peace? Will it be another League or an Anglo-American balance of power to replace the Anglo-French balance of power? Or will there be some real internationalism this time, with the participation of the best democratic elements of the Continent? (7) Wilson's "freedom of the seas." (8) What article of the Versailles treaty provided for this?

Generally speaking, the eight points apparently are designed to satisfy rather than thrill. They are good as far as they go, but they don't go far enough. They are a skeleton which awaits meat and skin. However, a big debate has been officially launched and now cannot end. Statesmen will be compelled to dot many i's and cross t's and elucidate x's. In the frame of the points the statesmen must draw a stirring picture of a brighter world than now exists in the countries which undertake to give it shape for all.

I am sure Roosevelt felt a greater urge than Churchill to formulate the eight points, but Churchill was able to establish at least one thing: America accepts responsibility for the peace. Otherwise, as far as the United States is concerned, the eight points would be pious wishes conceived in misleading vicariousness. Indeed, America is actually treated as the coequal of a belligerent in Point One. Else what right would it have to the territorial aggrandizement which it renounces therein?

F.D.R.'s First Task

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, August 16

It is against the background of two sets of figures that the 203 to 202 vote in the House on extension of army service must be assessed. The first figures are naval; the second, military.

The day of the House vote Vichy fully joined the Axis. In doing so it brought the total naval tonnage of the Axis powers-Germany, Italy, Japan, and France-to 2,143,000 tons. Our total combatant tonnage is 1,277,000 tons. That two-ocean navy of ours will not be ready until 1945 at the earliest. With the British fleet to aid us, we can defend ourselves in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the event of a British defeat, the naval odds would be heavily against us. If the Axis obtained the fleet of a defeated Britain as it has that of a defeated France, it would be able to march 3,500,000 tons, a naval force more than twice as large as the one we have now and a half-million tons larger than the one we shall have in 1945 even if the present tempo of naval construction is speeded up considerably; that assumes, too, that the Axis itself builds no new ships in the intervening years. This is the measure of Britain's aid to us, and the basic necessity which dictates our aid to Britain.

The military situation is also grim. Representative Thomason of Texas, a member of the Military Affairs Committee, put the bald facts before the House in the debate on selective service. Germany has 260 army divisions. Germany, Italy, and Japan combined have 449 divisions. We have 33 divisions, most of them only partly trained and yet to be fully equipped. Germany has 40 new divisions in training which will be ready for combat service this year. The Axis has 37,000 fighting planes and 32,000 big tanks; it has a plane production of 3,160 per month and a tank production of 900 per month. We shall not begin to match those production figures until the end of 1942, and at the present rate not until then shall we have a fully equipped and trained army of 2,000,000 men against the 10,000,000 the Axis has under arms.

Hitler will not be defeated by bombing Berlin or scrawling V's on outhouses. To land an army in occupied Europe would require a huge force, and the best the British could provide might be 100 divisions. The problem of landing one division and of maintaining one bridgehead under German bombardment would be terrific enough. Fortunately for Britain and America, the Führer by his attack on the Soviet Union has "landed" a huge anti-Nazi army on the Continent, the only army in the world other than the German which is trained and prepared for modern mechanized war. He has presented Britain and America with an enormous bridgehead on the Eurasian continent, from which flank attacks can be launched on both the Nazis and the Japanese. If the Russians can hold the Nazis on the Dnieper or the Volga, we may not have to worry about Nazis on the Amazon; and if they can hold the Japanese at the Amur, we may not have to worry about the tin and rubber we need from Malaya and the Indies. This is the measure of Soviet aid to us, and the basic facts which dictate aid to Moscow. If either Britain or Russia is defeated, the defeat of the other will become easier; the defeat of both would leave us outnumbered and encircled and blockaded in a hostile world.

