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ENDLESS WARS
POLICING THE WORLD

MANUFACTURED THREATS
BLOATED MILITARY BUDGET
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Trump’s Child Hostages

By now, the cruel and intended consequences of Donald Trump’s zero-tolerance immigration policy have become chillingly clear. Over 2,300 children, some younger than 4, have been forcibly separated from their parents by Border Patrol agents and held in what can only be described as cages in overcrowded detention centers and shelters across the Southwest. A former Walmart in Brownsville, Texas, now warehouses almost 1,500 boys, who are let outside to play for just two hours a day. A mother from Honduras reported that authorities snatched her infant from her while she was breastfeeding. Multiple parents described being told their children were being taken for a bath, only to have them disappear. One man, Marco Antonio Muñoz, 39, committed suicide in a padded jail cell after being torn from his wife and 3-year-old son.

Yes, this is happening in America. This sense of dislocation—Is this who we are now?—has prompted a wave of condemnation: everyone from progressives to the US Conference of Catholic Bishops to conservatives like Senator Lindsey Graham and former first lady Laura Bush, whose husband created ICE. The administration’s response to this outpouring has been a preposterous farrago of disinformation. Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen opted for bald denial: “We do not have a policy of separating families at the border,” she tweeted, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Attorney General Jeff Sessions cited Romans 13 as justification and also claimed, falsely, that the country was facing a “stampede” at the border. Fact: Border apprehensions are near a four-decade low. For his part, the president has repeatedly asserted that he has “no choice but to follow the law” and blamed Democrats for “their forced family breakup at the Border.”

This is a lie. There is no requirement that the Department of Homeland Security criminally prosecute all immigrants who cross the border unlawfully, and there’s no cause to separate children from parents absent that pretext. The current crisis is purely the result of the Trump administration’s “simple decision,” in the words of senior policy adviser Stephen Miller, “to have a zero tolerance policy for illegal entry, period.” It is also a crisis that the administration has deliberately stoked by slow-walking asylum seekers at legal points of entry and by shutting the door to refugees in general. The president can choose to end all this tomorrow, and if he doesn’t, Congress should do it for him. The Keep Families Together Act, endorsed by all 49 Senate Democrats and independents, would be a start—but as of press time, not one “compassionate conservative” had come on board.

Recognizing this truth, however, shouldn’t blind us to another one: that the decades-long criminalization of immigration is, in fact, a bipartisan creation. It was Bill Clinton who criminalized low-level immigration offenses and vastly increased the size of the Border Patrol. Operation Streamline, the federal initiative being used to prosecute border十字 in mass trials—often while they’re shackled together—was pioneered by George W. Bush. And yes, it was Barack Obama who massively increased the criminal prosecution of adult border crossers and, in response to a wave of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 2014, pursued a kinder, gentler version of deterrence that nonetheless saw children and parents locked up in privately run detention centers for long periods of time.

“This crisis is, at its core, about the Trump decision to separate children and their parents,” says Representative Pramila Jayapal, one of the organizers of a June 30 march on Washington to protest Trump’s policy. “But it is also showing how much abuse is built into our sprawling, out-of-control immigrant-detention network. We need to seize this moment to make lasting reforms.” A bill she’s introduced, the Dignity for Detained Immigrants Act, now has 93 co-sponsors. Its passage should mark the beginning of a deeper reckoning with how this country treats those who come here yearning to breathe free.
A Supreme Purge

The high court has stacked the deck against voters.

The antidemocratic majority on the US Supreme Court is openly at war with voting rights, and the justices have drawn new battle lines in the states as the 2018 midterms approach and as election officials prepare for the presidential contest in 2020. With its 5–4 ruling in the case of Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Court has given these officials the go-ahead to purge qualified voters from their registration lists.

Voter purging is an old tactic that politicians use to game the system. It works like this: If registered voters don’t cast a ballot in several elections and then fail to jump through bureaucratic hoops to maintain their active status, their names can be purged from voter lists. The next time these voters show up at the polls on Election Day, their names are nowhere to be found. In states that don’t permit same-day registration, these citizens have effectively been disenfranchised.

The A. Philip Randolph Institute and other civil-rights groups objected to this tactic and sued Ohio’s Republican secretary of state, Jon Husted, for employing it, arguing that the 1993 National Voter Registration Act was designed to prevent just such purges. Their challenge was rejected by the Supreme Court’s five GOP-appointed justices, including Donald Trump’s addition, Neil Gorsuch. This decision, by a Court that has already gutted key sections of the Voting Rights Act, appalled Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who argued in a scathing dissent that the majority’s embrace of voter purges “entirely ignores the history of voter suppression against which the NVRA was enacted and upholds a program that appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and low-income voters that Congress set out to eradicate.”

The threat of a new wave of voter suppression is real. Since 2011, according to Ohio Representative Joyce Beatty, Husted’s office has purged the registrations of more than 840,000 people identified as infrequent voters who hadn’t returned a postcard notice from the state. The Randolph Institute’s lawsuit put such purges on hold, but now that hold is off. Husted says he won’t do new purges for this year’s election, but the GOP nominee to replace him says he plans to utilize the process in a state that is likely to be a key battleground in 2020.

Aggressive purges remain an option for 2018 and 2020 in a number of states that now have purge laws—and in the Republican-controlled states that could adopt them. That’s why Kristen Clarke, president of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, describes the Husted decision as “a monumental setback for those who care about access to democracy in our country…. The Court’s decision could not come at a more important time,” Clarke adds. It “sends the wrong message to state officials, some of whom will likely interpret this decision as a green light to purge the rolls of legitimately registered voters.”

Once purged, these voters face various obstacles depending on their state. “At best, purged voters are forced to ‘needlessly reregister’ if they decide to vote in a subsequent election,” Sotomayor explained in her dissent; “at worst, they are prevented from voting at all because they never receive information about when and where elections are taking place.” States, though, need not choose to be so unwise, Sotomayor added, noting that in the past, “the majority of States have found ways to maintain accurate voter rolls without initiating removal processes based solely on an individual’s failure to vote.”

For that to happen, voters must elect secretaries of state who support voting rights. And this is a good year to do just that: Of the 35 states in which the secretary is elected directly by voters, 26 will be choosing someone for the office in 2018. Six more states will elect a governor who appoints the secretary of state, and there are legislative elections in three states where the secretary is chosen by the legislature. In battleground states across the country, voters can elect officials who side with democracy. These include Ohio State Representative Kathleen Clyde, the Democratic nominee to replace Husted, a hyperpartisan Republican careerist whose name will now be forever associated with voter suppression, thanks to the Court’s decision.

Clyde isn’t running against Husted (he’s the GOP’s nominee for lieutenant governor this year), but she is running against the approach that Ohio Republicans have taken to voting rights. “Even if aggressively purging voters for their frequency of voting does not violate a federal statute, it is still bad policy for all Ohioans,” says the legislator, who sponsored “Stop the Purge” measures in 2015 and 2017 that would have kept eligible Ohioans on the voter rolls. If elected, Clyde will end the purge process. But that’s just part of her vision for “securing and modernizing our elections so that every Ohioan’s vote counts”—a vision that begins with a voter-friendly approach to an office that has significant flexibility when it comes to making it easier to cast ballots and have them counted. She also wants to be an advocate for legislative remedies like automatic voter registration, which will ensure that Ohioans “are added to the rolls when they do everyday things like get a driver’s license, seek disability services, or simply turn 18.”

That isn’t a radical proposal. Progressive Democrats in the nation’s statehouses—led by Oregon Governor Kate Brown, a former Democratic secretary of state—are already implementing pro-democracy reforms. And serious contenders for the secretary position, such as Jocelyn Benson in Michigan and Jena Griswold in Colorado, are campaigning as voting-rights champions with ambitious agendas for increasing turnout. Griswold is challenging a GOP incumbent who cooperated with Trump’s bogus (and now-defunct) Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity; she says she’s running “to increase campaign-finance transparency, secure our elections, and protect voting rights.” In so doing, she can also stand up for democracy at a time when the Supreme Court has failed to do so.
Podemos, or “We Can,” emerged in 2014 out of the 15-M movement, the Spanish precursor of Occupy Wall Street. Led by political scientist Pablo Iglesias, Podemos has campaigned against austerity and corruption. This year, the so-called Gürtel case has grown into one of the biggest scandals in recent Spanish history, leading to the ouster of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. In May, Spain’s highest criminal court found dozens of people—many from the ruling conservative Popular Party—guilty of fraud, money laundering, and illegal kickbacks. I spoke with Iglesias, Podemos’s secretary general, about Spanish politics and global capitalism.

WW: Where does Podemos go from here now that Rajoy has been ousted?

PI: Our first step was to remove Rajoy from government; he was an obstruction that made it impossible to initiate change. But we are not naïve—the road ahead will be full of obstacles. We know that PSOE [the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party] has created policies that undermine our welfare state. We know that they have implemented labor reforms to remove worker protections. PSOE have demonstrated that they are capable of aligning themselves with the right to enact constitutional changes overnight in order to auction off our sovereignty. We know this, but this will not dampen our efforts in this historic moment. The no-confidence vote was a no to Rajoy, a no to corruption, a no to privatization, a no to parasitic institutions, but, above all, it is a yes to democracy and hope.

WW: As leader of Podemos, what do you see as the leading threats to the security and stability of Spain?

PI: The primary menace is inequality, which has surged under the policies of austerity imposed by the European Union. Spain has suffered a profound socioeconomic crisis, which has led us to our current political crisis. This is because the elite want to codify a social model based on the ongoing impoverishment of the majority of the Spanish people. Spain needs new national agreements to strengthen our democracy and meet the challenges of the crises in which we are immersed.

WW: How should the European left engage with transnational social movements to stop the rise of authoritarian regimes such as Viktor Orbán’s and Donald Trump’s?

PI: The question should be how long will the EU continue to undermine the creation of a genuine project to defend the interests of the region, one dedicated to strengthening democracy. We need another EU that will stand in solidarity and defend democracy, an EU that will not allow itself to be dragged around by the offensive policies of the United States, an EU that asserts its own leadership. The victory of Trump, the tone-deafness of the Democratic Party that refused to listen to the message of the Bernie Sanders movement, the long shadow of the financial crisis of 2007—these all signal to us the urgency of creating an alternative to the neoliberal policies of globalization, the urgency of working together with social movements that center sustainability and democratization, which is the complete antithesis of the authoritarianism of Trump.

WW: How should the left confront global capital?

PI: We have witnessed the inspiring rise of mass movements around the world demonstrating against capitalism and against a financial sector that has positioned itself as the enemy of human aspiration. Finance is against democracy; it is against the people and the environment. Our political experience is, in great part, a reflection of that. It is within the women’s movement that we can see the tip of the spear capable of thwarting the plans of the elites. In this moment, women have taken the reins of progressive, citizen-led democratic movements. It is within the women’s movement that we can see the tip of the spear capable of thwarting the plans of the elites. We must expand the arenas in which people can control their own lives and deliberate over our shared experiences. It is the only way we will be able to stop the destructive course set by the few who have accumulated too much power and capital.

When we have true equality and greater democracy, we will be able to confront the despotic power of corporations, transition away from an economy based on fossil fuels, and guarantee a sustainable economy that will ensure the survival of future life on this planet.

—Maricela Sanchez assisted with the translation.
T he media have recently awakened to the phenomenon, often discussed in this column, that mainstream American Jewish culture and mainstream Israeli culture are in the process of permanently parting ways. It is particularly poignant to see this realization occur in the wake of the recent passing of American Jewry’s greatest literary explicator and challenger, Philip Roth.

A recent American Jewish Committee survey tells us, as William Galston put it in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, that Israel is a red state and American Jewry a blue state. They hated Obama and love Trump; we, the opposite. They want to keep their settlements and occupy the West Bank forever, democracy be damned; we’re still democrats. They are unbothered by the horrors of what’s happening in Gaza; we are troubled. They let fundamentalist rabbis tell them whom they can marry, who can be buried where, and even who is and who is not a real Jew; we say “feh” to all that.

The Israelis believe that liberal, secular American Jews are disappearing, to be replaced by politically conservative Orthodox Jews. And according to the rough projections of scholars Ediel Pinker and Steven M. Cohen, in 40 years, Orthodox will indeed outnumber Reform and Conservative Jews combined. By the end of the century, given current birthrates, they could outnumber all American Jews, period.

Roth’s life tracked the golden age of secular American Jewry. Growing up in the shadow of World War II, he was able to effortlessly marry his patriotism to his Jewishness, not through jingoism but through baseball. As he explained back in 1973:

[B]aseball was a kind of sacred church that reached into every class and region of the nation and bound us together in common concerns, loyalties, rituals, enthusiasms, and antagonisms. The war that began when I was eight had thrust the country into what seemed to a child—and not only to a child—a struggle to the death (“unconditional surrender”) between Good and Evil. Fraught with perilous, unthinkable possibilities, it inevitably nourished a patriotism grounded in moral virtuousness and bloody-minded hate, the patriotism that fixes a bayonet to a Bible. It seems to me that through baseball I came to understand and experience patriotism in its tender and humane aspects, lyrical rather than martial or righteous in spirit, and without the veer of saintly zeal, a patriotism that could not quite so easily be sloganized, or contained in a high-sounding formula to which one had to pledge something vague but all-encompassing called one’s “allegiance.”

Coming of age in the aftermath of the Holocaust and (therefore) the near disappearance of socially acceptable anti-Semitism, Roth’s generation of Jews were freer and safer than any Jews in history—free to make their own lives as they wished and to negotiate their own relationship to their religion and its people. American Jews grew more self-confident, making their mark in places that had previously been closed off to them. Nowhere was this truer than in the world of culture. Arthur Miller’s 1949 Death of a Salesman is still the most representative American play of the past century. Saul Bellow broke open barriers four years later when his Augie March declared, “I am an American, Chicago born.” Augie was Jewish. So too, Arthur Miller would eventually admit, was Willy Loman. But they were Jews without religion and with a fierce American sense of limitless possibility. Roth, who frequently credited Bellow with liberating him as a writer, burrowed deep into the Jewish psyche, fusing it with an unqueenchable libido and a stiff-necked refusal to let anyone tell him who he should be and what he should write. As his friend the Israeli novelist Aharon Appelfeld would observe, “Roth’s Jews are Jews without Judaism.”

Roth’s revolution was to show Jews acting as badly as Christians did when it came to lying, adultery, and communal closed-mindedness.
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Bill Miller is an accredited journalist at the UN for the Washington International and has written extensively on UN issues. He is the Principal of Miller and Associates International Media Consultants, which created the Global Connection Television concept.

Bill developed an interest in international issues and the UN when he served as a US Peace Corps volunteer in the Dominican Republic. In his first year he worked as a community developer in a remote rural area; his second year he was Professor of Social Work at the Madre y Maestra University in Santiago, the country’s second largest city.

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(1969), he is clearly thrilled by it, but, while the fascination remains, his view of Israel gets darker. *Operation Shylock* (1993) is Roth’s most underrated book and a masterpiece regarding Israeli/American Jewish relations. In a remarkable scene in the epilogue, a retired Mossad agent meets “Philip Roth”—one of two in the novel—inside “a Jewish food store on Amsterdam Avenue” that is clearly Barney Greengrass, the smoked-fish restaurant that Upper West Side Jews sometimes invest with religious significance. Roth writes of “the bitter fragrance of vinegar, of onions, of whitefish and red herring” as lovingly as the scribes did of Jerusalem 2,000 years ago. The Mossad agent, who has accused himself earlier in the novel of criminality and brutality toward the Palestinians, is demanding that “Roth” alter the text of a book he is about to publish to protect Israel’s secret spy operations. He explains that “Diaspora Jews constitute a pool of foreign nationals” who often undertake dangerous and distasteful tasks for Israel. “They find their compensation, all of it, in having fulfilled a Jewish duty.”

“Roth” admires this man; he almost loves him. The Mossad agent represents “what ‘Jew’ is to me, the best of it to me. Worldly negativity. Seductive verbosity. Intellectual venery. The hatred. The lying. The distrust. The this-worldliness. The truthfulness. The intelligence. The malice. The comedy. The endurance. The acting. The injury. The impairment.” But “Roth” never stops sparring with the agent. He is his own man fulfilling his own Jewish destiny, not Israel’s. His is what is often called “lox and bagels” Judaism, one of memory, family, and friendship. But these qualities turn out not to be strong enough to sustain, much less reproduce themselves in, a new generation of secular Jews. Israel, moreover, has become an alien country, supported by a hateful American president who cozies up to anti-Semites and neo-Nazis.

The past is now truly the past; it died with our greatest novelist. Philip Roth insisted that he be buried with no religious trappings whatever. May his memory be a blessing.

