troubling questions would be silenced by the “stability” that is being called for in many places today.

All the more reason for Palestinians to specify what their political program for self-determination is. Doubtless this must be regarded as another of theonerously self-limiting and self-restraining tasks we have to impose on ourselves. But it, rather than the tactic of withholding recognition of Israel as a bargaining chip, is also the source of our political power, such as it is. Hitherto, we have been content to indicate our political decisions in a guarded, almostcryptic way. For instance, we have let others surmise that the resolutions passed by the Palestine National Council sessions of 1974, 1977, 1979 and 1981 were all parts of a concerted movement within the Palestinian community toward settlement and “a political solution. Ironically, our enemies have disparaged these resolutions while our super-patriots have denounced them as “concessions.” What we have yet to do is to say exactly what it is that we now struggle for, as we move with much difficulty and suffering toward self-determination.

Doing this does not mean making new concessions. It is a matter of courageously addressing the people who must be involved in Palestinian self-determination—Palestinians and, yes, Israelis and Jews. We have always been against territorial expansionism, against a polity based on race, religion or creed, against unequal economic and social practices, against power that is accountable to moral and ethical review. These values must now be embodied in the principles of Palestinian self-determination, and in such a way that the Israelis are offered something so clear and of such unmistakable human worth that they are drawn into political discussions. The time of hiding behind phrases like “the liquidation of Zionism” is past. We must say clearly and directly to the Israelis what we propose to share with them as inhabitants of Palestine—other than mutual annihilation. They must not be allowed to believe that their only alternative to permanent war is to be “driven into the sea.”

Who can doubt that this is a major, immensely difficult and complicated step to take? Yet such a thing can be done only by the Palestinians. It cannot be done by individuals alone; it must be a national effort. But individuals can now declare unequivocally that the time for speaking clearly has arrived. Ambiguity about our purposes is a useful tactic in the short run, but it cannot be a productive long-term strategy. Unless we produce a political discourse today that specifies as well as embodies what our struggle for self-determination is about, and unless we do so in a way that does not betray the values that have fueled our struggle, we risk entering the final stages leading to self-determination unprepared for its outcome, a Palestinian state. If such a state is simply a mirror image of other states in the region, it would be a monster.

Israel and the American Left

Christopher Hitchens

At the moment, the United States is governed by an Administration that indulges Israeli extremism on the West Bank of the Jordan River, and that supports anti-Jewish extremism in South America and South Africa and Saudi Arabia. To call this a paradox would be an overstatement. What is striking is that many leading intellectuals are prepared to support the government on the second count because they sympathize with it on the first.

This article will try to deal with the effect of the Middle East conflict on American liberals. It will thus, necessarily, be an article largely about Jews. There was a time when Israel was accepted by most liberals as a democratic state with many socialist features and as embodying an affirmative victory over the dark racial prejudices that in many ways precipitated its birth. Today, when Israel puts itself forward as a sturdy ally in the cold war and as a reliable bridgehead against Arab and Iranian ferment, there has been a certain, how shall we say—coarsening of the Zionist position. If Israel has become the natural friend of the overdogs in America and elsewhere, will this not have a consequence or two for liberal Jews and thus for American liberalism? A limited but significant number of commentators have already answered “yes” to this question, and striven to win over doubting liberals to a new pole on the right.

It is impossible to reduce the complexity of the argument to a single example. Still, two slight anecdotes from the contemporary scene may help to sketch an introduction.

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In June of this year, liberal circles in New York City were briefly but noticeably convulsed by an exchange in The Village Voice. Jack Newfield, a grizzled foot-soldier in the stage-army of the good, accused his colleague Alexander Cockburn of concealing anti-Semitic attitudes beneath a facile anti-Zionism. Newfield’s article, though clumsily written and argued, bore all the symptoms of a long-pent-up misgiving about socialist attitudes toward Israel and Zionism. But it did not, or could not, confine itself to the Middle East. It accused Cockburn of being a closet Stalinist and “anti-West.”

