Percy (R., Ill.), believes her husband had to do penance for his name; thereafter establish, by staying around, that he wasn’t using the adopted state as a launching pad to higher office, and then all would be fine.

With due respect to these theories and many others, there is a simpler explanation of what happened: Governor Moore deserved re-election on the strength of his first-term performance, especially when it was put beside the abysmal record of his two Democratic predecessors. Moore isn’t perfect. He is the total political animal. His word is valueless and his ego boundless. People who know him intimately aren’tcharmed.

But the areas of government in which Governor Moore shone were those in which his two predecessors were most derelict. Hanky-panky was substantially reduced. Capable, honest, hard-working administrators were by and large appointed to key positions. Most important, the Governor proved himself a leader and displayed an amazing attention to detail and fidelity to duty. In short, he gave the state efficient, respectable executive government for a change, and enough voters appreciated this welcome novelty to re-elect him.

Two ironies arise from the election. But for Rockefeller, Moore would probably not have been permitted to seek a second term. In 1969, Rockefeller not only endorsed a constitutional amendment authorizing gubernatorial succession but also prevailed upon a reluctant Democratic legislature to allow the Republican incumbent to succeed himself.

The second irony is that Governor Moore, a member of the House of Representatives in 1968 when he announced for governor, sought that office originally because he was convinced that it was just about the only way he could enter the Senate, where he hopes to wind up his public career (The Nation, October 25, 1971). At the time he ran for governor he couldn’t succeed himself. Now he’s in for more four more years and must match his accomplishments of the past four to have much chance of realizing his ambition. No matter how impressive his second-term achievements, in 1976 he must either tackle the invincible Sen. Robert C. Byrd or do something no politician relishes—drop out of the public limelight for two years before asking voters to make him Senator.

Meanwhile, Rockefeller is alive and well—and residing in West Virginia, pre-election predictions by detractors to the contrary notwithstanding. Two days after his political timetable required readjusting, he was doing what he had been doing throughout the last year, touring the state, shaking hands and thanking the faithful. His long-range plans include cooperating with whoever wishes to use his services to improve West Virginia’s much too coal-oriented economy, taking an active hand in state Democratic Party affairs, and running for governor again in 1976.

W. E. Chilton III

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE LIMITATIONS OF PLUCK

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

Mr. Bernstein, associate professor in the Department of History, Stanford University, edited Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Quadrangle Books). He is at present working on a book about the Truman era.

“Do your duty and history will do you justice.”
—Harry S. Truman

Nearly three decades have passed since that day in April 1945 when Franklin D. Roosevelt died and his little known Vice President, Harry S. Truman, became the thirty-third President of the United States. Awed by the responsibility and still standing in the shadow of Roosevelt, Truman told reporters: “Boys, if you ever pray, pray for me now. I don’t know whether you . . . ever had a load of hay fall on you, but when they told me . . . what had happened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me. I’ve got the most terribly responsible job a man ever had.” The folksy, cliché-ridden sentiments seemed to reveal much about the man—his lack of confidence, his plain origins, his unsophisticated nature.

His life, despite some early reversals and minor adversities, had been a quiet success story. His advancement was marked by pluck, tenacity, enthusiasm and luck. Raised in small-town America, he had been a bookish and respectful youngster whose weak eyes barred him from sports and West Point. After graduation from high school, he worked as a timekeeper, clerked in banks, and then returned to the family farm where he walked behind a mule and plow. (In later years he boasted of his straight furrows.) He also lost a few thousand dollars investing in lead mines and oil wells. Lifted out of Independence, Mo., by World War I, Truman found wide experience and great excitement in the army—combat, death and travel. Returning to Kansas City, he opened a haberdashery, lost it in the recession of 1921-22, and moved ambitiously into politics. Like many Democratic politicians of the period, he rose with the aid of a corrupt machine (the Pendergasts). He toiled industriously, avoided public condemnation, cultivated alliances and climbed to the Senate in 1934. He operated quietly and cautiously in his first term, failed to gain Roosevelt’s support in the 1940 primary, but in his second term won national attention as chairman of a special committee to investigate the war effort at home. In 1944, he was a compromise candidate for the nomination of Vice President, for he had offended no one and had built a record of integrity and party loyalty.