**OBAMA ENVY**
(Or, *Why Isn’t Orange the New Black?)

How great am I? As great as one can be. So why do they admire him, not me? The phony press keeps saying he’s got class, implying I’m a blimp-like bag of gas. They say he’s eloquent and dryly funny—Although, in fact, I’ve got a lot more money. I’ve tried to sign his legacy away. Why can’t they see his feet are made of clay? Why is it that affection for him lingers while they feel free to ridicule my fingers? Why can’t they recognize that I’m their ruler? They say he’s cool. Believe me, I am cooler. They’re on his side whatever they compare. No fair! No fair! No fair! No fair! No fair!
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Climate of Change

Our climate is changing, and our approaches to politics and activism have to change with it. That’s why The Nation, in partnership with the Food and Environment Reporting Network, is launching “Taking Heat,” a series of dispatches from the front lines of the climate-justice movement, by journalist Audrea Lim. In “Taking Heat,” Lim will explore the ways in which the communities that stand to lose the most from climate change are also becoming leaders in the climate resistance. From the tomato fields of Florida to the tar sands of Canada, from the streets of Los Angeles to Kentucky’s coal country, communities are coming together to fight for a just transition to a greener and more equitable economy. At a time when extreme-weather events and climate-policy impasse are dominating environmental news, “Taking Heat” will focus on the intersection of climate change and other social and political issues, showcasing the ingenious and inventive ways that people are already reworking our economy and society. The first article digs into how Puerto Rico’s agroecology brigades are creating a model for sustainable farming after Hurricane Maria. You can find it at TheNation.com/TakingHeat, and be sure to check for new articles every few weeks.

Blood, Soil, and Trauma

America’s fraught history of family separation.

As recently as last year, Republican Congressman Steve King was considered an outlier when he opined that “we can’t restore our civilization with someone else’s babies.” Now the Trump administration has endorsed this politics of blood and soil, full bore.

“They’re not innocent,” says our president of children torn from their parents at the border. “These aren’t people” is how he describes adolescents about whom he knows nothing but their nationality. Immigrants “are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s never happened before,” Trump adds. Their children will be put in “foster care or whatever,” according to the White House chief of staff, Gen. John Kelly.

Those children may come from abroad, but they are our babies. They represent the legacy of American policies that go back decades. After all, it was the United States that financed the infamous US Army School of the Americas and trained genocidal warlords, such as Efrain Rios Montt, who went on to destabilize all of Central America. If countries like Guatemala and Honduras have fallen into chaos since the 1980s, it’s partly because those wars took a toll on their social structures: the trauma of families wiped out and entire villages disappeared. The refugees at our southern border are part of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people still seeking safety from US-financed violence.

War is one way to kill children; putting them in concentration camps is another. “Casa Padre” is where some of these children have been taken. Once a Walmart in Brownsville, Texas, the building has been converted to house nearly 1,500 boys under the age of 18. In the hallway is a huge graffiti of Donald Trump’s head, oddly disembodied, looming larger than a miniscule image of the White House, above which he floats, godlike, in the sky. The mural includes a quote from The Art of the Deal: “Sometimes by losing a battle you find a new way to win the war.”

Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III has tried to wrap this barbarity in the sheep’s clothing of not just law but God’s law, invoking the Pauline Epistle of Romans 13. Sessions, whose very name summons two of the most notorious slaveholders of the Confederacy, uses a feint common in the antebellum South: It is God’s law, divine will, the “natural” order of things—not a policy dreamed up by President Trump and enacted at his command—that compels US government agents to treat immigrants like inventory.

Over decades, slavery hardened Americans to the tears, plea, terror, and grief of a trade that put human beings on the auction block, took babies from their mothers and sold them to strangers. That system relied on rationalizations we encounter still: Certain classes of human beings are not “really” human; they do not feel pain to the same degree as “more civilized” classes; these “others” are incorrigibly predisposed to prevarication (or “acting,” as Ann Coulter recently dismissed the images of bereft toddlers). Above all, “they” are always kept at a distance. This “they”—making obliterates due process, equal protection, and individual justice. It justifies racial and ethnic profiling, and punishes people in the plural.

We fail to recall America’s dark history at our peril. After the Civil War, juvenile-reform policies encouraged the removal of children from people deemed unfit, “feeble-minded,” “promiscuous,” or epileptic. These parents were disproportionately Irish immigrants, people of color, or unmarried women. During the first part of the 20th century, policymakers championed not only the removal of “defective” black children from their equally “defective” parents, but also the confinement of those children in adult prisons. Until recently, states sterilized thousands of women—and some men—for reasons that included ridding their tax rolls of the undeserving poor. Today, our government has grown indifferent to the cruelties of the so-called school-to-prison pipeline, arresting kindergartners and routinely sentencing very young teenagers as adults.

The legacies of these policies are all around us. Still, our government argues that the delib-
erate separation of parents and children will serve as a disincentive to others seeking to cross the border. That alone is a crime against humanity. The United States is the only member of the United Nations that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child—a text worth reading for anyone who wonders why the world has condemned the Trump administration in recent weeks. Moreover, the construction of detention camps has been outsourced to profiteers who have snatched babies away so carelessly that their identities have been lost in the shuffle.

We know that children subjected to this kind of trauma suffer catastrophic damage to the very architecture of their brains. Children who were abandoned in Romanian orphanages, for example, were found to have grown up with less cerebral white and gray matter than their peers raised by parents. Or look at our own foster-care system: it is deeply scarring, even when children are separated from their families to protect them from danger. Forty to 50 percent of children who age out of foster care become homeless within 18 months. And fully half of the nation’s homeless population were foster children at some point.

We understand all of these things, and yet we are not supposed to scrutinize this manufactured tragedy as it unfolds. The camps are off-limits to the public. Even members of Congress have been denied entry without two weeks’ notice—and the locations of many of the detention centers have been withheld, making them hard to inspect or hold accountable. We go about our daily business, not looking because we do not want to know. We pass the abandoned Walmart, this parking lot for disposable despair, this factory for future fury. And we quarantine this all-American banality of evil as the problem of “someone else’s babies,” whose torture we disown.

SNAPSHOT / CLODAGH KILCOYNE

Covert Catch

Rohingya refugees crew a fishing boat in the Bay of Bengal near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where about 900,000 refugees now reside. Although they cannot work legally, some earn a small income and an occasional share of the catch as under-the-radar fishermen.

War is one way to kill children; putting them in concentration camps is another.
WHY WE NEED A BIGGER DEBATE

We seek to instigate a new call to action on foreign policy.

KATRINA VANDEN HEUVEL
A RECKONING WITH AMERICA’S FAILED NATIONAL-SECURITY POLICY is long overdue. Donald Trump’s reckless machinations are destructive, but so too is the bipartisan establishment consensus that has defined our role in the world for decades and remains remarkably unshaken, despite its evident bankruptcy.

Our calamitous misadventures in the Middle East and the global financial collapse of 2008 dramatically exposed the failures of this consensus. Yet while citizen movements have begun to transform domestic politics, they have been virtually invisible when it comes to foreign policy. This special issue of The Nation challenges what has been a remarkably narrow debate in this area. Without pretending to offer a grand strategy, it provides alternative perspectives, grounded in values widely shared by the American people. We seek to instigate not only a more open debate, but a new call to action.

Trump’s impulsive belligerence seems centered on his determination to tear down all things Obama. He has abandoned the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal. He has shut down the opening to Cuba and moved the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. He seems intent on shattering transatlantic cooperation. In doing so, he has managed to resuscitate the reputations of certain of his predecessors—even that of the ruinous George W. Bush—as well as the crackpot realism of our national-security mandarins.

One widely touted hope is that, after Trump, the United States might return to its previous role as “the indispensable nation.” We should not fall for it. Our national-security policies failed Americans long before Trump announced his run for president in 2015. As Andrew Bacevich argues in this issue, the failures are particularly manifest in our wars without end, exemplified by the debacle in Afghanistan, now in its 17th year. The Global War on Terror generates more terrorists than it kills, and yet US Special Operations Forces have been dispatched to an astonishing 133 countries over the past year—that’s 68 percent of the nations on earth. The official National Security Strategy statements of the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all committed the United States to maintaining a military so powerful that it cannot be challenged anywhere. The most recent NSS statement declares that “revisionist nations” (Russia and China), not terrorists, are now the major threat to our national security. But in declaring our intention to confront both Russia and China, we are likely to foster an alliance between them that cannot be in our interest. We have also embarked on a renewed nuclear-arms race—mostly with ourselves.

The steady militarization of US foreign policy has hampered our ability to address real security concerns that are threatening not just our own people but the entire planet, from catastrophic climate change to a global economy rigged to foster extreme inequality, which corrupts democracy here and abroad. Our bloated military budget already constitutes over one-third of the entire world’s military spending, even as vital domestic imperatives are starved for funds. Seldom has the need for a new course been more apparent.
Toward Common-Sense Security

What would an alternative foreign policy entail? We reject the notion that the United States is faced with a choice between isolationism and the old elite consensus. Progressive reform would begin by discarding the notion that America is uniquely permitted to use force. We should recognize that, while we are a global superpower, it is in the US interest to defend international law. We can best bolster our security by respecting the law, not holding ourselves above it.

We must also roll back our failed interventions. Limiting the US military role will require more, not less, international cooperation as well as far more active diplomacy. New regional balances of power will inevitably be forged, but they need not pose a threat to American interests.

We must also ground our policy on a more realistic view of the challenges we face. The widespread campaign to portray Russia as a menacing global threat is wrongheaded. For all his bluster, Vladimir Putin is now cutting the Russian military budget. His policies, no doubt, express Russian resentments fed by provocative US actions after the end of the Cold War, which included extending NATO to Russia’s borders, in violation of promises made by the administration of President George H.W. Bush; ignoring Russian warnings against trying to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into NATO; and helping to inflict on Russia the shock-therapy economic policy of the 1990s, which created and enriched the Russian oligarchs, impoverished millions, and looted the country’s treasury. We should seek to reengage Russia, a necessary partner in key areas, and revive efforts to limit the nuclear-arms race and reduce tensions on Russia’s borders. Moreover, a renewed Cold War narrows the space for democratic forces and strengthens the hand of a repressive state and the influence of nationalist voices—on both sides.

China, on the other hand, is an emerging global power, a mercantilist dictatorship that has had remarkable success in lifting its people out of poverty. Its leaders seek to extend their economic influence as they consolidate China’s leadership position in emerging technologies and markets. Trump has abandoned the strategic neoliberalism of his predecessors, replacing the Trans-Pacific Partnership with threats of a trade war against China, while gearing up the US military presence in the South China Sea.

But it is not in the US interest—nor do we have the resources—to dominate a modern Chinese military on that country’s borders. Our allies and the other nations in Asia have reasons of their own to counter growing Chinese power, and they would be better equipped to do so if they could rely on consistent US diplomatic support rather than militarism and bluster. While China’s growth has been impressive, there are serious questions about its structural imbalances and its strength moving forward, as Walden Bello discusses in this issue. Washington should prepare for the problems posed by China’s weakness rather than those potentially caused by its growing assertiveness.

The transformation of America’s global economic strategy is essential to any effective security project. The neoliberal approach—the so-called Washington Consensus—has generated rising inequality and faces increasing resistance, both domestic and international. As James Galbraith argues, to create an economy that works for working people, we need to transform that model here and abroad.

If we were to free ourselves from endless war, the United States would be better able to focus on real security imperatives, chief among them the growing destructiveness of climate change. As Bill McKibben argues, rather than scorning the Paris climate accord, we should be working with other nations on a much faster transition to an economy free of fossil fuels. Business as usual is not just a threat to our national security; it’s a threat to our very existence.

America’s security would be far better served if, instead of acting as the military cop on the global beat, we helped to mobilize and partner with allies in humanitarian operations. Globalization and climate change are generating severe dislocations and the spread of more diseases. International cooperation has brought remarkable successes in this area, and when the United States has been involved, our efforts have not only strengthened our alliances, but protected Americans from the disruptions posed by massive refugee movements and deadly plagues.

Our security is best served when we provide a model for the values we champion. We should focus, therefore, on strengthening our democracy and economy at home. The greatest threat comes not from interventions by Russia or other foreign actors, but rather from the flood of dark money into our elections, the cynical efforts to suppress votes, and the gerrymandering of electoral districts. China’s mercantilist policies have run up record trade deficits that have surely undermined US wages. Yet it was not their policies, but ours—engineered by multinationals corporations and banks that rigged the economy for their own profit—that allowed this to happen.

Sensible reforms like these already enjoy broad support among the American people, as Stephen Miles details in this issue, which was co-edited by longtime Nation contributing editor Robert Borosage. Americans respect our soldiers and want a robust military, but they have no desire to police the world. The country elected its last two presidents—one Democratic and one Republican—in part because they promised to focus on rebuilding America at home. Their failure to live up to those promises reflects the influence of the military-industrial-academic complex, and an elite national-security establishment, that remain wedded to permanent war and global surveillance.

While congressional leaders like Bernie Sanders, Barbara Lee, and Ro Khanna—all of them contributors to this issue—have begun to challenge our current policies, many other key Democrats have been AWOL for too long in this debate. Leaders who lay out a foreign policy of restraint and progressive realism will find a receptive public, but we can’t afford to wait. This country desperately needs a fierce and energetic citizen intervention—a movement that demands both a reckoning and a change in course.
JUST WEEKS BEFORE SCUTTLING THE SO-CALLED IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL AND unveiling plans to get tough with the Islamic Republic, President Trump tallied up the cumulative financial costs of the enterprise once known as the Global War on Terrorism. He put the tab at $7 trillion. “Seven trillion dollars over a 17-year period,” Trump lamented, and “we have nothing—nothing except death and destruction. It’s a horrible thing.”

As a summary assessment of US policy since 9/11, this certainly represents a remarkable admission. If the sitting commander in chief thinks that US military exertions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere have achieved “nothing except death and destruction,” then surely the time must be ripe to undertake a fundamental reassessment of US national-security policy in those parts of the Islamic world.

Imagine Herbert Hoover in 1930 taking to the radio to announce: “Fellow citizens, my plans for ending the Depression just aren’t working. We’ve got a real mess on our hands.” Or Jimmy Carter conceding on national television in 1980: “This Iran hostage crisis has me completely buffalowed.” In either case, the disclosure would have prompted a lively discussion of policy alternatives.

Not so in the present instance, however. Instead, we get pedantic fact-checking. Writing in The Washington Post, Amanda Erickson derided Trump’s $7 trillion figure as “flat wrong.” The true number, she insisted, is closer to $1.8 trillion, or maybe $3.6 trillion, or $4–6 trillion, tops. But not the $7 trillion figure repeatedly cited by our dissembling and/or clueless president. Gotcha again, Trump!

I submit that Erickson is missing the larger truth that our president, no doubt going off script, has somehow managed to divine. She is hardly alone in that regard. Agenda-setting outlets like the Post and The New York Times, along with political elites more generally, today manifest a studied indifference to endless war, not all that dissimilar from the National Rifle Association’s indifference to mass shootings. The NRA adheres to a settled interpretation of the Second Amendment and will not budge from its terms, no matter how much blood gets spilled. Members of the Washington national-security apparatus—including anyone angling for a job involving regular visits to the Oval Office—likewise have arrived at a settled interpretation on how to deal with the afflictions besetting much of the Greater Middle East. And they won’t budge from its terms no matter how much blood gets spilled. As a result, the contours of basic policy evade critical examination, and American wars continue as if on autopilot.

The circumstances permitting this mindless under-taking to persist are so well-known that they hardly bear repeating. They include a brain-dead policy elite; a military system that insulates the vast majority of Americans from sacrifice; a cynical decision to saddle future generations with the responsibility to pay for today’s wars while the present generation enjoys tax cuts; congressional abdication of its constitutionally assigned war powers, compounded by more than a few members of the House and Senate being deeply in hock to the military-industrial complex; the hiring of what Tom Engelhardt has dubbed “warrior corporations”—profit-minded contractors, proxies, and mercenaries—effectively hiding the magnitude of war from American view; the absorption of available political energy by eminently worthy causes—the anti-Trump resistance and #MeToo offer examples—that inadvertently consign war to the margins; and finally, divisions within the feeble anti-war camp, one wing leaning left, the other leaning right, with neither willing to make common cause on matters where their views coincide.
N E E D E D :  A  N E W  F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y

Of course, underlying these is the enduring conceit, regularly celebrated in Washington, that Providence summons the United States to exercise global leadership now and forever, with that leadership expressed primarily through threatened or real military action. All of these together create a layered and interlocking defense that insulates the militarized status quo from challenge.

Even so, the profound American disregard for actual policy outcomes remains something of a puzzle. After all, at some level we see ourselves as a pragmatic people, preferring what works to what doesn’t. Yet as far as our wars are concerned, the gap between declared intentions and the results achieved continues to grow from one year to the next, while political elites, for the most part, pretend not to notice. Let Afghanistan, a conflict now promising to extend into eternity, serve as the prosecution’s exhibit number one.