Hitler had hoped that dislike for Stalin's ideological table manners—and, conversely, Soviet dislike for ours—would keep the leadership of the Western free countries from effective united action, and it may. The Roose-
velt-Churchill proposal for a conference with Stalin shows that our top leadership is robust enough to see the obvious. But the debate in the House on the Selective Service Act indicates that Mr. Roosevelt has yet to make America conscious of the realities confronting us. The British people see it; there is nothing like an incendiary bomb to illuminate an issue. But that hair-breadth victory in the House and the unanimous action of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the same day in voting down an army request for $1,347,000,000 for mechanized equipment show that too many Americans are still asl. When a nation’s leadership moves closer to war while its representative assembly moves farther away from it, danger is ahead.

To attribute Congressional action to Republican partisanship is to meet a crisis with a cliché. That a majority of the Republicans in Congress can play politics at a time like this indicates in itself that the issues have not been brought home to the people. Partisanship does not explain the vote of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which is controlled by Democrats, or the sixty-five Democratic votes against extension of army service. Not does it account for the hostile votes of such all-outers as young Tom Eliot of Massachusetts or Voorhis of California. The Communist issue played a double role. There was a feeling that the Russians would “take care” of the Germans, and there was talk of “bloody Joe Stalin.” But those who would lose a war rather than cooperate with the Soviets are distinctly a minority.

More fundamental than any of these factors was the feeling expressed over and over again in the debate by men whose devotion to country is beyond question that the Administration and the army chiefs have not taken the people into their confidence, have made promises only to break them, have not had the courage to be candid. Deepest of all was the rumble from the army training camps. Lack of material and failure to build morale have made extension of service unpopular, and this unpopularity was reflected in the vote. A contented people hates to fight until attacked, but recent history has shown over and over again that people which waits until it is attacked waits until the enemy has chosen the best possible moment to attack it. Mr. Roosevelt, with the future of the world on his shoulders, has no task more important than to bring this home to the American people.

A Strategy for Victory

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

As could have been calculated with mathematical exactness, Vichy, through Pétain’s recent broadcast, has sealed the closest possible bonds with Germany. But in spite of having betrayed the spirit of France in so many ignoble ways since his rise to power, the old Marshal likes to prove that he is still susceptible to the charms of l’esprit français. It is in that sense that one must interpret his burlesque reference to “the instinct of liberty which lives still within us, proud and strong.” To be fair, one should recognize that for more than a year the decayed defender of Verdun has been encouraged in his cynicism by the easy credulity of the democracies. Forgetting his past as a militant fascist and as a man of the Cagoule, together with his behavior during the days of the armistice, many ingenuous democrats have believed that the title of Maréchal de France was enough to set a limit to his honor. The theory of the “honest man” and of the “good Frenchman” also helped to obscure the outlines of a situation which it did not require very keen eyes to discern. On the other hand, the old game of playing a fascist who is considered less dangerous against another fascist of more frightening aspect again exercised its irresistible temptation in the chancelleries of the democratic countries.

In not a single case has this diplomatic strategy proved effective. It failed utterly in the case of Italy, where the frail Talleyrands of our day tried to exploit the supposed antagonism between the House of Savoy and the Duce. It failed in Berlin, where the fantastic Neville Henderson believed that Göring could be won over against Hitler. It will fail in Spain, where we have seen Franco represented as the man capable of keeping Spain out of the Axis orbit in opposition to Serrano Suñer, the evil spirit of fascism. But so many accumulated failures have not yet relieved certain people of the feverish desire to pursue a victorious policy through that absurd and discredited game.

On the very day that Pétain called upon France to tie its destiny to Hitler, a press dispatch from Madrid referred to the serious “disagreement” between General Weygand and Admiral Darlan on the policy of submission to Berlin. And here we are again! As soon as Pétain and Darlan have crossed decisively to the other side, there is discovered another candidate for the confidence of the anti-fascist public—the good General Weygand, who is to be played off against the abominable capitulators of Vichy. And so the game will go on until the hour when Franco will open the doors of Gibraltar and
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