LITERATURE AND WAR.

As the press has grown in power and importance, it has come to take a larger and larger part in international controversies. Despotisms are so well aware of this that they edit the periodicals on this class of questions themselves. At St. Petersburg or Constantinople the publishers are told by the Government what to say in a dispute with a foreign Power. But the support obtained in this way is feeble indeed compared to what democratic governments get from their periodicals. The lawyers, jurists, publicists, professors, and clergymen all fall to with arder to show that wherever their own Government does or claims is absolutely right and justifiable. For instance, during our Bering Sea trouble, numerous lawyers and professors showed in divers magazines that our claim of Bering Sea as our peculiar property was right, and that America would be recognized without difficulty off the Cape of Good Hope. During the Venezuela trouble, Senator Lodge and various other publicists showed weekly in some journal the exact extent to which Great Britain had encroached on Venezuela.

It really does not make much difference whether the views thus propounded are sound or not. They are not expected to exert any determining influence on the controversy. Neither Power engaged in it thinks of adopting their conclusions. The purpose they serve is to satisfy the writer's own public that things are going well, and that the party in power deserves to be backed up by the nation. In England, which has so many foreign controversies, this does not hold quite so true, because England always has a critical Opposition, which is often apt to take the side of the foreigner because its own ministry takes the other. The Afghans, for instance, the Egyptians, the Turks, and the Russians have had their friends among the Liberals. We have fewer of these foreign questions, and, since the war of the rebellion, we have had no national critical Opposition; whatever position the party in power may choose to take in any foreign controversy, the Opposition content themselves with "going them one better," or saying that they might have made the case stronger.

But we have had in the present dispute with Spain many curious examples of the literary backing of the Government than any others we can recall. In the first place, the object of the war was never clearly defined. Some said it was one thing and some said another. The public was left in the dark; a great deal of decisive essay-writing. But the topics suggested by controversies about the object of the war before Dewey's victory were nothing in number compared to those which have been produced since. The sudden appearance of a theory of "expansion" or "imperialism" running directly counter to previous American ideas and policy would have looked, to us by observers, like an example of greed and volatility if there had not been numerous ready writers to explain it, and show that it is the most natural thing in the world for people who have always hitherto carefully confined themselves to the continent of America, to claim a group of islands on the other side of the globe.

The most entertaining of these writers whom we have met with is a Mr. Powers, who writes home to the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, from Berlin, explaining to us how right and natural has been everything we have said, thought, or done since last January. He acknowledges that a year ago we firmly held the "Monroe Doctrine," and that we have turned it to good account since then, and have more than repudiated the Doctrine within this year, after having held it aggressively for seventy-five years. Says he, "The rapidity with which these great questions have been forced upon the American mind has been bewildering, and our instinctive response must be regarded as highly significant of national character." This might seem to many careless observers a sign of our ignorance of the difficulties of governing distant dependencies, and of the absence of the habit of deliberation on grave questions of public policy. But Mr. Powers shows that it is nothing of the kind. He approaches the subject as a "scientist," and maintains that we have not suddenly changed our ideals; that we are but slowly developing them after a century, and have suddenly discovered their application to a new situation.

Well, how does it happen that we have made this discovery so suddenly? We have not really made it ourselves; it has been thrust upon us by some thing called the "Manifest Destiny." What Manifest Destiny is, nobody exactly knows, but it is evidently the most useful phrase in the whole range of political terminology. As nobody is able to define it except as "a sense of destiny," any man or party, clergyman, professor, or "scientist," is able to ascribe to it any act or omission, crime or neglect, of which he has a mind to be guilty. It is simply a device to much in use in criminology, for the exclusion of the human will from the government of human conduct. We thought at one time that the control of what the ancients called Fate, or Destiny, over the affairs of mankind had been reduced to very small limits, and that since the introduction of Christianity the moral responsibility of men for their own acts had been immensely enlarged.