Here, I submit, part of the problem lies with Trump himself, widely viewed by members of the intelligentsia as a noxious charlatan. For this very reason, when the president, however inadvertently, utters a self-evident truth—that our post-9/11 wars cost a lot and aren’t working—his endorsement of that truth drains it of significance. It’s akin to an involuntary reflex: If Trump says our wars have achieved nothing, then surely they must have done some good, right?

Yet, however ironically, Trump’s own ascent to the presidency might itself offer a clue about how to extricate ourselves from these “forever wars.” Trump’s election testifies to the number of our fellow citizens who are mightily pissed off and who have lost confidence in Washington’s ability to govern in ways that address the needs of ordinary Americans.

On that score, we should view the election of 2016 as a plebisicite of sorts. As a candidate, Hillary Clinton wanted to discuss policy. In her wonkish way, she offered a plan for just about everything. Trump focused on a single question: Is the country headed in the right direction or not? Answer yes or no.

Almost 63 million Americans voted no. The number increases if we include those who supported the Libertarian or—like me—the Green Party candidate. The tally increases further still if we add the more than 90 million eligible voters who simply stayed home. Together, these voters and nonvoters handed Trump a majority in the Electoral College, and that, as the saying goes, was all she wrote. The rest—James Comey, hacked e-mails, Russian collusion, whatever—is just commentary.

Allow me to suggest that the final vote count signified something much more than a humiliating defeat for Hillary Clinton. It represents a decisive repudiation of both major parties—not only a Republican establishment that would have preferred just anyone to Trump, but also a sclerotic Democratic establishment unable to identify a candidate or devise a message capable of defeating an adversary spectacularly ill-suited for the office that he was seeking.

Trump did not earn the votes of the 63 million who cast their ballot for him. Instead, the Republican and Democratic establishments had earned the contempt of the electorate several times over, not least by their blind perpetuation of war, year after year, without even the pretense of accountability. The final outcome of the election was a great “fuck you” directed at the individuals and institutions that represent these party establish-

ments in the eyes of the larger public.

Yet allow me to suggest that all these disenchanted millions are essential to solving a problem that they have thus far mostly helped to create. To write them off as cretins or bigots or crypto-fascists is to make a huge mistake (even if Trumplandia offers sanctuary to more than a few of each). For anyone disturbed by the militaristic trajectory of US policy, the political challenge of the moment is to harness the energy of those 63 million pissed-off Americans—even a fraction of them would suffice—and thereby forge a broad coalition favoring a less bellicose approach to policy.

Education will necessarily precede mobilization, inviting the public to consider possibilities that in Washington remain off-limits even for discussion: that the national security of the United States may not require the stationing of US troops in more than 170 countries around the world, a massive military budget set to exceed $700 billion in the next fiscal year, or the continuous dropping of ordnance on targets in distant lands of marginal or nonexistent relevance to our own well-being.

American history offers assurances that this model of educating, and then mobilizing, is indeed feasible. Nineteenth-century abolitionists campaigned to make slavery morally untenable—and prevailed. Early 20th-century Progressives like Jane Addams and Samuel Gompers made it impossible to ignore the plight of the American working class. In the 1920s, “wets” robbed Prohibition of its legitimacy and forced its eventual repeal. None of this happened overnight, but in each instance intelligently crafted and focused agitation brought Americans (not all, but enough) to the realization that slavery is indeed immoral, that exploiting workers is unjust, and that amending the Constitution to outlaw liquor is plainly stupid.

What we require today is intelligently crafted and focused agitation that will bring patriotic Americans—not excluding Trump voters—to the realization that our present-day penchant for war is morally dubious, deeply unfair in its imposition of sacrifice, and just plain stupid. Of course, the issue goes beyond war to encompass other aspects of American life that are likewise immoral, unfair, and stupid. The problem, in short, has multiple dimensions.

Where can we turn for guidance? In 1967, while decrying “the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism,” Martin Luther King Jr. articulated themes that can serve us well today (even if some might add a couple of additional isms). “We must rapidly begin the shift from a ‘thing-oriented’ society to a ‘person-oriented’ society,” Dr. King insisted. “When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people,” he continued, “we’re in big trouble. So we are today, and the fault is by no means exclusively Trump’s.

The people who voted for Trump are not the enemy; they are wayward members of a flock that believes itself to have been roundly abused and neglected. Who will step forth to serve as their shepherd and invite them to return to the fold?

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The principal driver of global inequality—both within and between countries—is the global financial regime. This has been a feature since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, with recurrent catastrophic effects following the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, including the collapse of the socialist nations and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Back then, it was a conservative stroke of genius to institutionalize “market exchange rates” on a global scale. Those markets work well enough for rich nations, but they guarantee problems for everyone else. Each exchange crisis has wiped out a decade or more of progress against inequality, as anyone in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, or much of Africa will tell you. The rise of China, on the other hand, has everything to do with its refusal to play the game of open capital markets. And while inequality in China rose rapidly for internal reasons beginning in the 1990s, it stabilized more than a decade ago.

Global inequality is a security risk—and not just because it breeds resentment, violence, and mass migrations. It also makes the entire system prone to collapse. For over 40 years, the United States has enjoyed the advantage of issuing the world’s reserve currency, running a trade deficit, and living well off the work of others. But the respect that would be due to exercising that role responsibly has been squandered by our behavior.

Reckless interventions have demonstrated the limits of military power—as our professional soldiers can attest, and as the current state of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate. A self-centered economic strategy is only a bit more subtle. Yes, even when a financial crisis originates in the United States, as happened with the subprime-mortgage debacle of 2007–09, funds still flow to the safety of the US dollar and government bonds. So long as this pattern holds, the United States actually benefits from economic insecurity and instability, both at home and abroad. But you have to be very optimistic—or flat-out crazy—to think that this can go on indefinitely.

Controlling inequality—like controlling blood pressure—is good for your economic health. Economies with less inequality generally have lower unemployment and stronger productivity growth, and some researchers also claim better human health and social cohesion. In terms of the rest of the world, the peculiar organization of the United States into a boom/bust economy based on finance and high technology is the exception rather than the rule: We combine record-breaking inequality with low unemployment. But this is a formula that generates massive instability, as well as the resentments that gave us President Trump. Countries with stronger stabilizing institutions built on the principle of countervailing power may be less rich over the short term, but they are better-governed and built to last.

Our long-term safety and prosperity will therefore depend on creating a more just and stable world banking and monetary system. We can either get to work on this ourselves, or accept that other large countries and blocs will take up the task, creating regional alliances that will restructure global trade and finance—as is already beginning to happen. If we are not part of a common process, then ultimately we will be cut out and cut back. No one should think that a policy of provoking and destabilizing Russia, China, and Iran is going to work for us, over the long or even the medium run. No one should think that Europe and Japan will stay US economic allies forever if their interests dictate otherwise. No one should imagine that military power provides enduring safety in a world of multiple major powers with their own resources, technologies, and ideas.

Extreme inequality creates worldwide disorder. Here are the first steps to fundamental change.

JAMES K. GALBRAITH
In the United States, the key driver of inequality is capital-asset prices. This is because in a capitalist nation, capitalists and not workers own such assets and get their income from dividends, interest, stock options, and capital gains. Capitalist booms yield prosperity—often a wasteful prosperity—along with instability; as the bankers say, it’s not the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stop. Concentrated ownership of capital assets is therefore a central issue. Spreading the wealth sensibly over time means more public investment at every level and more investment by nonprofits with longer time horizons and sensible social objectives. It means fostering cooperatives and other stabilizing private economic forms that are not dependent on Wall Street. Instead of boosting the economic growth rate—a measure largely disconnected from social well-being—we should have a strategy to live better: more sustainably, more equally, with less waste and more common spaces, more public goods and enjoyments.

A first step toward that goal is to break up the big banks. Small-banks mean smaller bankers, loans to smaller businesses, and decentralized decision-making; it means more employment and bank organizations on a scale that can be supervised effectively by regulators. Public banks should be part of this mix, as should cooperative and mutual financial institutions. Mediating the entire economic organization of the country through a handful of mega-banks has been tried. It did not work out. And not incidentally, if the Democratic Party had taken a hard line on the big banks back in 2009, it might not be the wreck that it is today.

New technologies also concentrate capital values, and this cannot really be stopped. Nor can all those riches be taxed away in real time, though the country will survive a handful of young billionaires at any given time. What can be stopped is the transmission of excess wealth down through the generations, with the ensuing creation of political dynasties. This is the function of the estate and gift tax! It should be applied with far more rigor, especially against big fortunes. And the dodge of putting vast wealth into charitable giving is seen as a mere afterthought, for anyone who wants to run for president.

When we talk about “security” in magazines, we usually mean something to do with armies and guns and foreign policy. The Pentagon has actually been the one arm of traditional conservative power in America willing to at least lay out the facts of our climate peril, and ranking officers have become ever more outspoken: In 2013, the head of US forces in the Pacific, Adm. Samuel Locklear III, told a reporter that, although he was in charge of dealing with the threats from North Korea and China, the
ble foundations should be weakened by the timely separation of the donor from control and by more rapid payouts. Foundations should not be playthings of the rich, nor should they become eternal independent powers unto themselves.

The fundamental uncounted wealth of middle-class America is our social-insurance system: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, disability insurance, unemployment insurance, deposit insurance, and mortgage guarantees. Along with the income tax and the earned-income tax credit, this system stabilized the economy after the great financial crisis of 2007–09 and also mitigated the rise in post-tax inequality for many lower-income Americans. The system is messy, but it works. That is why the elites hate it. It should be strengthened, not weakened, by the kind of measures proposed by Senator Bernie Sanders: expanding Social Security; passing Medicare for All and a $15-an-hour federal minimum wage; providing tuition-free public universities, foreclosure protections, and a jobs guarantee. The Sanders program builds proudly on what is already there, and that is why it's politically potent.

The US government, in short, needs to break away from the grip of concentrated financial power and from the illusions of dominance that come with feeling exceptional, invincible, and rich. Financial power has an interest in instability at home and abroad. It has an interest in seeking to dominate what can no longer be dominated. It is therefore a vector for depredation and for conflict, neither of which we can afford—especially in an era of existential risks to the environment, through climate change, and to the future of life on the planet, through nuclear war.

Ultimately, therefore, this is a political struggle. “Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power,” notes Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*. And Thomas Hobbes was right; anyone who observes the US political scene knows this, as does anyone who participates in American politics. In the end, inequality—both in the United States and around the world—is a problem that can only have a political solution.

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Bill McKibben is the co-founder of 350.org, the largest global grassroots-organizing campaign on climate change.
that it was selling its fossil-fuel stocks from pension funds, it sent a nice jolt into the centers of market power, reminding them that the death spiral for oil and gas is under way. Washington needs to end the subsidies that have long enriched the hydrocarbon industry, and one good way to achieve that is for more candidates to join the more than 500 who have already pledged not to accept a penny from oil, gas, or coal companies. (The Democratic National Committee has vowed to do likewise.)

One problem in this distracted age is that, while climate change is the most important thing happening on our planet, there’s almost never a day when it’s the most dramatic story. So a commitment to climate justice needs to be a central and unvarying part of our message, just like racial or gender justice. (They are, of course, deeply allied—looking at Hurricane Maria’s aftermath, it’s not hard to figure out who bears the brunt of catastrophic storms.)

Another problem is that the whole world needs to be moving on climate change. Of all the actions that Trump has taken during his reckless and infantile months in the White House, none will do longer-lasting damage than his abandonment of the Paris climate accord. It’s not that his decision means the conversion to renewable energy won’t continue—“free” is a hard argument to beat, and solar and wind power will eventually spread around the globe. But the momentum that had begun to build at Paris has been hobbled, and the chances of them spreading fast enough to matter are much reduced. We will power the world of the future with renewable energy, but unless we act with great swiftness, it will be a broken world that we power.

So if and when the United States emerges from the Trump era, and if and when progressive politicians really embrace climate change as a core issue in tandem with race, gender, immigration, and inequality, we will have a chance for something new: an activist government whose task, alongside those of China and Europe, will be to help lead in a very different direction the planet that we’ve done the most to pollute. If there’s any reason for a superpower, it’s got everything to do with… power.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the peace movement has seemed moribund. But in the wake of the US-North Korean summit, there are glimmers of hope that something new is stirring, with a focus on the ultimate threat to humankind: the use of nuclear weapons.

This new momentum has been sparked by some of the dark times of the past 17 months. In January 2018, citing growing nuclear risks and unchecked climate dangers, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set its iconic Doomsday Clock 30 seconds closer to midnight, the nearest to the symbolic point of annihilation that the clock has been since 1953, at the height of the Cold War. The world seems

They pose the ultimate threat to humankind; now, a growing number of movements are dedicated to their prohibition.

BETSY TAYLOR
off its axis as new political forces have rekindled old animosities between nuclear rivals. The president’s disastrous decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal has led to new dangers in the Middle East. Trump’s choice of John Bolton as national-security adviser jeopardizes the prospect for enduring peace with North Korea; Bolton was one of the most rabid proponents for the invasion of Iraq and has pushed for regime change in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Meanwhile, the nuclear-armed states are undertaking new weapons programs, and the possibility of stumbling into a calamitous war with North Korea and/or Iran has never been more real. There are nine nuclear-armed states with a combined arsenal of around 15,000 nuclear weapons. Another 59 countries possess nuclear materials and the capacity to create their own weapons programs. Even a small regional nuclear conflict could inflict catastrophic global damage. The probability of lost or stolen nuclear material, the accidental use of nuclear weapons (or terrorists acquiring them), and the threat of full-scale nuclear war all rise each time a new country decides to make weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Last year, President Trump declared that he wanted the US nuclear arsenal to be at the “top of the pack,” asserting preposterously that the US military had fallen behind in its weapons capacity. In his 2018 State of the Union address, Trump again stated his determination to modernize the nation’s nuclear stockpile. His appointments, statements, and actions—combined with the knowledge that the president has sole launch authority for these weapons—have raised global anxieties to a level not seen in a quarter-century. Google searches for “World War III” hit an all-time high in April 2017.

In response, movements for nuclear disarmament around the world are reviving the kind of activism that’s been missing for a very long time. Take Korea: The American media make too little of the role of South Korean President Moon Jae-in and the domestic movements that propelled him into office. Moon did not emerge from a vacuum; he was backed by numerous progressive forces in South Korea. Women Cross DMZ and other Korean women’s groups were part of that electoral muscle. In 2015, on the 70th anniversary of Korea’s division by the Cold War powers, Women Cross DMZ led 30 female peacekeepers from 15 countries, including two Nobel Peace Prize laureates and the American feminist Gloria Steinem, across the Korean Demilitarized Zone. They held peace symposiums in Pyongyang and in Seoul, where hundreds of women discussed the impact of the unresolved Korean conflict on their lives and shared stories of mobilizing in their communities to end violence and war. They walked with 10,000 women on both sides of the DMZ, in the streets of Pyongyang, Kaesong, and Paju, calling for a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War, the reuniting of separated families, and a central role for women’s leadership in the peace process. Women are still pushing with meetings, marches, and political engagement across the Korean Peninsula. Moon’s election was partly a mandate to move forward with a new relationship with North Korea.

Peace movements in the non-nuclear states are on the rise too. In December 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to advance a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear arms. In all, 122 countries have voted in favor of adopting the treaty thus far, and many are on the path to full ratification. On May 17, Vietnam became the 10th nation to ratify it; the treaty requires the ratification of 50 countries before it acquires legal standing. No nuclear state has expressed support for it yet, but the treaty stands as a moral document and is galvanizing peace movements in many countries.

Meanwhile, peace activists are taking a page from the fossil-fuel divestment movement. Don’t Bank on the Bomb identifies corporations that produce key components for nuclear weapons and presses major institutions to divest from them. The Dutch pension fund ABP, the fifth-largest in the world, announced in January that it would divest from all nuclear-weapons producers. Twenty-two major global institutions have already done just that.

Back home in the United States, Beyond the Bomb is a new effort focused on grassroots advocacy to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict. To date, the campaign involves Win Without War and Global Zero, but it aims to enlist a much broader network of groups. The primary focus is to pass emergency legislation that will curtail the president’s sole authority to use nuclear weapons. Few things are more terrifying than Donald Trump’s continual proximity to the so-called nuclear football—a briefcase with codes for launching nuclear missiles. When Trump threatened to rain “fire and fury like the world has never seen” on North Korea, Beyond the Bomb gained momentum. The campaign is also working with others to block the United States’ proposed $1.7 trillion nuclear-weapons modernization program, and to support the adoption of no-first-use declarations as well as increased funding to clean up nuclear contamination in frontline communities.