Thrust unexpectedly into the Presidency, Truman was ill-prepared to confront the massive challenges in domestic and foreign affairs. During his twelve weeks as Vice President, he seldom met with Roosevelt, never gained
his confidence, and was even kept ignorant of the Manhattan Project. Truman's major political problems developed first on domestic issues. After a brief honeymoon with Congress, he reached a stalemate and found many of his programs blocked. He was unable to chart a popular or successful course during the uneasy period of reconversion and postwar readjustment. Casting him aside briefly in 1946, when Democratic Congressional candidates played phonograph records of Roosevelt, his party still could not avoid defeat as the GOP exploited the frustrations and irritations of disgruntled citizens. "Had enough? Vote Republican" was the popular slogan. Meat shortages, strikes and high prices helped elect the 80th Congress. Ironically, the results helped Truman win re-election in 1948. Campaigning against an (allegedly) "do nothing" Congress, Truman reconstructed the fragmented Democratic coalition and in the now famous "give 'em hell" campaign won a surprising victory. His second administration was mired by scandal and fell victim to new challenges and defeats—the "loss" of China, the rise of McCarthy and the prolonged stalemate in Korea. Eisenhower's great triumph in 1952 also symbolized the voters' repudiation of Truman.

During the Eisenhower years, the nation's esteem for Truman slowly rose as the rancor of the earlier period faded. Evaluating Chief Executives about a decade ago, scholars placed Truman in the ranks of the "near great." Many admired his pluck, viewed him as decisive ("the buck stops here"), forgave him for his favoritism to cronies and deemed him right on the major issues of his time. They saw him a victim of conservative opposition and of McCarthyism. They heralded his criticism of McCarthyism and his efforts on behalf of civil rights for blacks. His foreign policy received great praise: he recognized the Soviet threat, launched the policy of containment, sponsored the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, extended collective security to Europe with NATO, and acted courageously to stop Communist aggression in Korea.

In recent years, Truman's Presidency has been subject to a new, less flattering reappraisal. Some of his failures of domestic policy can be explained by his indecision, his poor tactics, his Cabinet system of government—in short, by his flawed leadership. During reconversion in 1945-46, for example, splits within his administration, his choice of poor advisers and their sabotage of his programs contributed to his adversities. His commitment to the liberal vision, and that vision itself, have also been found wanting. Even Truman's activities on behalf of civil rights now seem faltering, ambiguous and limited. His conception of equality was narrow. While he did champion the boldest civil rights program of any President until that time, he also followed a strategy that raised serious issues about his commitment. He made legislative demands that he knew Congress would not grant, but acted more cautiously and sometimes reluctantly in areas where he had administrative authority.

In civil liberties, his administration's record was disappointing. His own loyalty and security program, which failed to distinguish between loyalty and security, applied the same standards ("reasonable grounds for belief of disloyalty") to diplomats and gardeners. Its operation relied upon dubious procedures: secret investigations, loose standards of evidence and nameless, faceless accusers. The program ruined some reputations, intimidated many people, and thwarted dissent. Despite its injustices, Truman in his later years stiffened the program by creating even more troubling standards—"reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the individual."

Truman established the loyalty-security program in part to defuse the attacks of Republicans, who charged the New Deal-Fair Deal with "softness on communism." His administration ultimately became a victim of the pressures it unleashed and of the attitudes it encouraged. Its exaggeration of the Communist menace at home and abroad, its use of scare tactics to pass cold-war programs, its attacks on dissent, its promise to create absolute security, its misunderstanding of revolution and its pledges to halt the spread of communism abroad—all this contributed to the national "illusion of omnipotence." How could the administration explain spies at home or the "loss" of China? Was not stopping espionage or keeping China simply a matter of will? Were these failures bungling or betrayal? Citizens could ask such questions.

An assessment of Truman's Presidency must rest largely on his foreign policy. Perhaps the most dramatic, troubling event was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When he sanctioned these attacks, Truman acted upon an assumption he had inherited from Roosevelt: the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used in combat.
What new President, poorly informed and fearful of error, would have had the boldness, independence and initiative to challenge Roosevelt's position? Truman used the bomb because there was no thought of not using it, because it did not seem to raise profound moral questions, and perhaps also because there were other advantages to using it: it might stop the Russians in Asia and make them more manageable in Eastern Europe. Shortly after Hiroshima, he cited the attack on Pearl Harbor to justify his decision: "When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast." America accepted the use of the bomb and rejoiced in the victory that it helped produce. Truman and his advisers had acted in accord with the wishes and will of most Americans in 1945: they sought retribution and peace and were willing to sacrifice many enemy civilian lives in order to save some American soldiers.

