their civilized procedures, and their basic dependence on British power all tend to weaken their strategic position.

The British are afraid of the Arabs, and with reason. The League is no longer a source of security. It is openly planning the expulsion of British influence and control from the whole Middle East, as it has successfully expelled French influence and control (with the aid of British arms!) from the Levant states. Faced with this threat, what can the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office do but continue to stall and betray their promises and try more and bigger appeasement? The alternative would be a new approach to the whole problem of Empire defense.

Mr. Bevin's Palestine proposal is proof that the Labor Government is not ready for that. The Committee of Inquiry is little more than a new wrinkle in an old policy. This is not the first time necessary action has been delayed by the launching of an investigation; the device is as old as governments. The new feature introduced by Mr. Bevin is the participation of the United States—and it is an important innovation. For it insures powerful support for conclusions which, ironically, were largely anticipated by the Foreign Secretary in his statement announcing the committee. By accepting the plan on British terms, Mr. Truman has, we fear, walked into a trap, as the Zionists charge.

He can only retrieve the situation and live up to his own and his country's pledges by altering as completely as possible the frame of reference in which the Committee of Inquiry is to operate. He should insist upon his original proposal that 100,000 homeless European Jews be transferred to Palestine. The British turned down the request, but that was before the committee had been agreed upon. They would find it difficult to refuse if Mr. Truman backed his proposal with firm guarantees of American help in handling the transfer and insuring the safety of the refugees. In any case, it is cruel nonsense to leave the Jews in German camps while new investigations are undertaken. We already have the careful reports of Dean Harrison and Judge Rivkin to verify the known fact that most of these persons look to Palestine as the only hope of survival for themselves and their children.

The President should also make sure that the inquiry into the problem of Palestine is unhindered by Mr. Bevin's ready-made prejudices. If the United States is to accept responsibility for helping to solve that problem it must not go in with its hands tied. The only obligation it can afford to assume is the obligation to see to it that the terms of the Balfour Declaration, as elaborated in the British Mandate, and officially recognized by acts of Congress in 1922 and 1925, is duly carried out. In other words, the establishment of a Jewish National Home and the encouragement of Jewish immigration should be assumed, as a starting point. From there on, the inquiry should take the form of a brand-new examination of the place of Palestine in the intricate design of Middle Eastern relationships. It should consider, without prejudice, what kind of control can best be applied in a region where the interests of great powers, strategic and material, make external control of some sort inevitable. In view of America's own growing interests in the Middle East and its new international obligations, such an inquiry should be pursued without too much regard for existing colonial practices. We have an opportunity to do what Britain, tied to its burdensome past, has failed to do; we can make a new start.

Obviously British policy has broken down, whether the Labor Government will admit it or not. The old tactic of buying protection from greedy ruling cliques has sensationally failed. Perhaps the Middle East as a whole should be put under international control; perhaps the Levant states and Palestine might be joined in a federation under United Nations trusteeship. Perhaps a different solution altogether would emerge from a fresh study of the problem. But it is certain that the results of imperialist intrigue—now bloodily visible in Palestine—can be eliminated only if the powers are able to cooperate in new methods of regulation which will provide security for their legitimate interests and at the same time encourage the frail beginning of social progress, popular enlightenment, and self-government.

The Bomb Is a World Affair

BY KING GORDON

CAPTAIN Harold E. Stassen, in a recent speech before the Academy of Political Science, urged "placing the control of the atomic bomb definitely on a world level." The other courses open to the nations now possessing the bomb were to maintain a policy of secrecy and suppression or to open our records to the other United Nations without attempting to bring control of the bomb under a world authority. The consequences of the first course are vividly set forth in the original terms of the May-Johnson bill. Simply to share the secret would probably result in other nations' making bombs; it would remove the threat of the atom bomb as a unique instrument of Anglo-American power policy, it would not remove the threat of the bomb to our civilization itself. In outlining his proposal Captain Stassen assigns to the United Nations Organization the responsibility for control through an Atomic Bomb Commission, set up by an amendment to the United Nations Charter. After establishing an international air force armed with a limited number of atomic bombs, the United Nations would destroy the remaining bombs in existence, and forbid the manufacture of atomic bombs by any nation. The Atomic Bomb Commission, composed of distinguished scientists, would have full powers of inspection to see that no nation violated the ban. But scientific research devoted to the full development of atomic energy for peacetime uses would be carried on freely.

The details of the proposed World Stabilization Force raise some doubts: if we are to have international air police, an atom bomb is not a very good substitute for a nightstick. If we can manage to suppress the manufacture of atomic bombs as instruments of national policy it would seem wise to eliminate their use as punitive weapons in the hands of an international force. But Captain Stassen's main position is indisputable. Unlike Dr. Einstein's proposal for Big Three world government, his plan of control would be based upon the United Nations Organization. It is broad
enough in scope and concept to meet a mighty problem. It provides a practical alternative to the suicidal program of competitive armament on which the United States and their chief allies seem to be embarked today.