Some months after that suggestive exchange, President Ronald Reagan cracked enough fingers and fumors to get his Awacs deal past the Senate. On the night of the vote, ABC’s Nightline featured a three-way debate between Faisal Al-Hegelan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, former Prime Minister of Israel, and Richard Allen, Reagan’s ultra-right-wing (and pro-Menachem Begin) National Security Adviser. Since the Saudi ambassador was almost incorrigible with self-satisfaction, it came down to Rabin versus Allen. Why, Allen was asked, had America abandoned its written pledge to eschew sales of strategic arms to the Arab world?

Well, he replied, the situation had changed. Iran was in chaos, Ethiopia was in war, and Libya seemed positively menacing. Anwar el-Sadat had been slain. A certain notorious superpower stood by ready to exploit these distressing developments. So, what Saudi wanted, Saudi was going to get (and no nonsense, by the by, about them recognizing Israel’s right to exist). Rabin sat through this with an air of distinct discomfort. Weren’t those Is-
rael's hardware arguments he was hearing? Wasn't it just that reasoning that had impelled him, when he was Israel's ambassador to Washington, to urge American Jews to vote for Richard Nixon in 1972? Hadn't Israel stood by Haile Selassie and the Shah until the last ditch? Allen's proposition that a perceived threat implies the promiscuous armament of the nearest "bulwark" may seem like a non sequitur anyway (it is). But to Rabin, and to some others, it only sounds like a non sequitur when it isn't being applied to Israel. The best the former ambassador and Prime Minister could do was to threaten faintly that Israel might keep the Sinai. All in all, it was not an auspicious evening for Israeli "social democracy."

This is not the first time that Israel's policy has yielded unlocked-for results. In the 1950s, Israel became an ally of British and French colonial policy. It supported the French government's murderous repression in Algeria. It was a junior partner in the 1956 Suez crisis provoked by Britain and France. It shared "intelligence" and military information with Paris and London in a common front against Arab nationalism. This had two effects (beyond speeding the farcical collapse of British and French influence). It isolated those in Israel who sought a modus vivendi with the Arabs. And it compromised Jews on the British and French left while strengthening the hand of conservative forces. So long as loyalty to Israel was an issue in the conflict, there were many people who felt that the Anglo-French colonial policy could not be criticized quite as it deserved. Though, as ever, Jewish radicals were in the forefront of protest, there were many others, Jews and non-Jews, who were, fatally ambivalent. The French Socialist Party took decades to recover.

Both of these features are present in the current and continuing argument in America. And so is a third one, though its outlines can only just be discerned. Once the French right had no further use for Israeli support, it moved back to a more traditional position. As soon as Iraq became a better customer and partner than Israel, there was what might politely be called a "tilt" in that direction. And when Israel protested at this poor return on friendship, many in the salons of Paris were overheard to say that that was the trouble with Jews. There will come a time when the American right, for all its unwelcome support for Israel's current settlement policy in Palestine, decides in its turn to support Israel as the rope supports the hanging man.

(Sadly, the Israeli establishment has seen this point and drawn the wrong conclusion from it. It is common to hear Israeli spokesmen justify their hard line by saying that they do not wish to be abandoned "like South Vietnam or Taiwan." By appealing for support as an encircled and embattled state, Israel has moved toward psychological identification with the pariah community. Hence some of its less palatable alliances in the Third World.)

The future attitude of the right toward Israel is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of this article. I want to propose that the evolution of Israel into a colonial and military power has already placed American liberals in a very ambivalent and uncomfortable spot. I hope we may take it for granted that, as Irving Howe and Bernard Rosenberg put it a few years ago in an essay in The New Conservatives (New American Library):

"The overwhelming thrust of Jewish thought and writing in America these past several decades has been liberal, notably more so than in the population at large; and whatever radicalism we have had in America has found disproportionate support among Jews. For the sake of symmetry, let me add the natural corollary Howe and Rosenberg made:

"It is hardly a secret that the number of Jews active in liberal, protest, radical and civil libertarian movements is highly disproportionate."

The Howe-Rosenberg essay, which makes a convenient point of entry to the argument, was titled "Are American Jews Turning to the Right?" In answer, it gave a much qualified "not necessarily." It stressed racial factors and the undeniable improvement of the socioeconomic position of Jews in the United States. It gave some attention to the evolution of Commentary magazine under the stewardship of Norman Podhoretz (concluding that his mounting attacks on the left did not yet amount to a neoconservative position), and it emphasized the security and the prosperity of American Jews.