When Truman became President, Soviet-American relations were already strained—by the delayed second front, disputes over the Baltic states and Poland, and mutual suspicions. Within fifteen months, the Grand Alliance was smashed and the cold war a painful reality. Truman's reversal of FDR's acceptance of a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, the new President's attempts to roll back the Soviets from this area, his denial of a large loan to Russia, the practice of "atomic diplomacy," his maintenance of the nuclear monopoly, and the reversal of our policy in Germany—all these frictions helped to produce the cold war. That being so, the cold war could have been avoided if the administration had followed other practices, for Stalin's policies were basically conservative and devoted to establishing a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe and to reconstructing the war-ravaged economy. Nor did American public opinion demand the policies that the administration adopted toward Russia. In fact, Truman's government, often had to "enlighten" the electorate on Soviet malevolence and the need for militant American policies. Seeking to establish a world of peace and prosperity defined in American terms, Truman's administration aimed to impose its own terms on the postwar world. Would Roosevelt have acted differently? The evidence is unclear. We can only speculate—but we must remember that the atomic bomb and economic power were the potential weapons or bargaining counters that Roosevelt had purposely kept in reserve and thereby bestowed on Truman.

Losing hope of immediate liberation in Eastern Europe, the administration formally launched its containment doctrine in 1947: the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Truman seized upon Britain's withdrawal from Greece as an opportunity to declare a global crusade: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The situation in Greece was actually more complex than the administration understood: it was a broadly based revolution and not Soviet-directed. The economic arm of containment was the Marshall Plan: an attempt to reconstruct the faltering European economy, erase the conditions that would breed communism and integrate Europe into an American-dominated capitalist order. Despite denials at the time, the plan was designed to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. It considered the Soviet Union a prospective donor nation, required access to secret Soviet economic data, expected participating nations to move toward economic multilateralism, and also aimed to pry the Eastern European nations out of the Soviet orbit and back into the Western system. Rather than being simply an act of American benevolence, the Marshall Plan was part of a strategy for reconstructing the world on America's terms: the advancement of democratic capitalism. The program did assist Western Europe, thwart communism in that area; it also contributed to the East-West division of Europe.

During the administration's later years its probably most questionable decisions in foreign policy involved intervention in Korea, escalation and stalemate. Acting without adequate evidence, Truman wrongly interpreted North Korea's attack as part of a Soviet plot to extend communism in Asia and to test the administration's will in Europe. For Truman, the Korean conflict was not primarily a civil war between two sections of a divided nation but part of the plan of monolithic communism for world domination. Having badly misjudged the situation, the President and his advisers also moved promptly to remilitarize Europe and to request huge military budgets from Congress. In Korea, Washington's policies were unsuccessful. It sought to conquer North Korea and unify the nation, ignored warnings from Communist China, and thereby unwisely extended the conflict and squandered American lives and resources. Rejecting both withdrawal and victory (MacArthur's strategy), Truman continued the costly stalemate during his last eighteen months of office. The President and his associates thereby lost the confidence of many Americans.

To Dean Acheson, scion of the Eastern establishment of Harvard, Yale, and Covington and Burling, Truman was "the captain with the mighty heart." To many in the policy-making establishment, the President had acted repeatedly with courage and vision to create the world they sought: an American century. Theirs was not a new aim and others who did not serve might also have been willing architects of the cold war. Truman was not the indispensable man. He may have given the cold war his own distinctive flavor, but Soviet-American relations would probably not have been greatly different if someone else had occupied the White House. In the years 1945-53, few men with or near power were prepared to follow significantly different policies or desired a different world order. A judgment of Truman, then, ultimately may depend upon a judgment of America—its ideology and its structure of power.