The current global dynamics of fear, dysfunctional governments, and capitalism run amok are helping to drive the nuclear-arms race. But long-standing groups like Nuclear Watch New Mexico and Tri-Valley Cares, located near nuclear labs and production facilities, are mobilizing with a new intensity against the restarting of industrial-scale plutonium-pit manufacturing. On May 8, the Rev. Dr. William J. Barber II, co-chair of the Poor People’s Campaign, gave a groundbreaking speech in Washington, DC, that was reminiscent of Martin Luther King’s 1967 anti-war speech at Riverside Church in New York City. Barber invoked the moral necessity to resist militarism, the war economy, and nuclear weapons. Iraq Veterans Against the War is speaking forcefully against Trump’s abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal, while Veterans for Peace has condemned the continuing US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Young progressives are linking their concerns about the violence directed against women, immigrants, indigenous communities, and African Americans with their outrage over gun violence, ecological destruction, and US militarism. John Qua, senior campaigner for Beyond the Bomb, observes that “many young people see a seamless connection among these movements,” including the need to address the ultimate form of violence—the use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, many older Americans perceive a unifying theme here: the need to press for and protect a safe future for our children. Together, this incipient network of old and young alike is beginning to challenge government policies that have left us stranded for too long on the brink of nuclear conflict.
Leaders to Watch: Senator Bernie Sanders

A world for all of us, not just the billionaires.

On November 19, 1863, standing on the bloodstained battlefield of Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln declared that “we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

One hundred and fifty-five years later, under an authoritarian-leaning president, a right-wing extremist Congress, and a corrupt campaign-finance system, I fear that Lincoln’s vision is fading, that “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” is beginning to perish in the United States of America. Today, the richest 1 percent of American families own a greater portion of the country’s wealth than the bottom 90 percent. Even more shocking, just three individuals own more wealth than the bottom half. Meanwhile, the incomes of the top earners continue to skyrocket—CEO compensation jumped as much as 937 percent between 1978 and 2016—while most Americans struggle to get by on stagnating wages.

Such extreme inequality not only threatens our economic well-being; it undermines our democracy. Since the Supreme Court’s disastrous Citizens United decision in 2010, billionaires have poured huge amounts of money into the political process. In return, they are getting policies that serve their interests at the expense of working families, the environment, and our national security.

Consider the Koch brothers: After winning huge tax breaks and major rollbacks of environmental regulations, their network of advocacy groups is planning to spend up to $400 million during the 2018 elections to push their conservative policy agenda. Sheldon Adelson, meanwhile, recently cut a $30 million check to the Republicans after his company received a $670 million tax break from the Trump tax plan, and the same week that the Trump administration delivered on two of Adelson’s biggest priorities: withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal and moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. And the Walt Disney Company, which pours millions of dollars into campaigns, has been rewarded with copyright extensions worth billions, all the while paying many of its employees starvation wages.

Quite simply, in the United States today, a handful of billionaires and the corporations they run exercise extraordinary power over our economic, political, and social life. Yet this is not just a domestic issue. It is a global issue, one that reaches across oceans and continents as oligarchy, authoritarianism, and kleptocracy spread from country to country, and democratic institutions fight for their survival.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin—who stands at the center of a tight circle of oligarchs and is believed by many to have great personal wealth—is not only undermining democracy at home but destabilizing countries abroad. In Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern monarchies, a handful of multibillionaire despots exerts enormous influence over global energy policy and, under Trump, over American foreign and military policy. In China, President Xi Jinping has steadily consolidated power around himself and his inner circle as his government clamps down on political freedom and aggressively promotes China’s version of authoritarian capitalism abroad. And Eastern Europe, which suffered horribly from the scourge of fascism, is once again seeing the rise of demagogues like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Germany’s Alexander Gauland, one of the heads of the far-right Alternative for Germany party.

Donald Trump, therefore, should not be seen in isolation. He is part of a global trend, and the oligarchic, authoritarian, kleptocratic tendency he represents should be understood as a symptom of a much broader problem: a small number of extraordinarily wealthy people, motivated by greed and power, who see the global community as their plaything.

These forces have proved adept at capitalizing on the very real concerns that hundreds of millions of people face throughout the world. In many countries, people rightly feel that the establishment has failed them. They are struggling financially, fear for their children’s future, and are grappling with the loss of social and economic status. Rather than address these grievances, however, authoritarians exploit them, creating scapegoats and pitting one group against another.

In order to fight this trend, we need to strengthen the global coalition of progressive democrats. While authoritarians promote division and hatred, we will promote unity, inclusion, and an agenda based on economic, social, racial, and environmental justice. But the first step in winning this fight is to correctly identify the challenge. Internationally, we must have the courage to take on the global oligarchy and bring power to the many, not the few. This world belongs to all of us, not just a handful of billionaires.

Bernie Sanders is a US senator from Vermont.
Today we face a global humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. Almost 66 million people are refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced, or stateless. Conflicts rage from Yemen to Syria to South Sudan. Over the past 15 years, 3.3 billion people—almost half of the world’s population—have been exposed to political violence. And still darker clouds loom on the horizon. By 2050, a total of 1 billion people could be displaced by climate change, while 40 percent of the world’s population could suffer from water shortages. Inequality, population growth, and corruption add to the complexity, with the poorest of the poor increasingly left behind.

The United States has a long bipartisan history of global humanitarian leadership, stewarded by once-shared values. Yet this tradition is under threat. Even during the vaunted days of the Obama administration, the US government denied families their right to asylum and supplied weapons that helped to fuel conflicts overseas. Now the Trump administration is dragging the country even further from our humanitarian values—separating parents from their children at our southern border, boycotting meetings on the global refugee crisis, and requesting multibillion-dollar cuts to foreign aid.

The United States cannot turn its back on its global humanitarian commitments, and the American people must push back against efforts to do so. This is a moral imperative, but it is also a practical one: Our humanitarian leadership serves vital US interests, not only protecting our own people from the dangers of pandemics or the disruptions of mass refugee movements, but also advancing the United States’ moral authority in the world.

Rather than continue along our current path of retreat, we need to embrace a new humanitarian grand strategy—one that reasserts our global moral leadership and refocuses multiple foreign-policy tools on anticipating the humanitarian crises in decades to come. This new strategy should focus on three ideas.

First, we need a proactive policy for peace. Ten years ago, 80 percent of international humanitarian assistance went to the survivors of natural disasters—floods, droughts, and hurricanes. Today, violent conflict is the primary driver of humanitarian need, with more than 90 percent of all global assistance going to crises fueled by this cause. Conflict is also draining the global economy (in 2014, the economic impact of violence on the global economy was estimated at $14.3 trillion), while stoking our nation’s immigration pressures.

Despite these trends, the United States has invested little in peace building and conflict prevention relative to its other overseas spending. As one example, Congress had to fight to preserve $39 billion for the State Department and the Agency for International Development in next year’s budget, while it is poised to authorize $716 billion for the military.

It is time to reverse these priorities and create an overarching strategy of violence reduction and conflict prevention. Such a strategy would begin with rebuilding our diplomatic corps and dedicating the full force of our global influence toward conflict resolution, de-escalation, and prevention. Today’s most destructive humanitarian crises are political—think Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo—and can only be resolved through politics and diplomacy. A seasoned staff of devoted diplomats working to negotiate cessations of conflict under a mandate to restore global stability is the only known solution for ending today’s major wars.

In parallel, the United States should launch a new foreign-assistance initiative dedicated to reducing global levels of violence and preventing violent conflict through nonmilitary means. Fortunately, a bipartisan framework for such an initiative is already in motion: HR 5273, the Global Fragility and Violence Reduction Act of 2018. Following in the footsteps of President Bush’s HIV/AIDS Act and President Obama’s food-security initiative, the legislation could change the way the country approaches and funds efforts to tackle violence and conflict in fragile states.

Madeline Rose is the senior global-policy adviser for Mercy Corps. She is a Seminar XXI Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an organizing and advocacy trainer with Wellstone Action.
Second, we must radically expand support for mitigation and adaptation strategies in the countries most threatened by climate change. The United States has a vital role to play in building the capacity of these high-risk countries to plan for and react to climate-related crises. Even in the wake of President Trump’s reckless decision to pull us out of the Paris Agreement, Americans can still play a leadership role in addressing global climate change. The first and most urgently needed step is to enhance the collaborations among American industry, the global humanitarian response system, and the world’s most disaster-prone countries so that these nations have access to the best available information on which to base complex planning decisions. As an example, Mercy Corps, the organization for which I work, is partnering with NASA, the government of Niger, and Nigerien civil society in order to develop new models of climate-informed water governance using NASA’s satellite-based Earth-observation capabilities. This type of work warrants replication, at scale, worldwide.

Finally, we must build a 21st-century humanitarian response system centered on dignity, local leadership, and innovation. Humanitarianism begins at home. We must therefore work to reverse the Trump administration’s vile decision to take children away from their asylum-seeking parents and end asylum protections for victims of gender-based and gang violence. An attack on the right to asylum is an attack on some of the most vulnerable people. We must fight to preserve the dignity in US asylum policies.

Overseas, we need to dedicate far more resources to the humanitarian-response system, while spending the money we allocate in more effective ways. A 21st-century response system means recognizing that people on the front lines of crisis are often the best responders. More aid needs to be channeled through local nonprofits and companies. Without involving and empowering communities at the ground level, we often end up with a more expensive international response that doesn’t address the dynamics of grievance, governance, and inequitable growth that drive fragility in the first place.

A 21st-century response system also needs to embrace new technologies that put more power into people’s hands, such as using direct cash transfers to boost the purchasing power of people in crisis or using big data to enable access to besieged communities, like those in Syria’s civil war.

These three pillars can create the framework for a new American humanitarian grand strategy. Of course, these ideas will not solve every major problem—but if pursued, they offer the best chance for reviving our global moral leadership and ensuring that we uphold our reputation for protecting those in distress.
The US and its allies outspend their adversaries in terms of military budgets by a factor of 3 to 1.

Military spending in 2017 was higher than the peak spending in any war except World War I.

A CULTURE OF WAR IS A CULTURE OF WASTE AND ABUSE

37 OUT OF 78
The United States has been at war for nearly half of the 78 years since World War II.

$135 BILLION
In wartime, average annual military spending is $135 billion more than in times of peace.

LOCKHEED MARTIN
Since 2000, the biggest military contractor—Lockheed Martin—has had to pay $11 million in nuclear-safety violations; $6.7 million in employment-discrimination and wage violations; and $125 million in False Claims Act violations.

WHAT WE LOSE WHEN WE SPEND ON WAR

$400,000 for an F-35 jet-fighter helmet
$5,920 for a Pell Grant
$25 BILLION in bureaucratic waste at the Pentagon per year
$2 BILLION to rebuild power grids in Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands
$5.6 TRILLION in total costs of US wars since 2001
$2 TRILLION in unfunded infrastructure needs for next 10 years

SOURCE: NATIONAL PRIORITIES PROJECT AT THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
Nearly 17 years into the war in Afghanistan, there is still no end in sight. Our strategy and goals for the region are murky and ill-defined—and yet, while the violence continues unabated, the media and Congress have turned a blind eye to the conflict.

Despite the trillions of dollars spent on the so-called War on Terror—a sum that could have sent every young person in the United States to college—we have invested almost nothing in a peace process to draw down our military operations.

Even worse, what started as one conflict has now ballooned into a war zone that touches nearly every corner of the globe. We are now involved in active conflicts in seven countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. While these wars rage on, Congress refuses to debate, vote on, and in some cases even to acknowledge our military actions.

Back in 2001, this was exactly the quagmire I feared. Just three days after 9/11, Congress voted to authorize war against the conspirators involved in the attacks and any associated forces. That legislation—known as an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)—was a blank check for any president to wage war anywhere in the world, in perpetuity, without congressional input.

As the lone vote against the authorization, I could not in good conscience support such an overly broad resolution.

In the years since, the 2001 AUMF has become a catchall to justify dozens of military operations. From drone strikes in Yemen and Libya to indefinite detentions in Guantánamo Bay and warrantless wiretapping here at home, presidents from both parties have abused this authorization to drag us deeper into wars around the world. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the war has raged on without a debate or strategy from Congress. According to a 2018 report from the Congressional Research Service, the 2001 AUMF has been used at least 41 times for military action in 18 different countries—and those are only the unclassified instances!

For years, as I’ve seen lawmakers in Congress abdicate our war-making decisions to the White House, I’ve been urging my colleagues to repeal the 2001 AUMF and come up with a comprehensive peace plan and diplomatic strategy for Afghanistan and the region. Given President Trump’s erratic and unpredictable behavior in the Oval Office, we cannot wait any longer to get this blank check for war off the books.

Members of both parties agree.

Last summer, in the House Appropriations Committee, my amendment to repeal the 2001 AUMF passed with near-unanimous bipartisan support. This amendment proposed sunsetting the 2001 AUMF eight months after passage of the bill, giving Congress ample time to debate and pass an updated authorization.

But then, with urging from the Trump administration, House Speaker Paul Ryan unilaterally stripped my amendment from the bill. It was a frustrating setback that made it clear how far the Republican leadership is willing to go to preserve President Trump’s unilateral powers. But with growing support from the American people and a bipartisan coalition beating the drum in Congress, I truly believe the time for this debate has come.

Right now, the Senate is considering a proposal by Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Bob Corker (R-TN) to update the 2001 AUMF. I applaud their commitment to holding this debate and ensuring that Congress fulfills its constitutional duty. However, rather than reinining in Donald Trump and future presidents, I fear their draft authorization could have the result of codifying presidential power over our wars and extending this blank check in perpetuity.

Under the Corker-Kaine proposal, President Trump would be able to expand the geographic scope of military engagements and add additional targets with only minimal input from Congress. By omitting any requirement for a sunset date, their proposal ignores the lessons of the past decade and allows presidents to continue the practice of perpetual war.

If and when we tackle the 2001 AUMF, Congress needs to consider how we can untangle ourselves from these wars—not just sign off on the status quo. With Representative Walter Jones (R-NC), I wrote a bipartisan letter signed by 49 of our colleagues that urges the Senate to go back to the drawing board in considering a new AUMF.

After 17 years in Afghanistan, it is time for us to stop squandering lives and resources with no exit strategy and no plan for peace. Congress should act now to start the process of bringing our brave forces home from that distant land. If there’s been any prevailing lesson from the War on Terror, it’s that we can’t bomb our way to peace. We owe it to the American people—and especially our men and women in uniform—to demand an end to our perpetual wars and begin the peace process in Afghanistan.

Our service members are displaying incredible bravery every day in conflicts around the world, even while Congress is missing in action. It’s past time for members of Congress to do our job and live up to our responsibilities.

Congress needs to rein in the executive branch’s unchecked war powers by repealing the 2001 AUMF, ending the war in Afghanistan, and finally holding a serious debate and vote on the costs and consequences of our forever wars—before it’s too late.

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Barbara Lee (D-CA) has been a member of the US House of Representatives since 1998.
The existential threat to Western democracy isn’t Russia. It’s the home-grown backlash to deep social inequality.

**Shlomo Ben-Ami**

**GLOBALIZATION’S DISCONTENTS**

The Western liberal order is not in crisis because of Russia. Western democracies must take responsibility for a crisis that is ultimately homegrown—nurtured by their leaders’ own failure to effectively confront the challenges of globalization. The most worrying feature of the 2016 US presidential election was not the Russian trolls and bots that attempted to sow opposition to Hillary Clinton. Rather, it was that nearly 63 million American citizens blindly believed the flagrant lies of Donald Trump, the most uneducated and mendacious presidential candidate in American history. It did not help, of course, that Clinton—enabled by an obstinate Democratic Party establishment—ran a weak and visionless campaign that ignored the mounting anger of millions of voters who felt left behind by globalization.

Moreover, it was not Russian President Vladimir Putin who created the ethical crisis afflicting Western capitalism. That was achieved by US bankers, who, taking advantage of deregulation and financial interconnectedness, misguided the global economy to the 2008 financial meltdown. US politicians then refused to implement adequate new banking regulations, much less punish those who had caused the crisis and profited handsomely along the way. In Europe, similar ethical and political failures in response to globalization have fueled widespread support for populists of the right and the left.

Populist parties once confined to the political fringe did not win nearly half the vote in Italy’s recent election because of Russian disinformation campaigns. They won because of mounting anger toward a corrupt political establishment that has failed to address major economic problems, from financial instability to high youth unemployment. Italy’s persistent regional inequalities were also on vivid display: Whereas the prosperous north favored the anti-immigrant League party, the even more populist Five Star Movement received most of its support in the poorer south.

Putin may benefit from such electoral outcomes, but that doesn’t make him responsible for them. Nationalist politicians—from the Brexiteers to Trump—are the ones espousing divisive policies, refusing to acknowledge the importance of cooperation and ethics in policy-making, lambasting traditional elites and state institutions, and praising autocrats, including Putin himself. The campaign slogan of Italy’s League party—“Italians first”—could not be a more direct tribute to Trump’s nationalist approach.

Media have served to reinforce these narratives. Yes, Russians were found to have been behind some of the “fake news” spread via social media. But in the United Kingdom, for example, tabloids owned by Rupert Murdoch and Jonathan Harmsworth, better known as Lord Rothermere, did much more to sow opposition to the European Union before the Brexit vote.

