A minimum program should never be offered at the beginning of discussions. An appreciation of the difficulties confronting the Soviets might go a long way toward solving certain problems. The fact that both sides will have something to offer in the way of concessions will facilitate an agreement. The total-disarmament proposal has also great propaganda value. It would not be offered for such a purpose, but if the Soviets should reject their own 1927 proposals, the picture would be clear. It would be the Soviet Union which refused to discontinue the cold war.

Stalin told Harry Hopkins in 1945 in Moscow that the United States was in Europe to stay whether it wanted to or not. And so is Russia. But what about Europe? This may well be the last chance to preserve the source of Western civilization. It will not be preserved by shaping Europe into the alien image of either collectivist Russia or capitalist America. American economic dominance and the Russian army cast deep shadows over the Continent. Under conditions of total disarmament the shadows might not be so dense as to stifle all independent development or prevent the economic stabilization that alone can make Europe an effective mediatory force between the super-powers.

Total disarmament is not a complete prescription, for even within the terms of such an agreement there would be many residual details to be settled. The negotiators would have to decide whether a small international force or small national contingents should be retained for a limited period to police occupied areas. They would also be confronted with the allied problems of the easier convertibility of the American economy to war and the easier mobilization of Russian man-power. No plan in the real world could eliminate all difficulties. But because the burden of their own armaments is becoming more dangerous to each group of powers than the enmity of the other group, the solution of these residual matters becomes a necessity.

The arms burden threatens the physical existence of the major powers through the depletion of national resources, loss of financial stability, and reduction of the standard of living. It threatens the moral destruction of the Western powers because it undermines the very values of freedom which are the essence of our civilization. No plan for quantitative or qualitative arms reduction can succeed. But a plan for total disarmament might be made to work, and to the nation that presents it and gains acceptance for it would go the moral leadership of the world. May the United States of America be that nation!

LIBERTY IN AMERICA

How to Measure Loyalty

BY CLIFFORD J. DURR

Are you loyal to the government of the United States? That's a silly question, and an insulting one. Of course you are. You know how you feel about your country and your government, and you know that you have never been disloyal in thought or deed. At least, that's your story, but can you prove it? How would you go about proving it?

These questions are not a parlor guessing game. They have a pretty grim importance if you happen to be an employee of the United States government in this Year of Our Independence, 173, of Our Bill of Rights, 158, and of Executive Order 9833, 3. They are beginning to have importance for more and more employees of state and municipal governments and also for school teachers and college professors. You may find before long that they will have importance for you, whatever your occupation.

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Roy Patterson is one of the thousands of United States government employees who have had their loyalty checked pursuant to the President's "Loyalty Order" of March 21, 1947, and he has been found wanting. In consequence he has a badly damaged reputation and no job. He also has a wife and two small children who depend on him for support.

At first Patterson (his real name) thought it would be easy to prove his loyalty, but now he knows better. He has been at it since June, 1948, when he received a notice from the chairman of the Loyalty Board of the Department of Labor advising him that his removal from the federal service was proposed on the basis of a charge "that there are reasonable grounds for belief that you are disloyal to the government of the United States." He has had two hearings, which seems fair enough—an original hearing before the Loyalty Board and a hearing on appeal before a representative of the Secretary of Labor. It can be assumed for present purposes that both hearings were conducted "in a serious atmosphere of dignity and decorum" and that the conduct of those in charge was "characterized by fairness, impartiality, and
Patterson still grounds" are "reasonable grounds" to the belief that [he is] disloyal," and the Honorable Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor, says the same. What those "reasonable grounds" are is a secret buried deep in the breast of the Loyalty Board and the Secretary.

Patterson, quite logically, thinks he would have a better chance of proving that he is "loyal" if he knew why he has been found "disloyal." But Messrs. Shane, Tyson, and Dodson won't tell him, and the Honorable Maurice J. Tobin won't tell him. They say they are bound by the rules, which provide that "the decision shall merely state the actions taken and shall be made a part of the record in the case." The rules do not say that an employee is entitled to know why he is declared "disloyal."

Maybe Patterson was found disloyal because of a mistaken interpretation of certain evidence in the record. Maybe it was because some of the witnesses were believed and others were not. Maybe it was because the board and Mr. Tobin disagree with his views on the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine. Maybe it was because they don't like Texans, or members of government unions, or Methodists. Patterson needs desperately to know. He has one more chance—before the Loyalty Review Board, the "Supreme Court" of the loyalty program—and he is convinced he can prove his "loyalty" there if he can find out the reasons for the decision of his other judges.

Patterson has of course been served with the customary charges, but he doesn't know whether he has been found guilty of all of them, only some of them, or none of them. He is not accused of any illegal acts. No suggestion is made that he has ever failed to discharge his duties with complete fidelity. He is not even accused of being a "Communist," past or present.

Perhaps it is best to let the charges speak for themselves. Here they are:

1. That you are or have been an active member of the following organizations: (a) Washington Committee for Democratic Action; (b) American Peace Mobilization; (c) American Youth Congress, (d) Washington Bookshop Association.