In fact, one of the fundamental assumptions of the politics of the modern world is that what a Christian nation does has been done deliberately, and after full consideration of the pros and cons. Of course, if it were allowed to a civilized nation to start suddenly on new and aggressive courses, in which their previous ideas, standards, and policies were completely ignored, in which they turned their backs on all the doctrines they had previously preached about right, duty, or expediency, and gave no better reason for the change than that somebody said it "destiny," or somebody had had a "dream," or seen a vision, or met a black cat in the highway, the whole civilized world would be plunged in inextricable moral confusion. There is no duty which a nation or man owes to its or his fellows more sacred than the duty of letting them know what it or he will do next. In fact, this knowledge is what is called "character." It is the only proper basis which we have for our dealings with our fellows. A man who has not the courage to say in any matter of social intercourse nobody can predict is said to be a man without character. The same thing may be said of a nation. A nation which can make an alliance, or a claim, and abandon it in a month or two without giving reasons one way or the other, and the grounds of whose policy on any grave question can be ascertained, not from the speeches of statesmen or the public papers of its responsible representatives, but only from the hazy excesses of "scientists" or inflated "patriots," signifies very distinctly an unwillingness to continue in the family of nations, or acknowledge subjection to any law but its own power.

The situation under which the American people are in danger of getting at this crisis, through listening to the jargon of "scientists" and "sociologists," is that the notion of a people can "expand" through wealth and power when wealth and power are not backed up by necessities. Nothing can be more to suggest that we are the only people who have felt the desire to "expand" or who have "expanded." We have had half-a-dozen expanding nations, from Egypt down--Greece, Rome, Charles the Fifth's empire, Napoleon's empire, and Great Britain. They all expanded or desired to expand. "They wanted the earth," as Mr. Powers says, and some of them got hold of a large patch of it. They have all except Great Britain disappeared, not because the desire for wider dominion died out, but because the desire ceased to be supported by sound administration and healthy moral training. Rome had a far wider dominion than we can aspire to, and was weakened by internal dissensions. Rome had a far wider dominion than we can aspire to, and was weakened by internal dissensions.
that a stable empire must rest on other foundations than large revenues or big armies or great navies.

This is nothing more certain, if human history teaches us anything, than that the affairs of a nation, to be managed successfully, must, like those of an individual, be managed by its leading minds; that as soon as its leading minds, the minds of those who know and remember, cease to manage them, confusion and decadence set in, no matter what its material resources. This is the least we know about "Manifest Destiny." What Cato said in the Senate two thousand years ago is as true today as it was then, that byiggles, opus, bene consedulo national affairs prosper, and not otherwise—not by destroying fleets or storming redoubts.

Mr. Powers maintains, again, as a "scientist," that the "ideal of national isolation is due to 'law' as fundamental as the constitution of protoplasm." "We depurate," says he, "the petty politics, the short-sighted sentiment, and the unbridled passions which carried us with indecorous haste into a war whose cost we had not counted and whose results we could not foresee. But whence have come this pettiness and indecorum, these bickerings and feuds, this lawlessness and irresponsibility which are the repellent characteristics of American political and private life? From this same isolation and immunity from danger and responsibility. This is a characteristic exclusively vaguely thought, but, as well as we can make out, what it suggests is, that we need more people to rule in order to purify our politics and get rid of 'the bickerings and feuds and the lawlessness and irresponsibility.' We advise all persons who labor under this mischievous delusion to study John Wannemaker's speeches made in Pennsylvania this year, and then to apply themselves vigorously to investigate the causes of the appearance of the boss in our States and larger cities. Having studied them, they will be able to tell the world whether it is Manifest Destiny which makes us obey the Boss-implicity in spite of his notorious rascality, as well as to long for more people for him to rule over."

what to do with the philip-

ines.

A correspondent makes the perfectly reasonable inquiry what we should ourselves do with "the Philippines, the Carolines, Porto Rico, and all the rest," if we had our way, if, as appears plainly enough, we do not wish Uncle Sam to keep them. This inquiry we feel we ought to answer, and we certainly ought to be prepared to answer it.