History, too, has played a role. The Euroskepticism of Eastern Europe’s “illiberal democracies” reflects deep-seated religious and authoritarian traditions, which have impeded these societies’ internalization of the EU’s post-modern culture of secular tolerance and universal values. Poland’s combination of fierce anti-Russian sentiment and extreme religious nationalism illustrates this dynamic.

The fact is that the West is beset by deep social inequalities, reinforced in recent decades by poorly managed globalization. At the same time, its political establishment has become increasingly disconnected from the public. This is particularly apparent in the EU, where many decisions are in the hands of a distant and unaccountable bureaucracy lacking in sufficient democratic legitimacy.

Russia does not pose an existential threat to Western democracy. The Soviet Union represented a far more formidable challenge, and it ended up collapsing under the weight of its own economic failure. Russia’s internal problems—not just economic stagnation, but also demographic decline—are of a similar scale.

The real threat to the Western liberal order comes from a populist revolt against the colossal inadequacies of Western democracy. If Europe and the United States are to fill the political space now occupied by the unenlightened forces of provincial conservatism, they must reinvent themselves. Giving a humane face to the embrace of globalization and innovation is a vital enterprise of moral and social improvement if the reverberating echoes of the dark 1930s are to be aborted.
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT CHINA IS ON THE ASCENT AND the United States is in decline, that China’s economy is roaring with raw energy and that Beijing’s “Belt and Road” mega-project of infrastructure building in Central, South, and Southeast Asia is laying the basis for its global economic hegemony.

Some question whether Beijing’s ambitions are sustainable. Inequality in China is approaching that in the United States, which portends rising domestic discontent, while China’s grave environmental problems may pose inexorable limits to its economic expansion.

Perhaps the greatest immediate threat to China’s rise to economic supremacy, however, is the same phenomenon that felled the US economy in 2008—financialization, the channeling of resources to the financial economy over the real economy. Indeed, there are three troubling signs that China is a prime candidate to be the site of the next financial crisis: overheating in its real-estate sector, a roller-coaster stock market, and a rapidly growing shadow-banking sector.

China’s Real-Estate Bubble

There is no doubt that China is already in the midst of a real-estate bubble. As in the United States during the subprime-mortgage bubble that culminated in the global financial crisis of 2007–09, the real-estate market has attracted too many wealthy and middle-class speculators, leading to a frenzy that has seen real-estate prices climb sharply.

Chinese real-estate prices soared in so-called Tier 1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai from 2015 to 2017, pushing worried authorities there to take measures to pop the bubble. Major cities, including Beijing, imposed various measures: They increased down-payment requirements, tightened mortgage restrictions, banned the resale of property for several years, and limited the number of homes that people can buy.

However, Chinese authorities face a dilemma. On the one hand, workers complain that the bubble has placed owning and renting apartments beyond their reach, thus fueling social instability. On the other hand, a sharp drop in real-estate prices could bring down the rest of the Chinese economy and—given China’s increasingly central role as a source of international demand—the rest of the global economy along with it. China’s real-estate sector accounts for an estimated 15 percent of GDP and 20 percent of the national demand for loans. Thus, according to Chinese banking experts Andrew Sheng and Ng Chow Soon, any slowdown would “adversely affect construction-related industries along the entire supply chain, including steel, cement, and other building materials.”

The Shanghai Casino

Financial repression—keeping the interest rates on deposits low to subsidize China’s powerful alliance of export industries and governments in the coastal provinces—has been central in pushing investors into real-estate speculation. However, growing uncertainties in that sector have caused many middle-class investors to seek higher returns in the country’s poorly regulated stock market. The unfortunate result: A good many Chinese have lost their for-
tunes as stock prices fluctuated wildly. As early as 2001, Wu Jinglian, widely regarded as one of the country’s leading reform economists, characterized the corruption-ridden Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as “worse than a casino” in which investors would inevitably lose money over the long run. At the peak of the Shanghai market, in June 2015, a Bloomberg analyst wrote that “No other stock market has grown as much in dollar terms over a 12-month period,” noting that the previous year’s gain was greater than “the $5 trillion size of Japan’s entire stock market.”

When the Shanghai index plunged 40 percent later that summer, Chinese investors were hit with huge losses—debt they still grapple with today. Many lost all their savings—a significant personal tragedy (and a looming national crisis) in a country with such a poorly developed social-security system.

Chinese stock markets (now the world’s second-largest, according to The Balance, an online financial journal) stabilized in 2017, and seemed to have recovered the trust of investors when they were struck by contagion from the global sell-off of stocks in February 2018, posting one of their biggest losses since the 2015 collapse.

**Shadow Banking Comes Out of the Shadows**

Another source of financial instability is the virtual monopoly on credit access held by export-oriented industries, state-owned enterprises, and the local governments of favored coastal regions. With the demand for credit from other sectors unmet by the official banking sector, the void has been rapidly filled by so-called shadow banks.

The shadow-banking sector is perhaps best defined as a network of financial intermediaries whose activities and products are outside the formal, government-regulated banking system. Many of the shadow-banking system’s transactions are not reflected on the regular balance sheets of the country’s financial institutions. But when a liquidity crisis takes place, the fiction of an independent investment vehicle is ripped apart by creditors who factor these off-balance-sheet transactions into their financial assessments of the mother institution.

The shadow-banking system in China is not yet as sophisticated as its counterparts on Wall Street and in London, but it is getting there. Ballpark estimates of the trades carried out in China’s shadow-banking sector range from $10 trillion to more than $18 trillion.

In 2013, according to one of the more authoritative studies, the scale of shadow-banking risk assets—i.e., assets marked by great volatility, like stocks and real estate—came to 53 percent of China’s GDP. That might appear small when compared with the global average of about 120 percent of GDP, but the reality is that many of these shadow-banking creditors have raised their capital by borrowing from the formal banking sector. These loans are either registered on the books or “hidden” in special off-balance-sheet vehicles. Should a shadow-banking crisis ensue, it is estimated that up to half of the nonperforming loans of the shadow-banking sector could be “transferred” to the formal banking sector, thus undermining it as well. In addition, the shadow-banking sector is heavily invested in real-estate trusts. Thus, a sharp drop in property valuations would immediately have a negative impact on the shadow-banking sector—creditors would be left running after bankrupt developers or holding massively depreciated real estate as collateral.

Is China, in fact, still distant from a Lehman Brothers-style crisis? Interestingly, Sheng and Ng point out that while “China’s shadow banking problem is still manageable...time is of the essence and a comprehensive policy package is urgently needed to preempt any escalation of shadow banking NPLs [nonperforming loans], which could have contagion effects.” Beijing is now cracking down on the shadow banks, but these are elusive entities.

Finance is the Achilles’ heel of the Chinese economy. The negative synergy between an overheating real-estate sector, a volatile stock market, and an uncontrolled shadow-banking system could well be the cause of the next big crisis to hit the global economy, rivaling the severity of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the global financial implosion of 2008–09.

**Instead of War...**

Rather than gearing up for a military face-off in the South China Sea or engaging in a trade war with Beijing (which no one will win), the United States and its allies might be better advised to prepare for the threat that China’s economic weakness poses to the US economy and, indeed, the world’s.

Global financial reform—a task urgently needed (but never undertaken) after the 2008 financial crisis—is one area where cooperation would immeasurably benefit China, the United States, and the rest of the planet. The loss of $5.2 trillion during this February’s global financial meltdown has highlighted the necessity of putting stronger restrictions on the global movement of speculative capital before it spawns a bigger crisis in the real economy. The regulation of dangerous real-estate-backed securities and derivatives—the same types of instruments that triggered the 2008 financial crisis, and which are now making their appearance in Asian markets—should be a top priority.

When it comes to trade, there are far better strategies than a trade war to deal with Beijing. It is true that the export of jobs to China by US corporations, supported by free-trade and globalization enthusiasts in government, has been a major cause of the deindustrialization of significant parts of the United States, but the solutions lie in building bridges, not walls. First, we need formal or informal trade agreements to limit select industrial exports to the United States, much like the Reagan-era arrangements with Japan to limit automobile exports bought time for the US car industry to retool and recover. Second, we need an industrial policy, drawing from the current playbook of Germany and China, in which an activist state channels private and public investment and promotes job creation in cutting-edge industries, such as renewable-energy-based infrastructure and transportation.

None of this is as simple—or as foolish—as a military face-off near the Chinese coast. Too often, for America’s national-security managers, the US military is a hammer, and every problem looks like a nail. But as US officials begin to address the rise of Chinese power, they would do far better to understand the state that the United States and the rest of the world now have in a healthy Chinese economy, and worry more about avoiding its economic implosion than about planning for a military explosion.
Miracle Teeter on the Brink of Famine. America Is Complicit,” warned the headline for a Washington Post editorial on June 13, as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched a military assault on Hodeida, the major port city in Yemen, despite pleas from relief agencies and the United Nations. The United States provided diplomatic cover and military intelligence for this catastrophic attack on the lifeline for nearly 80 percent of Yemen’s food imports.

The Trump administration’s hand in this gruesome new chapter of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis highlights the urgency for Congress to act. After all, the Saudi-led conflict in Yemen could not continue without unauthorized US support. Congressional efforts to end this war may not only help to avert a famine in the Arab world’s poorest country; it could also fundamentally change how Washington works. By drawing on the Constitution and partnering with conservatives to rein in decades-old presidential overreach, progressive advocates for peace and restraint are laying the groundwork for a potential sea change in US foreign policy.

In 2015, the United States began fighting alongside Saudi Arabia in its war against the indigenous Houthi rebels of Yemen. Even before the attack on Hodeida, the conflict had pushed nearly a third of the population to the brink of starvation. The Saudi-led coalition has imposed an air, land, and sea blockade on a country almost entirely reliant on food imports, deliberately starving millions. Washington has participated in these horrors by providing targeting assistance for Saudi air strikes and by deploying US aircraft to refuel Saudi warplanes in midair. The Saudis have bombed schools, a funeral, a wedding, and even medical facilities, including a cholera-treatment center.

President Obama never obtained congressional authorization for active US involvement in this war. His administration made a unilateral decision in 2015 to engage in these hostilities to reassure the Gulf monarchies of the US strategic alliance in light of the Iran nuclear deal, which was signed that year, though administration officials did not anticipate the scale of the Saudi atrocities. Now, under President Trump—whose shadowy campaign ties with the Saudis and Emiratis are only now emerging—these countries have felt emboldened to intensify the conflict. American military participation has even expanded to include secretive on-the-ground operations by Army Green Berets.

The Constitution’s framers sought to prevent exactly this sort of situation. As James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1798, “The Constitution supposes what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch most interested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature.” Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the sole authority over the use of offensive force.

In 1973, horrified by the sprawling US wars in Indochina and determined to assert its constitutional authority, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution with the specific intent to “prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities” and to avert “ever deepening ground combat involvement” in foreign conflicts. Today, by invoking the War Powers Resolution and partnering with constitutional conservatives, progressives in Congress are forcing debates and votes to end US military participation in the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

I introduced such a measure last fall with my fellow progressive Mark Pocan and conservatives Thomas Massie and Walter Jones. The resolution attracted more than 50 co-sponsors and led to the first-ever public acknowledgment by the House—through the passage of H.Res. 599—that secretive US military activities such as targeting assistance and refueling for Saudi air strikes were indeed occurring, and that US participation in a war unrelated to the fight against Al Qaeda had never been authorized by Congress. Senator Bernie Sanders then partnered with Republican Mike Lee and Democrat Chris Murphy to introduce a companion effort in February. Their joint resolution invoking the War Powers Resolution led to the first vote in Senate history directing a president to remove US forces from unauthorized hostilities. Despite a furious lobbying campaign by the White House and the Saudi government, 44 senators voted in favor of considering this unprecedented measure.

These congressional efforts provide little consolation to the millions of Yemenis who still face famine and cholera. Yet they’re inspiring ordinary Americans to get involved: Congressional offices received tens of thousands of letters and phone calls from constituents opposing this underreported war. The initiatives also chip away at the secrecy that allows unauthorized Pentagon actions to stagger on for years. What’s more, by reasserting the core tenets of the Constitution, progressives and conservatives are developing durable, bipartisan partnerships on Yemen to build the political power necessary to overcome the entrenched interests that have led to overreach and endless global war.

There is no more urgent moment to reclaim the Legislature’s constitutional war powers. The framers understood that the momentous decision to go to war requires the informed consent of the American people, expressed through their elected representatives. Our ability to expand democracy into this insulated sphere holds the key to a more peaceful future and the promise of alleviating the unimaginable suffering of millions of innocent people.

Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) is the sponsor of H.Con.Res. 81, a measure with 53 co-sponsors that utilizes a provision of the War Powers Resolution to end the unauthorized US participation in the Saudi-led war against Yemen’s Houthis. He is a vice chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus.
Donald Trump’s election stunned the national-security establishment, which the precocious Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national-security adviser, once dubbed “the Blob.” In his campaign speeches, Trump mocked its “stupid” wars and “lousy” deals on trade, Iran, and the environment. He scolded it in his inaugural address: “The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country. Their victories have not been your victories.” His trumpeting of an “America First” policy, with its disgraced isolationist provenance, offended the Blob’s core beliefs.

Not surprisingly, the mandarins sounded the alarm. Rhodes even organized charter members of the Blob into National Security Action, an advocacy group designed to challenge Trump’s heresies. Opposing Trump, however, is cheap grace. The real question is what lessons the establishment has drawn from his rise. Is Trump a grotesque aberration, an accidental interloper whose removal—by impeachment or electoral defeat—will allow a return to normalcy? Or does his victory constitute a wake-up call, one that demands a fundamental reworking of US national-security policy?

Trump in the Back Alleys

American national-security policy over the last several decades can be viewed as having what the historian Alfred McCoy euphemistically described as a “delicate duality.” It has featured the creation of global institutions and a “rules-based” commercial system, represented by the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Health Organization, among others. At the same time, the US has waged hard-knuckled, back-alley brawls involving constant interventions in other nations’ affairs: brutal proxy wars, the lawless toppling of governments, routine election interference, ruthless economic pressure, and more.

Trump, despite his rhetoric, is far from an America First isolationist. He has doubled down on the interventionist side of US foreign policy, escalating the “stupid” wars in Afghanistan and Syria, arming Ukraine, threatening to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea, increas-
has built and led over the last decades. Trump's trade bluster—the tariffs, the schizophrenic dealings with China, the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, renegotiation of NAFTA, tantrums at the G-7—is viewed as a direct threat to an order that the Blob still regards as an unprecedented success story. “A smaller share of the world’s population than ever lives in poverty,” writes Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and the “liberal order constructed and led by the United States made such progress possible.” It is vital, Princeton University’s G. John Ikenberry writes, to “defend its institutions, bargains, and accomplishments,” beginning with “reclaiming the master narrative of the last 70 years” and its “world-historical advances.”

One part of “reclaiming the master narrative” has been a gaggle of books detailing the threat to democracy constituted by rising populist movements and by Trump in particular. In Fascism: A Warning, Madeleine Albright, the former secretary of state under President Bill Clinton and still a titular leader of the Democratic foreign-policy establishment, maintains that it could happen here, unless we rouse ourselves to defend liberal democracy. She argues that Trump’s politics of hate, constant lies, and assaults on the truth, the independent press, and our election process must be countered and condemned.

Defending democracy, however, too easily slides into a defense of the status quo ante. Albright, for example, sneers at the growing popular revolt. The problem, she says, is that we’ve become “spoiled.” “Globalization,” she argues, “is not an ideological choice but a fact of life,” and yet now has become, in the eyes of many, an “evil to be fought at all costs.” Likewise, “Capitalism is considered a four-letter word by an increasing number of people who—if not for its fruits—would be without food, shelter, clothing and smartphones.”

Albright writes these words about a rich nation with extreme inequality, 40 million people living in poverty, and declining life expectancy. Fully 43 percent of Americans cannot afford the basic necessities of life, according to a recent United Way study.

As the writer Robert Kuttner outlines in his important new book Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?, the embrace of market fundamentalism at home and abroad, particularly after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, led the US-dominated order to enforce a harsh version of corporate capitalism. The ability of governments to protect basic economic rights at home was constricted, while international corporations and banks rigged the rules to undermine workers, avoid taxes, and manipulate markets. This fix was most dramatically illustrated during the global financial crisis of 2007–09, when those who caused the crisis were bailed out, while those who

Americans are sick of the failures of our militarized foreign policy.

STEPHEN MILES
were its victims were left to fend for themselves, if they could.

More sensible establishment figures understand that something major has gone awry. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Jake Sullivan, a former adviser to Hillary Clinton at the State Department and for both her 2008 and 2016 campaigns, suggests that, while reports of the international order’s demise have been “greatly exaggerated,” the system nevertheless needs an “update to account for new realities and new challenges.”