2. That you took an active part in the leadership of the American Peace Mobilization

3. That you have been in frequent and sympathetic association with persons alleged to be members of groups or organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney General.

4. That you have regularly read the Daily Worker; that you have approved and supported its policies.

5. That you have consistently followed and attempted to influence others to follow the Communist Party line regarding national and international problems. Particularly, (a) that you publicly criticized and attempted to influence others to oppose plans and efforts toward military preparedness and aid to the allies, terming the war the "imperialistic war," prior to Germany's invasion of Russia; (b) that you quickly reversed your position after Germany's invasion of Russia and approved and supported the position of Russia, and approved all possible aid to nations fighting Germany, terming the war the "people's war," attempting to assume a position of leadership in your community and personal associations in matters of preparedness, (c) that you have repeatedly approved and supported the position of Russia on significant issues as opposed to the position of the United States.

Patterson thought the best way to clear up any suspicions of "disloyalty" would be to offer affirmative proof of his "loyalty." Here is what the record shows on the affirmative side.

H e has been continuously employed by the United States government, as a civilian or soldier, for eleven years. His efficiency record as a civilian employee has never been lower than "very good." His immediate supervisor in the Department of Labor and the chief of his section both testified that his work had been entirely satisfactory; that he had been "loyal" to his job and that they did not have the slightest reason for questioning his complete and unqualified loyalty to his country.

On the military side he has in his favor a commission as a first lieutenant in the army, a Purple Heart with cluster, a promotion for "outstanding performance in active combat," a Silver Star, and a permanent partial disability resulting from a German machine-gun bullet that crashed through his chest and carried away a piece of his backbone.

The citation accompanying the Silver Star is weirdly incongruous with the findings of the Loyalty Board and Secretary Tobin. It reads as follows:

. . . For gallantry in action on October 4, 1944, in Italy. While attacking enemy positions located in a well-prepared defense system in mountainous terrain, Lieutenant Patterson. . . . was severely wounded when an enemy machine-gun opened up on the left flank of his platoon. Notwithstanding the severity of his wounds, he courageously remained in command of the platoon . . . and led a bold and daring attack to destroy the enemy threat upon the position's flank. His heroic tenacity in continuing to close with and destroy the enemy, although severely wounded, insured the success of the platoon's combat mission . . . and reflects great credit upon himself and the military service.

It would seem that past conduct should constitute strong evidence of future behavior. It would also seem...
that a demonstrated willingness to die in the defense of one's country should create a presumption of loyalty in the absence of very convincing evidence to the contrary. What weight did the Loyalty Board and the Secretary of Labor give to these factors, and what weight will the Loyalty Review Board give to them? Patterson doesn't know and nobody will tell him.

Patterson must also disprove his "disloyalty." How does one disprove "disloyalty" when the principal witnesses against one are nameless and absent? In answer to the suggestion of Patterson's lawyer that a little more information about the source of the charges might be helpful in getting at the facts, Mr. Shane, chairman of the Loyalty Board, stated the matter succinctly: "I hope you understand the position under which we have to operate. . . . It is not possible to call all the informants because in some cases we don't know who they are" (italics supplied).

But Loyalty Boards seem to have found an ingenious solution to the problem of cross-examining invisible witnesses who aren't there. Their presence is symbolized by a semi-invisible document, and their testimony is accepted without cross-examination. A report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has magic qualities which give veracity and relevance to everything in it. It becomes evidence above evidence.

The members of the Loyalty Board at least see the FBI report. The "accused" employee doesn't. The Sixth Amendment to our federal Constitution makes some very specific statements about the right of an accused not only "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations" upon which he is being tried, but also "to be confronted by the witnesses" against him. The loyalty program, however, is apparently above the Constitution. "I assure you," repeated Mr. Shane, "it isn't possible for us to reveal either the investigating report [or the names of the informants], as we ourselves do not know the names of the informants."

Patterson denied that he was ever a member, active or otherwise, of the American Peace Mobilization or the American Youth Congress. He admitted a "casual" past membership in the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and the Washington Bookshop Association, but presented documentary evidence to show that he resigned from both in June, 1941—two weeks before the invasion of Russia, by the way. What did the Loyalty Board and the Secretary of Labor find with respect to Count 1, and what conclusion did they draw from their findings? Patterson wants to know but nobody will tell him.

Patterson denied that he ever took an active part in the leadership of the American Peace Mobilization. What findings were made with respect to Count 2? Patterson wants to know but nobody will tell him.

Patterson admitted acquaintance with certain individuals mentioned for the first time at the hearing. He denied knowing others. Who are these individuals? What have they done? Are they honest, law-abiding citizens, or are they spies or otherwise dangerous criminals? What findings were made with respect to Count 3? Patterson wants to know but nobody will tell him.

Patterson admitted that at one time he read the Daily Worker as part of his assigned duties at the Department of Labor. It was part of his job, he says, to check a large number of newspapers for items dealing with labor disputes. He denied that he ever supported the policies of the Daily Worker and doesn't recall having seen a copy since he left his job to join the army. What was the finding with respect to Count 4? Patterson doesn't know and nobody will tell him.