For driving the Spaniards out of Cuba there were many excuses of various degrees of value. The gross spectacle of bad and cruel government which the island had afforded for many years, the nearness to our shores, the disturbance to our peace of its frequent rebellions, were all things which might have been fairly treated as reasons for interfering, according to the principles and precedents of international law, whenever the people of the United States deliberately determined to do the Cubans a good turn, no matter at what cost to themselves. The chief argument against interferences which we always used was the effect on ourselves. We cordially solemnly announced that the war was simply a war of liberation, there was no more to be said. The liberation has been accomplished. The destruction of the regular government of Cuba, and her close contiguity to us, make it impossible for us to cast her loose. We must take charge of her, and do the best we can with both her and Porto Rico. But we are bound by our own solemn pledges not to make a conquest in either case. That we need a "cooling-station" in one of these places has no more to do with the matter, after what we have said, than my want of a watch would have to do with my right to steal one.

One, of course, any one who replies that we may do whatever we have the strength to do, has us on the flank. One does not argue with the master of twenty legions. It was, we who said originally that, to make this war result in conquest for our own benefit, would show that it was a war of 'criminal aggression.' It was President McKinley. It is to him that any one must apply who wants to know what we are going to do with Cuba. In Porto Rico there were no rebellions and no discontent to our knowledge. The only excuse we have heard of for taking the island is that we wanted it ourselves. This as an American excuse is certainly very novel, as an excuse for conquering it is very old and familiar; but it is not an excuse one can argue about, as we have already said. This is one of the difficulties which the theological professor recommended his students "to look steadily in the face and pass by." When a man has stolen something, there is no use in getting advice as to what he had better do with his "bootie."

The Philippines seem to us to stand in a different category from Cuba or Porto Rico. We have never had anything to do with them. But few of our people had ever heard of them before this year. We were, when the war broke out, no more responsible for them than for any other part of the globe. They were not near us. They were as remote as they could be with the present configuration of the earth. They had in no way troubled our peace. They had never appealed to us for being oppressed. They were not of our faith, language, or religion. Our commerce with them was small. Other relations we had none. When the war broke out, no admiral or general was directed to carry on operations against them. Spain had a foot in their vicinity, which Admiral Dewey was directed to destroy, not for the purpose of freeing the Philippines, but of compelling Spain to relinquish Cuba. Under the original McKinley programs, therefore, the thought which came to him after Spain had relinquished Cuba, or even after it was plain that her relinquishment was only a question of days, was clearly "criminal" thought. His mind clearly worked in some such way as this, after Dewey's victory:

"It is true I gave out, before the war began, that it was to be a war of liberation, and to have in view solely the elevation of mankind.' But that was before I knew how easy victory over the Spaniards would be. I thought then the fight might be long and costly. It is turning out such an easy matter that I see clearly I asked too little. I see now I can get twice as much out of Spain as the liberation of Cuba, at little or no expense. So why not make what the Filipinos, but not the Spaniards would be. I thought then the fight might be long and costly. It is turning out such an easy matter that I see clearly I asked too little. I see now I can get twice as much out of Spain as the liberation of Cuba, at little or no expense. So why not get it? Our own people are so proud of what Dewey has achieved that I am sure they will not object. England will not object either, as she is just now very anxious for our friendship, and we need not mind what the others say. Of course that talk of 'criminal aggression' was a little thoughtless, and is now a little awkward when I come to explain matters to the church-members and the clergy, but my friend Hanna has suggested to me an excellent plan for shutting them up. What he recommends is as we should call Dewey's victory a providential extension of our original programs; that we should say it was made very clear, by the Philippines being near the scene of the victory, that God Almighty meant that we should occupy them in order to convert the heathen and Catholics to good American Christianity, and destroy the power of their wicked and unscrupulous clergy, and spread good Republican civilization through the islands. This will be 'blessly' to the religious people especially, as they are, just now intoxicated with victory, and will also please the speculators, who expect to make money in the Philippines, and the politicians, who expect to get salaries through annexation, as well as anything we could say. So it will do, at all events, to withdraw as yet."

Now for what we think should have been done after the Dewey victory. We think that a thoroughly honest and consistent President would have ordered our Admiral to leave Manila, to give himself no more trouble about the Philippines after he had destroyed the fleet, but to come back to the West and, after Camara's fleet, to follow it steadily until he caught and destroyed it also, or shut it up in some impenetrable port, and after he had caught Camara and destroyed him, we should, if we were not needed over here to assist in the reduction of