Sullivan understands that the popular discontent is rooted “in the lived experience of many who have seen few [of the] promised benefits flow to them.” This has sparked “new and urgent conversations” about how to address the “distributional consequences of globalization and automation.” The United States, Sullivan insists, is the only country with the sufficient “reach” to lead this process, despite its extreme inequality at home. But he offers no ideas for how to deal with these questions other than the imperative that Trump not be “handed another term.”

The limits of the establishment “conversation” are exemplified by the Council on Foreign Relations’ Haass, who suggests that the Trump administration should “tone down some of its rhetoric on trade” while launching a national initiative to increase economic security, including “educational and training programs, temporary wage support for displaced workers [unions refer to this as “burial insurance”], the repatriation of corporate profits to encourage investment at home, and infrastructure spending.” In other words, the global capitalist order needs “a renovation, not a teardown…. The strategic focus for U.S. foreign policy should be preservation and adaptation, not disruption.”

This won’t do. It will take far more than getting rid of Trump and having “urgent conversations” to make the changes necessary to revitalize democracy at home and abroad. The populist revolts building on both the right and the left are but the first stirrings of a growing demand for fundamental change.

The source of democracy’s vulnerability isn’t in this populist response, but rather in the failure of the elites. When elections produce the same results no matter which party is elected, cynicism and anger spread. For too long, the foreign-policy mandarins have reinforced a global order in which the interests of the “winners” are protected while the struggles of the “losers” are ignored. Right-wing populism, as trumpeted by aposer like Trump, can evolve into a frightening threat to democracy. Left-wing populism may be democracy’s salvation. Trump’s election was in many ways a warning to the establishment. The question is whether they heed that message. Thus far, the results are not encouraging.

Driving the relentless pursuit of these failed policies.

Yet electoral results and public-opinion polling make it clear that this assumption couldn’t be further from the truth. The American public is tired of the failures of our militarized foreign policy, eager to support candidates promising a new path, and supportive of dramatic shifts in our national-security priorities.

Let’s start with the elections. During the last three presidential campaigns, Americans turned to the candidate promising a less interventionist foreign policy. In fact, research that looked into the 2016 election suggested that voter disaffection with our wars in the Middle East was a significant factor in Trump’s victory. Communities that bore the brunt of US combat deaths since 9/11 were more likely to support Trump, who, despite his militaristic turn as president, painted himself as fed up with our foreign interventions. Even after controlling for other factors, the data showed that the casualties from our endless wars helped put Trump in the Oval Office.

And it’s not just the top of the ticket. Earlier this year, my team at Win Without War took a comprehensive look at what happened to 528 members of Congress who voted for or against the Iraq War. In short, those who tried to stop the war are twice as likely to be in Congress as their pro-war colleagues. Up and down the ballot, voters have rewarded restraint and punished hunkishness.

We don’t have to speculate why: Current opinion research shows precisely where the American public stands. The Nation recently highlighted new polling demonstrating that Americans prefer the progressive position on national security (less spending on the Pentagon, fewer nuclear weapons, fewer foreign arms sales, etc.) by as much as a three-to-one margin. In fact, while Trump and the Republicans recently pushed through an $80 billion increase for the Pentagon, voters said they would have cut the Pentagon’s budget by $41 billion.

The more you look, the clearer the picture becomes of what Americans want for their foreign policy. In analyzing the polling data from YouGov, we found remarkably stable support for diplomacy with North Korea. Last summer, at the height of Trump’s talk of “fire and fury,” Americans supported direct talks between the two nations by 71 to 13 percent—a 58 percent margin. Today, with those talks happening, Americans support diplomacy by 70 to 11 percent—a 59 percent margin. That commitment to diplomacy held true regardless of party, age, gender, or any other available metric.

And just days before Trump pulled us out of the Iran nuclear deal, a poll found support for the accord at a record high. The day after Trump made his decision, another poll found that nearly two-thirds of Americans believed the country should remain part of the deal.

It’s not hard to see what’s happening here. Since at least 2001, politicians, pundits, and policy “experts” have told Americans that, in order to keep the country safe, we had to go to war and spend whatever it takes. Yet after all the massive human costs, trillions of dollars squandered, and empty promises of “mission accomplished,” the wars go on. What has changed is that Americans aren’t buying the sales pitch any longer.

But despite this overwhelming consensus for change, the status quo endures. Change will only come when we stop accepting leaders who refuse to stand with the majority of Americans. Already, we can see the beginnings of a new foreign policy, as leaders in Congress like Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Chris Murphy (D-CT), and Representatives Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Barbara Lee (D-CA), demand an end to our disastrous war in Yemen and champion diplomacy with North Korea. Now it’s up to us to turn these ripples of progress into a tsunami of change. The good news is that the American public is already with us.
Letters

Solidarity Forever

Many thanks to Mike Konczal and the economists cited in his article—Henry Farber, Dan Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko, and Suresh Naidu—for telling everyone what us unionists already knew [“Union Strong,” June 18/25]. As the saying goes, a rising tide lifts all boats. Our unions are the rising tide and the nation’s workers are the boats.

Hale Landes
Member, IBEW Local 134, Chicago Naperville, Ill.

The Only Way Home

Re: “Give Us Shelter” by Bryce Covert [June 18/25]: Housing, health care, education, and transportation are all crucial public services. In other developed countries, “enlightened” elites or, even more important, socialist movements ensured that these were not simply left to market forces. But in the United States, capitalist forces have always been too strong, and countervailing movements too weak, to ensure that these services are truly public and of high quality. Until we create powerful popular political movements dedicated to restricting the power of capital, nothing will change.

Peter Unterweger

Naming, Shaming

Re: “Who Owns Public Space?” by Laila Lalami [June 18/25]: I teared up when I read this, thank you. We all need to stand up for each other when we see something like the confrontation in the New York deli. It has to become socially unacceptable to treat people in such a nasty and discriminatory manner. I wonder if Aaron Schlossberg’s family emigrated from another country and perhaps spoke a different language when they came here? All of us need to stand up to the brutish, nasty cruelty that is being said and done to immigrants and people of color. The majority of Americans are not like these nasty people.

Cathleen Merenda

Lalami’s column suggests that “disruption and discomfort” imposed by “online mobs” is an appropriate response to a racist rant in a public space. It used to be that most folks accepted “an eye for an eye” as the norm for retaliation or punishment; that’s obviously questionable, as it leaves everybody blind. But it did suggest a societal norm for dealing with such incidents: proportionality.

Aaron Schlossberg and the others mentioned in the column certainly manifested crude xenophobic feelings and behaved in a hurtful way. But were the harms inflicted on Schlossberg by the mob really deserved? Or were they excessive?

Walter (Jerry) Kendall
Grayslake, Ill.

Alas, Donald Trump is setting a terrible example of barely disguised racism and nativism. He is appealing to the very worst sentiments of bigotry that still infect our nation. If he wants to “Make America Great Again,” he should speak the opposite of how he is speaking and try to be a healer in chief rather than a divider in chief.

Frederic Webster

I am going to learn Spanish. Way overdue.

Peter Scotto

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STATEs of EMERGENCY

Imagining a politics for an age of accelerated climate change

by AYSSA BATTISTONI

Climate change has been a political issue in America for almost my entire life—James Hansen first testified to the reality of global warming before the Senate in 1988—but the prospects for the planet keep getting worse. At first, climate change was discussed as a distant problem, something to fix for future generations. Then it was discussed as geographically remote, something that was happening in some other part of the world. Now it’s recognized as something that’s happening today to people living in the United States—and yet what are we doing about it? Usually, it seems, very little. Kim Stanley Robinson has dubbed this period of doing-nothing-much the Dithering; Amitav Ghosh suggests calling it the Great Derangement. Something has gone terribly wrong: A problem that is widely recognized as threatening millions of lives, perhaps even the future of human life on Earth, has not been addressed seriously and doesn’t seem likely to be.

For a while, democracy was deemed to be the culprit: Democratic politics, some argued, simply isn’t suited to addressing problems that lie in the future or extend beyond national boundaries. Climate change is just too complicated for most people to understand; better to

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Climate Leviathan
By Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright
Verso. 224 pp. $26.95
leave it to the experts. It’s too hard a subject to broach during a political campaign; no one really wants to think about something so depressing, and what politician in his or her right mind would call for lowering living standards in order to decrease carbon emissions?

Now that capitalism is again on the table as a political issue, it also gets its share of blame. The political problem, it’s now said, isn’t democracy alone, but rather that democracy is held hostage by oil money and the politicians purchased by it. Even some capitalists are starting to acknowledge that the system could use some tweaks. (Others, like Elon Musk, are planning to decamp to Mars: the Great Derangement indeed.) Swapping corporations for democracy as the root of the problem is a welcome development. Yet serious political thinking about climate change remains in short supply. Most people are now worried about it, but a few are putting climate change at the heart of their political thought and practice.

In this context, Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s new work of political theory, *Climate Leviathan*, is a welcome addition to the small but growing body of climate writing on the left. It’s a book explicitly aimed at understanding the political dimensions of climate change instead of relegating them to a paragraph or two in the concluding section. It also takes a different tack than most works on climate politics. The authors are not interested in why we aren’t acting to curb carbon emissions; instead, they’re interested in the kinds of political scenarios that are likely to emerge in response to the approaching ecological crises.

Climate change will be so central to human life and global politics in the coming years, Mann and Wainwright argue, that the response to it will shape the entire future world order, not merely the statements that issue out of the United Nations at the end of every year. If the left is to play a role that the left can play in responding to it, but we will need to develop old ideas in new directions if we are to navigate a world that is now changing radically.

**Toward this end, *Climate Leviathan* engages a wide range of political thought, from Gramsci to Hegel, Kant to Naomi Klein. But as the title suggests, at the heart of the book is Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* remains the fundamental work on the sovereign power that underpins modern states. Hobbes looked at a nation torn asunder by the English Civil War and reckoned that it was better to relinquish one’s freedom to the authority of an all-powerful sovereign than to live through such nastiness and brutality. Such a sovereign power did not yet exist in Hobbes’s time, but in describing it, Hobbes sought to understand a political form that he thought might soon come into being.

Mann and Wainwright argue that we are in another such moment, a time when political forms are in flux and one can begin to see the shape of the growing leviathan. They therefore follow Hobbes into a speculative mode, describing the forms of power they think are likely to emerge in the future while recognizing that none have done so yet.

Their other key resource in thinking about this leviathan is the German political theorist and Nazi sympathizer Carl Schmitt, who draws on Hobbes in constructing his own theory of sovereignty. Everyday decision-making is governed by law, Schmitt argues, but sovereignty is to be found in the moments when emergency demands extra-legal action. For Schmitt, it was crucial that the sovereign be able to take action against a community’s enemies as it deemed necessary. Sovereignty here consists of the political power that allows a state to override the law in defense of its friends.

As with Hobbes, people accept this extreme form of rule in exchange for protection. The left rediscovered Schmitt during the Bush years, when, as the Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben noted, a “state of exception” had, under the guise of the amorphous “war on terror,” become the norm. But this view of the state has rarely been extended to thinking about the kind of emergency politics that will arise as a result of climate change. Drawing on Hobbes and Schmitt, the authors begin to do this work: *Climate Leviathan* imagines how ecological disruption will create the conditions for a new sovereign authority to “seize command, declare an emergency, and bring order to Earth, all in the name of saving life”—and this time on a planetary instead of national scale.

Yet this sovereignty is still nascent, and other political forms might yet challenge it. At the core of *Climate Leviathan* are four types of political formation that the authors believe are likely to emerge in response to climate change. “Climate Leviathan” would be a system of global capitalism governed by a planetary sovereign—not necessarily the individual ruler Hobbes imagined, but nevertheless a hegemonic power capable of taking drastic action; “Climate Mao,” an anti-capitalist system governed by sovereign power at the level of the nation-state or the planet; “Climate Behemoth,” a capitalist system within the autarchic confines of the nation-state; and “Climate X,” which rejects both capitalism and sovereignty for something yet to be determined. These four possible futures, Mann and Wainwright admit, are thus far inchoate. But as we blow past our carbon targets and the impacts of climate change become increasingly destructive, one of these is likely to emerge as the dominant mode of politics.

The most likely victor, the authors think, is Climate Leviathan: It is, after all, already in the ascendency, epitomized by international pacts like the Paris Agreement and global institutions like the UN Conference of the Parties (COP). These institutions are not currently sovereign in the Hobbesian sense; to the contrary, they are explicitly international, working to coordinate action between sovereign nation-states. But Mann and Wainwright think they nevertheless point the way toward a form of sovereignty that has been anticipated for centuries: one encompassing the world. Thinkers from Kant to Einstein have typically imagined a world state in response to the threat of war; Climate Leviathan would be just such a world state in an age of ecological disaster.

Rising temperatures will produce new emergencies, from tsunamis and hurricanes to famines and refugee crises, and with them new opportunities for powerful states to expand their reach by declaring a state of exception. A major climate disaster could prompt northern capitalist states to take action—up to and including geoengineering—via the United Nations or a European Union–like supranational authority. By calling for agreements at the annual COPs, many climate activists have legitimized Climate Leviathan rather than challenging it. But what these institutions cannot do, Mann and Wainwright argue, is solve the climate crisis: They were created to manage capitalism, and will continue to do so even in the face of catastrophic warming.

Yet while global capitalist institutions have been the primary site of climate politics for the past two decades, *Climate Leviathan* has a rival: Climate Behemoth represents a “reactionary populism” that turns away from the global elitism of planetary forums...
WITHOUT ONLINE ACCESS, YOU’RE ONLY GETTING HALF THE STORY.
(SOUND FAMILIAR?)

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on climate change and toward a nationalist capitalism—a dynamic perfectly encapsulated by Donald Trump’s claim that he was “elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”

Visible in Trump’s America, Narendra Modi’s India, and the surge of right-wing Euroskeptic parties across Europe, the backers of Climate Behemoth are a mix of fossil-fuel capitalists, petit-bourgeois reactionaries, and disillusioned working-class people who want to stick it to the cosmo-politan elites and the political establishment. Its contradictory but potent mix of ethno-nationalism, religion, masculinity, and scientific denial make it a powerful but ultimately unstable form; it is likely, Mann and Wainwright argue, to burn out—but in the meantime, it could do plenty of damage.

The revolutionary possibilities represented by Climate Mao and Climate X, meanwhile, are less immediately proximate, visible at present only in fragments. Climate Mao describes a revolutionary transformation led by a non-capitalist state acting quickly to address climate breakdown. In Mann and Wainwright’s account, it follows its namesake but also Robespierre and Lenin in suggesting “the necessity of a just terror in the interests of the future of the collective”: It pits the power of the planetary sovereign against that of capital. Climate Mao, that is, portends a renewal of “authoritarian state socialism” that act to reduce carbon emissions and address climate emergencies, eventually on the level of the planet.

China’s unilateral restrictions on corporations and citizens alike show a glimpse of this future, though one not operating at full strength. Indeed, Mann and Wainwright take pains to argue that China isn’t currently on a path toward Climate Mao. The Communist Party can close steel mills in a matter of months to minimize emissions, but China is no longer plausibly described as communist; to the contrary, it has committed to working with the Western capitalist powers to build the international system that characterizes Climate Leviathan (think, for example, of Barack Obama’s much-lauded negotiations with Xi Jinping).

Nevertheless, Mann and Wainwright insist that in the near future, Climate Mao is only likely to emerge in Asia: Latin America may have a more robust legacy of radical ecological politics, but only Asia has the necessary combination of powerful states and major economies paired with vast numbers of peasants, proletarians, and surplus populations whose expectations are likely to be frustrated by the disruptive effects of climate change. Only in Asia, in other words, is it possible to imagine popular movements seizing state and economic power in a way that would meaningfully affect the world’s use of resources.

Some of these futures may be worse than others, but none, to the authors, seems likely to be particularly just. That’s where Climate X comes in: It names a democratic movement against both capitalism and sovereignty, the “X” intentionally suggesting a journey into the unknown. Though X’s meaning is teased throughout the book, it is not until the very last chapter that Mann and Wainwright finally delve into its details.

It’s disappointing, though not entirely surprising, to find that this is also where the book’s otherwise lucid, often sparkling analysis falters. Coming up with a politics adequate to an existentially threatening and essentially unprecedented problem is a deeply daunting prospect, as the authors acknowledge. Time and time again, and they’re understandably reluctant to describe in too much detail what it might look like. In the hopes of “illuminating possible paths through apparently impossible problems,” they offer a set of loose rather than programmatic ideas: three principles, two “openings,” and two trajectories. The principles, drawn from the left’s traditions as well as contemporary climate-justice movements, are equality, democracy, and solidarity. Equality affirms that we all share the earth; democracy assures the “inclusion and dignity of all”; and solidarity recognizes the common cause of preserving life on this shared planet while affirming many ways of living on it, a “world of many worlds.”