Patterson denied that he had ever followed or attempted to influence others to follow the Communist Party line on national or international problems. Did the Loyalty Board and the Secretary of Labor find that he had or had not followed the Communist Party line? If so, in what respect? What was the finding with respect to Count 5? Patterson wants to know but nobody will tell him.

Patterson was asked a few questions that may or may not have a bearing on his loyalty.

Did you or did you not agree with Mrs. Blank's thoughts on American Peace Mobilization?

Did you or [your wife] sign any petition or send any telegrams to the Secretary of Labor protesting the discharge of Mrs. Blank and asking her reinstatement?

What was your opinion, if you wish to express it, as to whether Mrs. Blank was or was not [a Communist]?

What were your views on the Spanish revolution?
Were you always for China in its war against Japan?
Do you favor the present draft?

Do you recall if you had any ideas about European aid prior to 1939?

What distinction do you draw between the terms "communism" and "fascism," if you see any, and if so what is it?

What was your government bond-buying record right from the beginning?

I am interested to know when you became vitally interested in the question of non-segregation because it is rather unusual, you will have to admit, for persons born and raised in Texas to feel that that would be the reason for one to join the Washington Bookshop, for instance, because he could there attend segregated meetings. I would like to get your thinking on that.

Did Patterson give the right answer or the wrong answer to these questions? Or did he give the right answer to some and the wrong answer to others. He would like to know, but nobody will tell him.
Thus in the name of our "democratic process," which the Loyalty Order declares to be "the heart and sinew of the United States," certain men are empowered, in secret hearings, to render judgment against others depriving them of their jobs, their reputations, and all hope of normal and friendly intercourse with their fellow-men, without even giving the reason for their actions. Does it not follow that they are empowered to render such judgments arbitrarily and without having any reason?

Is the issue of our time really democracy versus communism? Is this the era of the "Fair Deal"?

Can Tito Survive?

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

I. The War of Nerves

BELGRADE'S only skyscraper is a thirteen-story building called the Albania, one of the city's hotels is called the Moscow and another the London. The most popular story in Belgrade today is about Tito being shown some plans for the reconstruction of the capital and, when asked if he had any suggestions, saying, "We should cut the Albania in half, pull down the Moscow altogether, and widen the street leading to the London."

For more than nine months now Russia and the "people's democracies" have been slingling mud at Yugoslavia, along with quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Yugoslavia has thrown back other quotations to show that it is a better Marxist than they, that Stalin is not infallible, and that Yugoslavia is perfectly right to go ahead with its own "building of socialism." Since December especially the Yugoslav leaders have been more and more emphatic in their statements to the effect that the Soviet Union and the people's democracies were deliberately sabotaging Yugoslavia's Five-Year Plan, and that under the circumstances Yugoslavia would trade with the West as much as possible—that is, obtain as much of what it needed for its Five-Year Plan as the West was willing to sell to it.

Before long this question of trade may become a question of credits. The official Yugoslav line is that there is nothing wrong in taking credits from America; even Anna Paucker's Rumania, the press has revealed repeatedly, has been getting loans from London bankers. Representatives of large United States steel interests are in Belgrade negotiating with the Yugoslav authorities about setting up blast furnaces and rolling mills so as to increase appreciably the country's steel output. Talk of sums like $100,000,000 is being gaily tossed around.

The official party line, as laid down by the party's ideologist, Moshe Pijade, is that "we shall go right ahead, for it will take the East some time to realize and to admit that it has committed a sin against Yugoslavia." The clear suggestion in all this is that Yugoslavia will go its own way in building socialism "without the Soviet Union" for the time being, and that later a reconciliation will take place between Tito and Stalin. While almost anything may happen in, say, twenty years' time, a reconciliation between the two can hardly be imagined in the foreseeable future, unless the Russians should become desperate and make friends with Tito on Tito's terms.

A war of nerves more ferocious than the cold war between East and West has been waged by the East against Yugoslavia. There is every reason to suppose that most if not all of the recent stories about "riots in Macedonia," "troop movements on the Hungarian and Rumanian borders," and so on which have hit the front pages of hundreds of Western newspapers were simply planted in Trieste, Vienna, Rome, Paris, or Istanbul by Cominform agents and joyfully lapped up by our news hounds. Official and semi-official advisers of the Western press, who encourage all the sillier forms of wishful thinking about Czechoslovakia and Poland, were taken in by these planted rumors, not realizing that their main purpose was to demonstrate to the West that economic aid to Yugoslavia would be a very poor investment.

Having traveled all the way to both the Rumanian and the Hungarian border, I am quite certain that there are no "troop movements" there of any description, and that the Voivodina is as peaceful as your back garden. If there is to be any trouble, fostered from outside, it will break out in the south, not in the north; but I shall come to this later.

The major questions in Yugoslavia today are the following: How much headway has Cominform propaganda made in the last nine months in preparing the overthrow of the Tito regime? Is the country on the
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