Macronism has died its second death. On December 4, France’s National Assembly overwhelmingly approved a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Michel Barnier, now the shortest-serving head of government under the Fifth Republic. When President Emmanuel Macron appointed the 73-year-old former Brexit negotiator to the post in September, it was a long-shot bid to retain control of government. The premier’s main task was to secure a 2025 budget that would safeguard the president’s pro-business agenda while charting a path for severe deficit reduction in the face of mounting concerns over French state finances.

But the votes just weren’t there. Leading a minority coalition tying parliamentary Macronists to Barnier’s center-right Républicains, the prime minister could count on the support of barely more than 200 MPs in the lower house (289 votes are needed for a majority). Even that “common foundation,” as surrogates and the press coined the rickety Macronist-Républicains alliance, proved weak from the start. Since the government was formed, the parties in the coalition and their leadership have been prone to infighting and competitive posturing.

With the math against him, Barnier had little choice but to throw down the gauntlet on December 2, when he announced he would use a special constitutional provision to force a social security financing bill through parliament without a vote from the National Assembly. By invoking “49.3,” Barnier exposed his government to a no-confidence motion, immediately submitted by the left-wing Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP). The votes of 331 MPs—mostly from the left and Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement National (RN)—were more than enough to block Barnier and oust the prime minister from power. In parliament, Macron is running out of gas.

The same goes for the president’s standing with the broader public. Barnier’s fall marks the latest turn in a political crisis that began in early June, when Macron took the country by surprise by dissolving the National Assembly. The snap elections that followed fractured the lower house into thirds and revealed broad-based rejection of Macron’s technocratic centrism. Once viewed as front-runners in that campaign, Le Pen and her far-right allies finished with 142 seats in the National Assembly. The NFP eked out a first-place finish with 193 seats thanks to tactical voting in runoffs by moderates and left-wingers seeking to block Le Pen’s party from power. Meanwhile, Macron’s centrist alliance withered to a mere 166 seats, down from the 250 it held in the prior parliament.

Barnier’s tenure provided a short reprieve for the president, who still finds himself at record lows in popularity ratings. According to a November opinion study, 76 percent of the public disapprove of Macron’s handling of the presidency. As Barnier’s budget bill made it through the National Assembly, a majority believed opposition parties should vote to sink the government. “My decision to dissolve the National Assembly was not understood,” Macron said in a televised address on Thursday evening, in a rare admission from a chronically self-assured president.

True to form, Macron passed most of the blame on to the opposition. “[Barnier] was censured—something that has been unheard of for 60 years—because the extreme right and the extreme left united in an anti-republican front and because forces that used to govern France decided to help them,” Macron continued. The president is expected to name a new prime minister in the coming days, holding a series of meetings with figures from the center-left Parti Socialiste, his centrist bloc, and the Républicains.

Barnier’s government failed when the primary conceit propping it up gave way: the good graces of Le Pen. Designed above all to block the NFP from power, Barnier’s only other possible crutch was the far right. Since September, the Rassemblement National has basked in this kingmaker role. “Whatever happens, we’re the ones who decide,” Jordan Bardella, the RN’s official president, boasted this fall.

Barnier bent over backward to coax and appease the RN. He appointed staunch conservatives to his cabinet to anchor his government on terms possibly amenable to Le Pen, including the ultraconservative Bruno Retailleau as interior minister. Barnier promised to consider reforms to France’s legislative election system long demanded by the far right and prepared another stringent anti-immigration package for early 2025. When Macronist Finance Minister Antoine Armand suggested in late September that he would not speak with Le Pen and the RN during budget drafting, Barnier reprimanded him and called Le Pen to apologize.

To grease the wheels of their rapprochement, the parties of the “common foundation” moved closer to Le Pen on immigration, while the Rassemblement National shifted toward a more traditional conservative stance on economic policy. However, the risk of tying the RN’s fate too closely to an unpopular government ultimately prompted Le Pen to pull down the curtain, if only as a show of strength.

For her part, Le Pen may now tack back to a more compromising position. She said after the vote that her party was open to “letting [a future government] get to work” and would eagerly “co-construct” a new budget. In recent days, Le Pen’s caucus was reportedly instructed not to excessively celebrate Barnier’s fall.