The openings offer tentative possibilities for left praxis instead of prescriptive certainty: The first is found in the “categorical refusal” that animated Marx’s reluctance to detail the communist future in favor of ongoing revolutionary thought and practice, and the second is found in the stance of bearing “witness to crisis,” which is surely already in our midst. The two trajectories that ground Climate X are the longer histories in which these principles and possibilities are rooted. One is the left’s anti-capitalist tradition stemming from Marxist political economy; the other is composed of the alternatives to sovereignty found in indigenous and anti-colonial movements, forms of knowledge, and ways of life. This second trajectory, the authors believe, also offers some resources for “living differently, radically differently”—not simply by making the 21st century superficially greener, but by helping to change our relationship to the land and the planet altogether.

As these nebulous offerings suggest, Mann and Wainwright don’t pretend to have Climate X fully figured out. Examples of actually existing movements that more or less fit the mold of Climate X, they grant, remain far from overthrowing either capitalism or sovereignty. The Zapatistas, who launched an offensive against the Mexican state in 1994 and have since retreated to the countryside, offer a view of Climate X’s promise but also its limits: Though entire communities have withdrawn from the reach of the state to live according to their own principles, they remain surrounded and contained by its power. It’s certainly unclear how they might effectively counter climate change from this position. These and other contradictions, Mann and Wainwright admit, may lead readers to sympathize with Climate Leviathan or Climate Mao, which at least get things done. But despite these challenges, they maintain, we must insist on noncapitalist nonsovereignty. As Adorno says, “It could come.”

This conclusion is starkly at odds with the book’s opening cry for strategic thinking on the left: Shrewd analysis gives way to repeated avowals that things must, and therefore can, be otherwise—never mind how, exactly.

“The priority,” Mann and Wainwright argue, “must be to organize for a rapid reduction of carbon emissions by collective boycott and strike.” And yet, almost immediately, they pull back from this position—too utopian—and then lurch forward again: After all, we need to be utopian. “We must create something new,” they explain. “More of the same is not an option.” Surely they are right on this count. But absent further discussion, calls for massive and immediate
boycotts and strikes as a means of putting an end to a global economy built on fossil-fuel use register as wishful thinking at best. At times, this seems not merely utopian but unjustifiably so: If things are as bad as Mann and Wainwright claim—and they are—principled refusal and gestures toward living otherwise are no longer sufficient, if they ever were. If the response to the “marked unimaginativeness” of most climate politics is a flight into imaginative fancy, we truly are doomed.

Similarly, the call to heed indigenous approaches to sovereignty is left mostly unexplored. Indigenous politics have been particularly effective in struggles against fossil-fuel infrastructure not only because of underlying philosophies regarding sovereignty or nature, but because indigenous groups have acted strategically: Native claims to land are useful in blocking pipelines, and First Nations groups in Canada, in particular, have embarked on an aggressive legal campaign to reclaim unceded lands. Likewise, in Latin America, internationally recognized indigenous rights have proved a potent legal tool in the fight against new oil or mining projects in the region. These complicated political efforts demand more substantial analysis; they aren’t merely metonyms for nonsovereignty. At the same time, their lessons are not easily transferred to other political struggles. How far can these projects for self-determination take the climate movement, with which they are sometimes but not always aligned? What insights do they hold for actors without subjects as well as in relation to capital are existing states have acted in relation to their behaviors: The Zapatista Army of National Liberation recently endorsed a candidate, María de Jesús Patricio Martínez, who is running in the 2018 Mexican presidential election and seeking to represent indigenous communities.) As the authors observe, the problems that climate change poses are part of a much longer history of struggles for freedom and justice—the only difference is that now we have an ecological deadline. Surely this means buying time must be an essential part of left strategy, even if it means working to mitigate the worst effects of climate change within systems that we eventually aim to dismantle or transform.

The difficulty of solving for Climate X ultimately reflects the limits of the book’s typology, wherein planetary sovereignty and global capitalism are presented as all-or-nothing choices. Exploring ideal types can be clarifying, but what would be more useful in our present moment is an effort to dig into the possibilities of working within, through, and beyond the Climate Levianthans and Climate Behemoths that already exist—perhaps the latter most of all. Indeed, in the face of a rising tide of reactionary Behemoths, which shows little sign of receding, planetary sovereignty seems like something of a red herring: Global capitalism surely isn’t done for, but there is little to suggest that the planetary sovereign is waiting in the wings.

Must movements really be opposed to all forms of sovereignty, on all scales, in order to oppose a capitalism-reproducing world state or achieve any measure of justice? Is there truly no left-populist Climate X that could act as a counter to Behemoth at the level of the nation, no way to channel planetary solidarity through international—not necessarily global— institutions? The difference between, say, Jeremy Corbyn’s pledge to nationalize and decarbonize the British energy industry and Justin Trudeau’s sign-off on private pipeline projects in Canada may not be enough to save the planet, but it would seem to deserve at least the status of an opening. Instead, the ways that actually existing states have acted in relation to their subjects as well as in relation to capital are collapsed by the authors into an argument about sovereignty—for or against.

Mann and Wainwright are by no means alone in hedging about what is to be done. Two other recent books on the eco-left—Jason Moore and Raj Patel’s A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things, and Andreas Malm’s The Progress of This Storm—end in more or less the same place. All recognize that the “global fascism” that Mann and Wainwright name Behemoth is far more potent today than any eco-left formation, but try to muster hope by looking to some movements for climate justice, all the while insinuating that a much greater upheaval is necessary.

Like Mann and Wainwright, Moore and Patel decline to draw a “road map for class struggle that simultaneously reinvents humans’ relations with and within the web of life”; instead, they suggest their own five principles—recognition, reparation, redistribution, re-imagining, and re-creation—and their own movement of movements. Their expansive view of capitalism, which takes seriously the place of unwaged work, colonial appropriation, and coerced extraction, makes it possible to understand a much broader coalition of struggles as anti-capitalist and capable of helping to head off climate change: the indigenous movement Idle No More; the peasant movement led by La Via Campesina; the work of disability-rights activists and Argentine socialist feminists. They also suggest that a more salutary political formation can be found in the “alternative nationalisms” of indigenous and aboriginal nations that exist “in opposition to capitalism’s ecology.” Yet while Moore and Patel detail the long history of popular resistance to capitalism, the effect is more discomfiting than heartening when one remembers that literally centuries of struggle have yet to achieve their aim. What, exactly, would make the next couple of crucial decades any different?

Malm’s The Progress of This Storm, meanwhile, issues a welcome call to get serious about political agency but ends on an unapologetically apocalyptic note that borders on adventurism. “The warming condition spells the death of affirmative politics,” he declares. “Negativity is our only chance now.” Perhaps this is why he concludes, like Mann and Wainwright, with Walter Benjamin—in Malm’s case, with Benjamin’s idea of a “destructive character” that reduces existence “to rubble—not for the sake of the rubble, but for that of the way of leading through it.” We must destroy fossil-fuel capital, he suggests, before nature destroys us.
When Marx scorned the project of writing “recipes for the cookshops of the future,” he called instead for a “critical analysis of actual facts.” The actual facts are not auspicious—yet we have no choice but to face them. The threat posed by climate change demands that we imagine a very different world, one that does not exist now and never has; and one, moreover, that is not oriented toward our current ideas of progress and the future. As each of these authors observes, the threat posed by climate change requires political action of a different order and magnitude than anything currently on offer: Business as usual will not suffice. It is worrying that thinkers so astute about the dynamics of capitalism and nature appear stymied by how we can escape them. But they are undoubtedly correct that climate change will shape politics for the foreseeable future, which shrinks by the day.

So while Mann and Wainwright and other supporters of a possible Climate X need not draw blueprints, some hard questions demand answering. How is the massive global fossil-fuel industry to be dismantled without state coercion? How would an anti-sovereignty and anti-capitalist movement prevent the enormously wealthy from decamping to some reasonably stable patch of the world? How are massive boycotts and strikes to be not just imagined but organized? What’s to prevent private coercion from replacing the public kind?

Certainly, many on the left are too blithe about the state, presumably on the grounds that you seize it first and ask questions later. Those who tend to think that state power is necessary to undertake the kinds of projects needed to address climate change should say more, too: How do we think the “good state” of welfare and public schools can be detached from the “bad state” of war and prisons? How do we imagine actually winning enough state power to usefully wield it? And how can we then transform it rather than finding ourselves transformed by it?

These are real questions, not rhetorical ones, and they have urgent implications. Climate Leviathan helps us understand what they mean and why they matter, and offers rich conceptual resources with which to think them through. These questions will ultimately have to be answered in practice more than in theory, but they deserve our attention—and soon.

Even as monstrous, self-published political novels go, The Turner Diaries is a stylistic wasteland. Written under a pseudonym by the white-supremacist activist William Luther Pierce, The Turner Diaries tells the story of a racist terrorist on a revolutionary crusade against the US government and liberal American society (“the System”). Befitting its role as a kind of how-to manual for kick-starting a race war, the book is written in concrete, simple prose nearly devoid of figurative language. A Jewish shopkeeper is murdered, black teenagers are assaulted, journalists are assassinated, federal buildings are bombed. On page after page, an orgy of violence unfolds, all narrated in flat, declarative sentences, building to a nuclear holocaust and the cleansing of the earth of all nonwhite people. There is only one real recurrent metaphor—cancer. Writes Pierce:

But there is no way we can destroy the System without hurting many thousands of innocent people—no way. It is a cancer too deeply rooted in
our flesh. And if we don’t destroy the System before it destroys us—if we don’t cut this cancer out of our living flesh—our whole race will die.... Most [white Americans] hardly ever see a Black or a Jew, and they act as if there’s not a war going on. They seem to think that they’re far enough away from the things that are plaguing other parts of the country that they can keep on with their same old routine. They resent any hint that they may have to halt their pursuit of pleasure and afluenence long enough to cut a cancer out of America that will surely destroy us all if it’s not eliminated soon. But it’s always been that way with Boobus Americanus.

The belief expressed here is that the majority of Americans are soft and insulated, ignorant of a long-running war, and that revolutionary racist terror is the only remedy for an American society suffering from a terminal cancer of liberalism and tolerance. This conviction may seem obscure and The Turner Diaries mere fiction, but as the historian Kathleen Belew demonstrates in her compelling new book, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*, it has been at the core of decades of white-supremacist organizing and violence.

Meticulously researched and powerfully argued, Belew’s book isn’t only a definitive history of white-racist violence in late-20th-century America, but also a rigorous meditation on the relationship between American militarism abroad and extremism at home, with distressing implications for the United States in 2018 and beyond. Two fundamental insights underpin the book: first, that there exists a profound relationship between America’s military violence and domestic right-wing paramilitary organizations, and, second, that the character of that relationship underwent a decisive change in the late 1970s and early ’80s.

Foreign wars, like racial violence at home, are recurrent features—one might even say defining ones—of the American story, and Belew notes that spikes in domestic white-supremacist terrorism have regularly followed the close of major military hostilities. From the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan to the activities of the “second Klan” in the 1920s to the violence against the civil-rights movement in the 1960s, Belew observes that “after each war, veterans not only joined the Klan but also played instrumental roles in leadership, providing military training to other Klansmen and carrying out acts of violence.”

These militants presented their activities as essentially reactionary—aimed at rolling back gains in minority rights—but they also, in most cases, understood them to be a kind of vigilante supplement for preserving the hierarchical social order of the militarized American nation with which they identified. Belew argues that from the late 1970s onward, however, this attitude changed. Unlike previous racist violence, a new strain of white militancy emerged after Vietnam that was not conservative at all: It envisioned overthrowing the state and entertaining the idea of founding an all-white homeland and participating in outright genocide. As Belew documents, this new ideology proved so effective at attracting adherents and fostering coalitions that it can be seen as constituting a new social movement: white power. Over and against the attitudes and positions designated by the terms “white nationalism,” “white supremacy,” or even the “racist right,” “white power” came to represent something far more specific: a radical, well-organized movement of hardcore militants on a mission to turn the nightmare dystopia depicted in *The Turner Diaries* into a reality.

What triggered this shift? Belew argues that the precipitating event was the Vietnam War itself, not just in terms of what individual veterans experienced, but also what the war came to mean. Unlike America’s previous large-scale 20th-century wars, with their set-piece campaigns against opposing armies in uniform, Vietnam was an asymmetrical conflict waged against irregular forces, a “morally ambiguous proxy war” where the distinction between civilians and fighters was eroded from the start. With territory being won and lost in an endless churn, a consequent fetish for body counts as an alternative metric of military success encouraged a unique kind of brutality.

Meanwhile, anti-Vietnamese prejudice ran parallel to a remarkable amount of racial violence within the only recently integrated US Armed Forces (Belew documents a litany of racist incidents, including murders and Klan actions, on military bases in the United States and in Southeast Asia). But the most distinguishing characteristic of the Vietnam War was that, by any standard, it was a defeat. The fantasy of the US military as unstoppable, and of the American soldier as a “triumphant warrior,” was dealt a profound humiliation by a nonwhite, non-European army made up of soldiers whom many Americans were inclined to hold in contempt as racially inferior peasants dressed in “black pajamas.”

To explain this defeat, Belew argues, many Americans—veterans and civilians alike—embraced a narrative about the war that helped the United States recover its sense of honor, a kind of homegrown *Dolche-stößlende* (“stab-in-the-back myth”). Vietnam became the story of the “soldiers’ betrayal by military and political leaders and of the trivialization of their sacrifice,” a story that mapped to the dramatic demographic changes, political turmoil, and economic downturn of the 1970s.

This crucible of factors led some veterans to embrace left-wing ideologies. But for many more, it helped to create a movement “inspired by feelings of defeat, emasculation, and betrayal…and by social and economic changes that seemed to threaten and victimize white men.” Given the right’s affinity for all things military and its ongoing ties to active-duty soldiers, the stage was set for a newly radicalized, empowered, and emboldened white-power extremism. This extremism had resonances with earlier versions of white extremism, but it was also distinguished by an emphasis on violence that was concerned with far more than merely supplementing the power of the American state and upholding a racist social order through barely legal—yet implicitly condoned—vigilantism.

Instead, these extremists turned to outright illegal violence in what they saw as a military campaign to redeem what the state had failed to accomplish, both on the battlefields of Southeast Asia and against the civil-rights protests back home. Key figures in this movement were indeed veterans, but its appeal traded on much more than veteran status. “Whether they had served or not,” Belew writes, “activists took from the war a tangle of testimony and potent narratives, as well as a set of uniforms, weapons, and political rhetoric. Primarily, the Vietnam War allowed men to take on the role of the soldier as an all-encompassing identity…. [A] shared story about Vietnam outweighed the historical reality of the war itself.”
Below has receipts for all of this, and she doesn’t hold them back. Profiling influential white-power leaders, she traces how numerous Americans returned from Vietnam and formed groups united by shared dreams of ethnic purges and race war on the home front. For these activists—men like Louis Beam, a former US Army helicopter gunner turned Christian Identity preacher who led campaigns against the fishing communities composed of Vietnamese refugees in Texas—racial violence stateside was a continuation of their combat abroad.

Positioning themselves as the opponents of nonwhites, liberals, Jews, homosexuals, immigrants, and “Communists” (a particularly effective dog whistle), these white-power activists founded paramilitary training camps and separatist communities throughout the South, in parts of the Midwest, and in the Pacific Northwest (with the latter soon attaining the status of a desirable future all-white “homeland”). With impressive organizing savvy, movement leaders forged bonds among previously competitive white-supremacist groups and held conventions that brought Klansmen, neo-Nazis, and militia groups together for the sake of a shared agenda of racist extremism and terrorist violence.

Their efforts had far from negligible consequences. Belew traces the white-power movement over three key periods: an initial period of consolidation (1979–83), the revolutionary period following a “declaration of war” against the federal government in 1983, and the militia phase of the early 1990s. She stresses the cohesive character of white-power ideology, the recurrent ties between key players and groups, and the remarkable violence the movement generated—and not just in the American heartland. Indeed, as Belew demonstrates, white-power paramilitary deployed themselves to patrol the US border, worked as mercenaries in conflicts in Africa and Latin America (sometimes with the benefit of CIA funding), and even developed plans to stage a coup and install a white-supremacist regime on the island of Dominica.

Drawing on networks of active-duty servicepeople, white-power groups equipped themselves with stolen and black-market US military materiel—including rockets, grenades, and mines—and developed sophisticated criminal enterprises for counterfeiting, illegally modifying weapons, and more. In real-life episodes that read like something straight out of The Turner Diaries (which became something of a movement bible), white-power activists targeted people for violence, murdered leftists and critics in the media, and robbed banks and armored cars.

In one particular episode, Belew describes the meticulously planned assault against a demonstration organized by anti-racist protesters led by members of the Communist Workers Party in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1979. Armed to the teeth and coordinating their actions by CB radio, a caravan of white-power activists drove up to a crowd of demonstrators and, in the ensuing tumult, calmly proceeded to pick them off with their firearms, killing five people and wounding 10 before fleeing.

