump’s use of the chilling National Security Presidential Memorandum–7 to criminalize left political organizing, we’re seeing McCarthyism reborn before our eyes.
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Lastly, the de facto fuel blockade of Cuba, the imposition of secondary sanctions on foreign firms operating on the island, increased diplomatic pressure on countries sustaining ties with Havana, and ongoing military planning for potential kinetic or covert actions should remain a top priority for legislative oversight and debate. Reports of cronyist graft and back-channel deals between administration-linked figures seeking to swoop in and control Cuba’s key assets must also be addressed as Congress seeks accountability for the administration’s role in accelerating Cuba’s humanitarian crisis.
To pursue these issues and others, legislators have a number of tools at their disposal.
First and foremost, Democrats in the majority can call hearings and issue subpoenas—whether for administration officials, their family members and business associates to testify, or to review the text of official agreements—as Representative Castro (D-TX) recently requested with regard to the Venezuela oil deal. They can also use the increased resources and personnel afforded to the majority to launch special investigations, issue committee reports, and convene temporary task forces on select topics.
Congress can also use the power of the purse—particularly through the annual federal appropriations process—by wielding funding restrictions or inserting reporting requirements for certain policies that, if Democrats win both chambers, have an increased likelihood of becoming law. Democratic leadership can also continue to restrain the administration by forcing floor debates and votes on the War Powers Resolution—as it has tried and failed over the past year on the boat strike campaign, war with Venezuela, and military action in Cuba—albeit with better chances at success come January.
And the Senate can choose to block the ambassadorial nominations for particularly partisan or underqualified political appointees for the dozen-plus vacancies at US embassies across the region and/or other top foreign policy posts charged with advancing the Donroe Doctrine from Washington.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the Trump administration will likely plow forward to reassert US dominance across the hemisphere and weaponize the economic and military diplomatic tools it has to those ends. But attempts to constrain these and related actions are well worth the fight, as congressional action can spur public frustration and mobilization over the domestic and global costs of unchecked militarism.
At the same time, vocal Democratic action may accelerate GOP dissent and intraparty infighting, creating space to further expose the frustrations and disagreements some Republican lawmakers have with aspects of Trump’s approach to the hemisphere and his apparent contempt for meaningful congressional input.
For Latin American governments, including those that have become willing, if junior, partners in Donroeism, heightened legislative action may incentive hedging, a push to invest in bipartisanism, and a diversification of the bilateral agenda beyond security and defense issues.
Perhaps most importantly, more robust congressional action can redefine the terms on which US-Latin America relations are debated, expanding possibilities for less securitized solutions and more productive, multifaceted, and respectful ties with our neighbors to the south.
Lee SchlenkerLee Schlenker is a research associate with the Global South program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, where he focuses on Latin America.