A brief examination of Captain Stassen’s proposal sets useful bounds to a discussion of the international control of the atom bomb. There is no doubt that the determined effort of the nations which own the bomb to hoard its secret has increased distrust among the nations which were united in a victorious war effort. The bomb, of course, has been only one of a number of factors that have led to the waning of international good will since the San Francisco conference. In half a dozen areas widely scattered over the earth, local infections are being aggravated and dangerously extended by the conflicts of rival power systems and the exigencies of imperialist consolidation. Germany, the Balkans, the Middle East, Indonesia, China, all present critical problems which are being resolved not primarily in the interests of the inhabitants, or on the level of international responsibility, but in the interests of the great powers. These problems accentuate distrust among the nations and provide a bad foundation for attempts to deal with atomic control through international mechanisms. It has been this distrust that has driven us back to the inveterate folkways of national sovereignty, national security, national defense—concepts which in the world of the atom bomb have very little meaning. It has permeated the thinking of our military leaders as they urge preparedness and present horrific pictures of the next air war. It has plotted out advance naval and air bases far into the zones from which conceivable aggression might come. It has inspired our policy of guarding the secret of the bomb and sowed panic over the prospect that others might steal the secret from us or arrive at it themselves—as undoubtedly they will—within a few years.

If Russia was disturbed by the American policy of strict bomb monopoly, it must have been even more disturbed by its exclusion from the conference between the three nations possessing the secret of the bomb’s manufacture. For the purpose of the conference was to discuss means of international control of a weapon that admittedly could not long remain the secret of one nation or group of nations and against which there was no effective defense. It would have been a wise and statesmanlike move for Mr. Truman to invite the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain and Canada to Washington, as we proposed editorially last week.

But, having admitted basic errors in policy that have tended to heighten rather than lessen international distrust, what about the statement itself? I must confess that I differ with certain commentators who see in it only a maneuver to put Russia on the spot or a plot to blow up the embryonic structure of the United Nations. It is true that the statement carries no assurance that the secret of the bomb will ever be shared; in fact, it indicates that it probably will not be. This in itself is no disaster, although in the present state of international confidence it does, of course, underline our distrust of the good intentions of other nations. What is more important, however, than immediate sharing of the secret is an efficient method of controlling the bomb and, if possible, eliminating it altogether. The Washington statement proposes a very specific plan for removing the control of the bomb from the hands of one or three nations and placing it in the hands of an international body, the United Nations Organization. The first step toward this control is the setting up of a commission to submit recommendations to the United Nations Organization—

(a) for extending among all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends
(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use for peaceful purposes alone
(c) for the elimination for national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction
(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

It is arguable that the statement should have announced clearly that the bomb’s secret would be handed over to an international body. Certainly the language could have been simplified and carried a more ringing challenge. Certainly Russia should have been included in the discussion. But it is irresponsible to suggest that the conference proposed no method of international control or was aimed at sabotaging the United Nations. It is quite possible for the United Nations Assembly to set up an atomic control commission at its January meeting. The first step can be taken within the next few weeks while the preparatory executive committee is meeting in London: if instructed by their governments, representatives of the major powers can place the business of constituting the commission at the top of the agenda of the Assembly. (And in the diplomatic conversations which will inevitably coincide with this preliminary meeting Russia’s opinions should be fully consulted.) If the matter is not taken up by the preparatory committee, it can be raised directly in the Assembly or the Security Council. There has been some demand for a Big Three meeting to deal with this and other crucial matters before the Assembly meets, and this, too, might still be arranged. But on the other side, there is much to be said for regarding the United Nations henceforth as the international body primarily intrusted with international decisions. There is no better way to build the prestige of the U. N. O. than to put it to work. There is no better way to reduce its authority than to bypass it on every important crisis.

The Washington statement provides that when the control of atomic energy is firmly vested in the United Nations commission, the manufacture of atomic bombs will cease and the manufacturing plants of all nations will be open to inspection. Some have raised a question as to the feasibility of such inspection, but sound scientific opinion holds that it can be carried out satisfactorily. Of more crucial importance is a willingness to submit to inspection by all the United Nations. Here, quite obviously, the veto power by members of the Security Council cannot operate. No nation can be exempt from inspection or every nation will feel insecure. It is safe to predict that it is on this question that the first important fight for recognition of a genuine international authority will be fought out in this and other countries. It is on this concrete and limited issue that liberals had better be prepared to rally their forces.