At their trial, the white-power activists presented themselves as “honorable and wronged Vietnam veterans” who had acted out of “self-defense,” sincere “anti-Communism,” and a desire to “protect” the white women in their group; despite multiple trials, not a single one was convicted. Today, less than a year after the fatal car attack on anti-fascist protesters at a “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, Belew’s analysis of the Greensboro massacre—from its instigators’ rigorous planning to their cynical legal defense—rings both uncanny and horrifying.

Bring the War Home is a grim and sobering read—and, for many, it may arrive as a much-needed and troubling revelation: The sheer size of white-power extremism since Vietnam is frightening. Belew presents credible estimates that white power mobilized some 25,000 “hard-core” supporters in the 1980s, with 150,000 to 175,000 people buying its literature, donating to white-power groups, and attending events. Likewise, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands participated in militias in the 1990s. (“The John Birch Society, in contrast, reached 100,000 members at its 1965 peak,” Belew observes pointedly.)

Equally surprising for many will be the role of women in the movement: Rather than being simply passive objects of a patriarchal ideology that makes much of “protecting” (and subordinating) white womanhood, women were activists in their own right, creating their own white-power periodicals, founding spin-off groups, and even participating in various criminal enterprises. (In one instance, Sheila Beam, Louis’s wife, shoots a Mexican police officer while on the run with her husband.) And in what may be the most powerful rebuke to conventional wisdom, white-power activists—far from their stereotype as hapless hillbillies—emerge in Belew’s research as sophisticated operators, ahead of the curve in their use of communication technologies.

When, in 1984, Louis Beam set up LibertyNet, a secure online message board for white-power activists, it represented, as Belew notes, one of the first instances of computers being used for social-movement organizing. And the white-power model of propaganda and image management, which mobilizes and coordinates violent terrorism while also coyly disavowing responsibility for acts of “lone wolf” violence, is as much 2015 Charleston or 2017 Charlottesville as it is Oklahoma City in 1995.

Despite the size and sophistication of white-power extremism, it has consistently been minimized, both by the American media and in political and law-enforcement responses. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring nearly 700. Although, in keeping with the white-power strategy of “leaderless resistance,” he claimed sole responsibility for the act, the ties implicating a network of white-power activists were abundant.
What was never acknowledged by many public figures at the time was how emblematic McVeigh was of the new turn in white racial violence. McVeigh was a veteran of the first Gulf War, and his radical ideology was old and familiar. He traveled in white-power circles, and for a time sold copies of *The Turner Diaries* at gun shows. His method in the Oklahoma City bombing appears to have been inspired by an event depicted in one of its chapters, and he was carrying documents with quotations from the book when he was arrested. Belew makes the point forthrightly: “McVeigh, trained as a combatant by the state, belonged to the white power movement. He acted without orders from movement leaders, but in concert with movement objectives and supported by resistance cell organizing.”

However, for most Americans, the event was an object lesson not in the threat of white-power violence but rather, paradoxically, in its limited scope. Oklahoma City should have been a wake-up call to the existence of a broad-based and highly organized movement; instead, Belew writes, it and many other acts of white terrorism were “largely narrated and prosecuted as scattered actions and inexplicable lone wolf attacks motivated not by ideology but by madness or personal animus.”

The power of Belew’s book comes, in part, from the fact that it reveals a story about white-racist violence that we should all already know. Instead, mainstream politicians and media voices have embraced the idea of white-power militants as mere misguided loners, not the representatives of an actual movement, and have demurred on any sustained interrogation of how white-power ideology might be implicit, in more “diffuse, coded, and mainstream” dimensions, in our society, our politics, and our habits of war. Thus, at the close of the millennium, the history of the white-power movement—the story of a dark dialectic between terroristic revolutionary violence and the state violence of American empire—was consigned to the dustbin of “the End of History.”

All the while, in a particularly grim twist, so many other aspects of American life—from civilian policing to television shows to best-selling video-game franchises—have become militarized as never before. Now, in 2018, coming up on nearly two decades of an apparently endless War on Terror, and with white-power violence prominent in our headlines once again, forcing a more serious reckoning is imperative—and Belew’s vital intervention is a necessary step toward that end.

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**JUST ENOUGH TEARS**

*Boom for Real, En el Séptimo Día, and Summer 1993*

by STUART KLAYANS

Y ou’d have to go back to Bloomsbury to find another set as insular, self-promoting, self-destructive, imitated, parodied, publicized, and at last mythologized as the crowd that hung around New York’s East Village in the late 1970s. All things in proportion, of course. Compared with their English counterparts, the Alphabet City group scored far lower in investment income, Cambridge certification, and connections to the gentry, and far higher in ethnic diversity, assertive queerness, and heroin use. There were also a lot more of them—if not swarms, then a shifting mass who earned their credentials by being young and showing up, and who believed that the right to be called an artist (or at least artistic) was best enjoyed without prior mastery of a skill. That said, democratic upstarts, too, can be snobs. Speaking
functions in *Boom for Real* as a kind of alternate-universe figure; the man Basquiat might have become if he hadn’t made it big in the high-end galleries and museums but survived into a productive middle age. Quiñones comes before the camera with a calm and thoughtful demeanor: by any reasonable standard a successful painter of historic significance, confident of his merit, proudly Nuyorican, and above all alive. But that wasn’t what Basquiat wanted, any more than he wanted to make a name by painting subway cars. (He learned from the graffiti artists, but despite his “SAMO” period he never really was one himself.) As one after another of Driver’s subjects testify, Basquiat was determined to achieve greatness, with all its benefits.

*Boom for Real* ends at the moment when the 20-year-old Basquiat got his wish, taking off in his career with such speed and power that Driver illustrates the effect with a rocket launch. She is not concerned with what came afterward: the escalating prices, critical disputes, and untimely death. What matters to her is that Basquiat lifted off, and in so doing raised to glory the whole amorphous clique in which he’d lived. Many commentators speak of his art as an assertion of blackness in a white-dominated art world. To Driver, though, his paintings are important because they condense everything that she and her friends were watching, listening to, and doing. Think what you will of the insularity and snobbism of the downtown crowd. Basquiat, more than anyone, made good on its boast of having become a culture.

That’s all over, of course. The streets where Basquiat scuffled are now lined with pricey restaurants and boutique hotels. The paintings belong to those who can pay $110 million at auction (hammer price plus buyer’s premium). When you watch *Boom for Real*, though, all that disappears for a few moments, and the lost downtown Bloomsbury swims into view. No, not everybody was there, or wanted to be—but how marvelous it is, to be able still to visit.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in New York: The immigrant Mexican laborers in Jim McKay’s *En el Séptimo Día* pedal around Brooklyn delivering food, clean vegetables in corner delis, mop the floors of porn-video stalls, or hawk cotton candy in Times Square. Those are their days. At night, they cook for each other and then sleep jammed into an apartment that six or seven of them share. Or maybe eight; the guy who finds them jobs and collects the rent is liable at any moment to show up with somebody who just came off the bus from El Paso and will now occupy his own slice of the floor. It’s summer 2016, according to a title at the start of the movie—not a good time for immigrants whose papers aren’t in order, though not as bad as it was going to get. But the characters in McKay’s sparkling fable have things to worry about beyond Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These roommates have formed their own soccer team (the jerseys say “Puebla” but might as well read “Apartment 3B”), and with just one week to go before the league final, they’re short a man.

Part De Sica, part Loach, and all Brooklyn, *En el Séptimo Día* is principally the story of José (Fernando Cardona), the apartment’s leading scorer and mainstay of the bicycle delivery team at a Sunset Park restaurant that aspires to white tablecloths. Trim, slope-shouldered, and oval-faced, he’s everybody’s low-key Mr. Reliable: the guy who is last to leave for practice (because he’s been in church, praying for the team) and the first to step forward to ease problems with the boss. On Monday, though, José runs into a labor issue he can’t negotiate. The restaurant’s slick young Anglophone owner (Christopher Gabriel Núñez) tells him with the blandness of unchallengeable authority that he’s needed on the coming Sunday, the day of the league final. No substitute or excuse will be accepted—it’s show up or lose his job.

Now the team’s at risk of being short by two—and Mr. Reliable, who wants to please everyone, doesn’t know what to do or how to tell his buddies.

Premised on a single though multilayered workaday problem, filmed on location, and cast almost entirely with nonprofessional performers recruited in Sunset Park, *En el Séptimo Día* plays out day-by-day with the unfussy integrity you’d expect of neorealism. Every detail seems as solid and dependable as José himself, and the actors (an array of vivid, unforced personalities) look and feel at home in whatever they do. But as McKay understands, there’s more to neorealism than negativity: the rejection of artifice, the outcry against injustice. The tradition can also affirm the resilience, humor, and even charm of its characters—which *En el Séptimo Día* does so generously that it gave me more pleasure than any film I’ve seen in a while.

Much of that pleasure comes from sheer visual satisfaction, prompted by the joy that cinematographer Charles Libin finds in every street corner, walk-up apartment, and
stretch of public park. When José interrupts his deliveries to phone his lover back in Puebla—his pregnant lover, whom he needs to bring to New York without delay—he tells her something you’ve been thinking yourself, that it’s a beautiful day in the city. José may have paused for this call under a lane of trees near an industrial waterway, but it’s the freshest, calmest, most glistening industrial waterway you’ve ever seen.

To get this kind of cinematography, which releases the inner light of things rather than imposing a vision on them, it helps to have a director with McKay’s crisp, self-effacing style. To cite just one of the thousands of decisions he’s made: Look at the scene where the members of the soccer team first appear, loaded with gear as they clatter one by one down a staircase in their apartment building. McKay has positioned the camera on the staircase itself, on a low step, to emphasize a sense of narrowness, crowding, and high spirits, as a seemingly endless stream of players pours down from the landing.

The deepest satisfaction of En el Séptimo Día comes from these characters, these comrades, as they improvise a piecemeal scheme to rescue their championship hopes and José’s self-respect. He has struggled quietly with himself throughout the movie; he has listened to reasonable people advise him that no soccer match is worth his future in the United States with his lover and their child. On the other hand, the people he plays with are more than just teammates; they’re his sustainers, his community—and he’s really good at this game. When the tension is released at last and the dilemma’s put to rest (you can’t really call it resolved), McKay does not cheat on the darker implications of the story. But like the rest of the film, the culminating image is radiant: a close-up of José smiling in the soft, late-afternoon light.

En el Séptimo Día has been knocking around the festival circuit for about a year, having started its tour, appropriately enough, at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. It goes into general release in early June, having to search for a special screening. All you’ll get is a special experience.

The Catalan filmmaker Carla Simón has been on the festival circuit, too, with her autobiographical Summer 1993, winner of the award for Best First Feature at the 2017 Berlin International Film Festival. Don’t let the prize put you off: “Autobiography,” combined with “first feature,” can spell trouble for

juries, which are too often tempted to reward the emotionally overwrought and stylistically flashy. Simón, though, has made a blessedly subtle film, which despite a core of terrible loss unfolds with the gentle patience of someone unwrapping a gauze bandage.

“Why aren’t you crying?” are almost the first words spoken to the point-of-view character, tousle-haired 6-year-old Frida (Laia Artigas), as she plays in the nighttime city streets. A fireworks celebration is in progress, while upstairs, in a small apartment, Frida’s relatives are packing boxes for an imminent departure. Straight-faced, dry-eyed, Frida lets herself be put into a van, clutching a doll as well as the half-remembered words of a prayer that she’s been told will keep her close to her mother.

When she wakes up the next morning, she’s at her new home: a farmhouse in the hilly, forested countryside. Though no one spells out the situation, it’s soon enough clear that Frida is now in the care of her uncle Esteve (David Verdaguer) and his wife Marga (Bruna Cusi), a handsome young couple whose informal but polished manners and artistic tendencies suggest they’re back-to-the-land types. From the first, they’re warm, generous, and accommodating toward Frida, but she’s having none of them, or of their little daughter Anna (Paula Robles), for whose benefit Frida explains the name and origin of each of her dolls while insisting they must never be touched.

There’s something unburdening about spending time with a cold, angry, watchful little girl. She’s not asking for your sympathy, and when it comes to trying to amuse her, as you would with an easier kid, the pressure’s off. Summer 1993 gives you the imaginative distance to sit back in freedom and observe, as you do in the film’s many shots that trail along behind Frida. That said, Marga isn’t privileged to sit in the audience. She has volunteered to make an effort and has been deputed to do it as well, and you feel for her, as her frustration gradually comes into the open. Frida is trouble herself and makes trouble with Anna, while Esteve, who’d rather play his guitar than take a stand, is worse than useless. You sense Marga needs a breakthrough; but you also understand you’re in the hands of a filmmaker who does not traffic in cheap catharsis.

And yet this modest, quiet, deeply felt movie comes through in the end. Frida lets herself smile. Marga gets her crucial—if unacknowledged—moment of acceptance. And Esteve, with his usual good-hearted inadvertence, sets off the tears. Just enough of them; just in time.
ACROSS
1 What led to denials! (6,7)
2 Cryptic solver gets all but the initial letter of word for “masters” (9)
3 Robbins up and sent tangled knitwear (7)
4 What's left, for example, inside Doctor Strangelove's head (5)
5 Longing for return, retiring prisoner embraces last unstable soldier (9)
6 Nation features terrible roué and cad (7)
7 Soprano introducing Ain’t Misbehavin’—that’s smooth (5)
8 Instrument of choice between two numbers, exchanging one for another one (5,3)
9 Drunk conceals most of legal document in semi-darkness (8)
10 “You tagged me!” (raising Peron’s old hat) (9)
11 What a biologist might use to study a favorite root vegetable, reversing the swap made in 8 (5,4)
12 Basic techniques to revise prose (5)
13 Pushing corrosion into object (9)
14 I ran amok, taking lead in rock band (7)
15 Bags with masculine symbol (5)
16 Money and entertainment outside of Dallas (5)
17 After commencement, student housing is possessed by baby rat (9)
18 I ran amok, taking lead in rock band (7)
19 Exotic man mishandled source of federal 22 (6,3)
20 Avoid decapitated cat in San Francisco neighborhood (7)
21 Playwright cited in rewinding of scenes, bizarrely (5)
22 Avoid decapitated cat in San Francisco neighborhood (7)
23 Basic techniques to revise prose (5)
24 Watch to the west: Yes, that is the beginning of sunset (5)
25 Loose fuse, with start of ignition slightly delayed (5)
26 Send back Anne Hathaway’s initial dye… (5)
27 ...in payment for education and understanding (9)
28 The art of governing (while excluding half the population?) can be built from the elements of pantheism (13)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 3469
ACROSS
1 BUTTERFLYNETS (Sharry, first rec.) 9 WRE + A ROUTE
2 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
3 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
4 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
5 WRE + A ROUTE 9 BUTTERFLY NETS
6 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
7 WRE + A ROUTE 9 BUTTERFLY NETS
8 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
9 BUTTERFLYNETS (Sharry, first rec.) 9 WRE + A ROUTE
10 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
11 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
12 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
13 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
14 WEAROUT (rev.) 10 WHIM + PER 11 & 24 REP + AID
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DOWN
1 Belt containing piece of tanned hide (5)
2 Cryptic solver gets all but the initial letter of word for “masters” (9)
3 Robbins up and sent tangled knitwear (7)
4 What's left, for example, inside Doctor Strangelove's head (5)
5 Longing for return, retiring prisoner embraces last unstable soldier (9)
6 Nation features terrible roué and cad (7)
7 Soprano introducing Ain’t Misbehavin’—that’s smooth (5)
8 Instrument of choice between two numbers, exchanging one for another one (5,3)
9 Drunk conceals most of legal document in semi-darkness (8)
10 “You tagged me!” (raising Peron’s old hat) (9)
11 What a biologist might use to study a favorite root vegetable, reversing the swap made in 8 (5,4)
12 Basic techniques to revise prose (5)
13 Pushing corrosion into object (9)
14 I ran amok, taking lead in rock band (7)
15 Bags with masculine symbol (5)
16 Money and entertainment outside of Dallas (5)
17 After commencement, student housing is possessed by baby rat (9)
18 I ran amok, taking lead in rock band (7)
19 Exotic man mishandled source of federal 22 (6,3)
20 Avoid decapitated cat in San Francisco neighborhood (7)
21 Playwright cited in rewinding of scenes, bizarrely (5)
22 Avoid decapitated cat in San Francisco neighborhood (7)
23 Basic techniques to revise prose (5)
24 Watch to the west: Yes, that is the beginning of sunset (5)
25 Loose fuse, with start of ignition slightly delayed (5)
26 Send back Anne Hathaway’s initial dye… (5)
27 ...in payment for education and understanding (9)
28 The art of governing (while excluding half the population?) can be built from the elements of pantheism (13)
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