Even in his years of retirement Truman commanded attention because he was once our President. Yet, at this time when we reflect upon his life, we should not concentrate exclusively upon his policies and thereby overlook other aspects of the man. He was feisty and enjoyed the combat of politics. Toward his associates he was fiercely loyal and he could inspire affection and respect even from men of greater education and sophistication. As a father and husband, he was a model drawn from an earlier age. He was loving, protective, solicitous,
understanding. As a private man, he was unpretentious, even earthy. Those who loved him may want to remember Truman not as an architect of the cold war but as a man of quick personal judgment, firm conviction and salty language. Consider, for example, an event of almost a decade ago, when he was walking with a crony along the corridor near his office. Pointing to his behind, Truman complained of a pain. Was it his hip?, the associate deftly asked. No, said Truman. Maybe the back? No, said Truman again. The upper thigh? No, said Truman impatiently, "It's a pain in my ass." With that blunt comment, he also revealed qualities of mind and temperament that partly explain why Truman, after meeting J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had expressed his personal agony about Hiroshima, ordered that he never wanted to see "that damned fool" again.

LABOR & NIXON

MOVING THE HARD-HATS IN

WILLIAM GOULD

Mr. Gould is a professor at the Stanford Law School, where he teaches labor law. He is the author of the forthcoming Black Workers and the Labor Movement: The Role of Law and Private Initiative.

President Nixon's appointment of Peter Brennan, head of New York City's building trades, as Secretary of Labor is not merely a "political payoff." To be sure, Mr. Brennan's oft expressed enthusiasm for the President's domestic and foreign policies demonstrated sufficient political fealty. Brennan first gained national recognition when he led demonstrations in lower Manhattan to support the Nixon war policy in Indochina—demonstrations in which a number of students holding contrary views were beaten up.

But much more is involved. The Nixon Administration is attempting to establish a firmer foundation for its newly won blue-collar constituency. In so doing, it has cleverly widened the cleavage between the industrial unions—whose leaders piously praised Brennan for the record—and the more conservative crafts, whose social vision does not extend further than the next wage increases for their white memberships.

For the first time since the Roosevelt New Deal coalition formed forty years ago, the unions in 1972 deserted the Democratic Party in significant numbers. And for the first time, the workers themselves deserted the Democratic standard bearer as well. A recently released Gallup poll shows that 54 per cent of union families voted for Nixon—56 per cent supported Senator Humphrey in 1968.

The defection of organized labor's top leadership from the McGovern-Shriver campaign was heralded by the announced neutrality of AFL-CIO President George Meany and I. W. Abel of the Steelworkers. These gestures were followed by active support for President Nixon's candidacy provided by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Teamster President Frank Fitzsimmons was the only labor member of the Pay Board not to resign last March; by a coincidence, the White House announced withdrawal of compulsory arbitration legislation aimed at transportation disputes almost simultaneously with the Teamster endorsement. Although Senator McGovern had the most endorsements from labor (eight of the major unions backed him—among them the UAW, Retail Clerks, Machinists, and State, County & Municipal Employees), the erosion of traditional unanimity damaged the Democrats.

Mr. Brennan explained the position of approximately thirty New York City unions, including the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the Fire Fighters and the Sanitationmen's unions at the formation of the Labor Leaders Committee for the Re-election of Nixon: "We put our country first." A day earlier in Washington, seventeen building trades internationals, accounting for 3.5 million of the AFL-CIO's 13.6 million membership, had denounced the McGovern policies as "unacceptable" and said: "We are convinced that the election of President Nixon will serve the interests of our members as Americans and building tradesmen."

Accordingly, the Brennan appointment is a straightforward attempt to serve those interests—and to serve them at the expense of the more progressive industrial and public employee unions (like the UAW and State, County & Municipal Employees union), as well as minority groups traditionally excluded from the five almost exclusively white mechanical trades in construction. (These are the plumbers and pipefitters, electrical workers, sheet metal workers, ironworkers and operating engineers.)

When Brennan was questioned at a press conference after his nomination about bringing minorities into the building trades, he said "I'm all for it." But he cited as proof his support for the Department of Labor's Outreach project—a program which admirably demonstrates the policy of "tokenism" as practiced by both government and the crafts. (According to AFL-CIO estimates less than 5 per cent of the apprentices selected by Outreach in areas where it operates are from the minorities—and in the mechanical trades these workers are still three to five years away from journeyman status.) Brennan's real attitude seems to be reflected by a statement that he made, according to The New York Times, in response to the 1963 civil rights demands: "We won't stand for blackmail. We had that from the Communists and the gangsters in the thirties."

More indicting, however, is Brennan's antagonism toward policies devised to integrate the trades by the Nixon Administration itself—e.g., the Philadelphia Plan (Actually this approach was conceived under Johnson but im-
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