The setting up of such international control will admittedly...
go only a small way toward restoring confidence between nations. And it may be that even this amount of progress will be delayed by existing rifts and suspicions. We have learned that there is no easy or clearly marked road to peace. In a recent speech on atomic control Beardsley Ruml insisted that three programs had to be embarked on simultaneously—a long-term program directed toward the establishment of world government, an intermediate program in active support of the United Nations Organization, and a short-term program making use of diplomacy, public and private, to reduce existing international tensions. Mr. Ruml gives the world about twenty years in which to lay a solid foundation for realizing the long-term objective. Perhaps Mr. Ruml is an optimist, but he thinks it can be done.

Jewry in a Blind Alley

By I. F. STONE

Jerusalem, November 13

I CAME to Palestine unhappy, and during the first few days I became even unhappier trying to figure out solutions of the problems involved; but the longer I have been here the happier I have come to feel despite all that has happened and may happen in the next few days.

I stayed five days in Egypt visiting with many Egyptians and spending some time in a village near Cairo. I was able to see the sharp contrast in cleanliness and health between the Egyptian village and urban poor and the Arab village and urban poor in Palestine. I felt happy that the coming of the Jews had helped rather than hurt the Arabs.

I was deeply moved by my visits to the colonies here. From Gevulot, in the far south of the Negev desert wastes, to glorious Minara, 3,000 feet above the Upper Jordan on the far northern edge, I saw young Jews from every clime and country reclaiming the land and making something for themselves and their children under conditions which are truly heroic. This sense of consecration and common effort in the Jewish community must powerfully attract all who prize human courage, devotion, and idealism. I was not at all surprised to hear of two cases of non-Jewish demobilized British soldiers, formerly in service here, applying for admission to membership in the Jewish Kibbutzim, or communal settlements.

I felt happy to see that despite difficulties which from abroad appear insuperable there was a great and growing community here, and in visits both to Arab villages and neighboring Jewish colonies I saw evidence of good relations between the two peoples. I feel a huge reservoir of goodwill between the Arab and Jew which can be tapped; and I have not sensed in talks with Arabs either in Palestine or in Egypt, despite their differences, any feeling of race hatred or dislike of Jews as a people.

But at the cost of unpopularity perhaps in the Jewish community of America I wish to say as strongly as I know how that the new Bevin statement is only the latest indication of the blind alley into which Palestinian Jewry is being led by the failure to achieve any political understanding with the Arabs. And I wish to say just as strongly that political agreement will be impossible so long as a single Jewish state in Palestine is demanded.

We have been carrying on a campaign in America on the basis of half-truths, and on this basis no effective politics can be waged and no secure life built for Yishuv. It is true that the Arabs have benefited by the Jews coming to Palestine, and it is true that there is plenty of room here for several millions more, but I cannot find a single Jew who can find a single Arab who favors a Jewish state in Palestine! It should not be hard to understand the natural dislike of any human being for being ruled by another people or his unwillingness to trust himself to such rule.

There is only one way in which a Jewish state here could be sold to the Arab world and that would be as part of a general settlement of Anglo-Egyptian and other Arab problems which would satisfy the aspiration of the Arabs for self-development and federation. That was what made Zionism acceptable in earlier days to the wise and far-seeing Feisal and other Arab leaders, but Britain's failure really to keep the promises given to the Arabs has made the Arabs naturally hostile to the promises given to the Jews. The Bevin statement is only another chapter in the record of broken promises to both.

The most significant point to be noted in the Bevin statement is that while consultation is assured the Arabs concerning any further Jewish immigration in accordance with the White Paper, not a single solitary word is said about a promise to consult with the Jews on the other major item in the White Paper—the undertaking to the Arabs that a start would be made in setting up self-governing institutions in Palestine within five years. I could not help noting also that in Egypt, if it were not for anti-Zionist political agitation, the British would be confronted immediately with a demand for a basic settlement of Anglo-Egyptian problems, including the Sudan, Suez, and British occupation.

It is true that the Jews are in a terrible position, on the one hand asking to be beneficiaries of British imperialism and on the other serving as its lighting rod. Two political axioms seem to be completely forgotten by Jewish world leadership. One is that politics cannot be played unless one has alternatives; one cannot bargain unless one can obtain similar wares elsewhere. The other is that in politics one saves favors for those one must win over and does not waste them on elements already in one's pocket. So long as the Jews are dependent on Britain with no alternative policy for an agreement with the Arabs, the Jews are helpless. Incidentally the Arabs are also helpless until they reach some agreement with the Jews, because just enough will be given both sides, as by Bevin, to keep both disillusioned and embroiled. Let us remember that as long as there is no solution of the