Howe and Rosenberg fairly concluded that there had been no general rightward shift among Jews. What they did not do, except in the most tentative manner, was to scrutinize the influence of Israel in shaping the answers to their crucial original question. When the authors did do this, they preferred to stress ideological and even psychological factors. Discussing the predicament of Jews, they wrote:

"Black antagonism... is linked in their minds with global anti-Semitism and the enmity of Arabs toward Israel. Personal fright on the streets, poor public schools, a meritocracy in decline—all merge psychically with the precariousness of Israel and the mortification of Soviet Jewry. Who can easily separate in such reactions the warranted concern from the "paranoid" excess?" [Emphasis added]

This approaches the root of the matter. Since the days of Hubert Humphrey there has been a measurable decline in the Jewish vote for liberal causes and positions. But this decline has not been as sharp as Milton Hintmefarb's electoral analysis in Commentary would have us believe. Nor is it traceable to any one issue. Rather there is a certain nexus of emotions involved—very much like those described by Howe and Rosenberg. Clearly, the question of Israel is near the heart of this confusion, and if the left fails to recognize it, the right does not.

The furthest that Howe and Rosenberg would go in this direction was to state, cautiously:

"Yet the paradox that must be recognized is that ifso far as Israel functions—must function—as a state dealing with other states, its impact upon American Jews is—perhaps must be—conservative. [Emphasis added.]

Note the throat-clearing and the conditional in that thoughtful sentence. The key word is "paradox." I want to argue that, increasingly, there is nothing paradoxical about positions that favor Israel's policies and are highly conservative; that there is now a better "fit" between Zionism* and conservatism than

* All shorthands are odious, but very few are dispensable. Some define "Zionism" as the end of exile and the ingathering of all Jews Jacob Timmerman defines it as "the national liberation movement of the Jewish people." Most Arabs define it as a theory of racist colonization. George Orwell said of it that it had "the usual characteristics of a nationalist movement, but the American version of it seems to be more violent and malignant than the British." Others on the left have seen it, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, as the Jewish version of self-determination. I use it here to mean those who accept the rationale of Israel's actions as a state even when they disagree with some or many of its specific policies.
ever before, and that this has exacted a high price from the American liberal coalition. Irving Kristol once wrote, crassly, that a neocorporative was a liberal who had been mugged by reality. I would not wish to borrow his pseudo-intellectual method. But, as one of the hired pens of the New Right and the Reagan Administration, he has hit on the ghost of a point. Many of those who have moved rightward are former liberal Zionists disturbed by the resentment of ghetto dwellers and repelled by the Third World attitude toward Israel.

Let me define what I mean by the use of a counterexample. Writing in Commentary almost two years ago, Midge Decter packed the whole problem into fifty words:

In a world full of ambiguities and puzzles, one thing is absolutely easy both to define and locate: that is the Jewish interest. The continued security and, in those happy places where the word applies—well-being of Jews, worldwide, rests with a strong, vital, prosperous, self-confident United States.

This is question-begging on a Homeric scale. "Security" is of course a well-known code word. (Is Israel more or less secure for holding Arab territory?) And we all know what some people mean by a "strong" United States. But the idea that the issue is an "easy" one, devoid of ambiguities and puzzles, is breathtaking: In order to minimize misunderstanding, I state my own position, which is that the problem is highly complex and sensitive. And that Jewish security and well-being depends, perhaps rather more than other people's, on the defeat of chauvinism everywhere. And that the Israeli ruling establishment, both the Labor and the Likud parties, has moved away from this position. And that those in the United States who call themselves Zionists have, as a consequence, wavered in their traditional allegiances. Inevitably, this has led to confusion among liberals and intellectual—one confusion that can only intensify as Israel becomes more conservative. The idea of Begin as an "aberration" used to be convenient as an escape clause, but it now lacks the crucial merit of plausibility.

I have the impression that Howe has somewhat modified his own position to take account of this. In a recent interview with me, he said that "Israel has replaced liberalism as the secular religion of American Jews." This suggests, to put it no higher, that coexistence between the two commitments is becoming problematic.

Why should this not be the case? The Jewish people have the same right to a "state dealing with other states" as do any other people. They have no less right to form opportunistic alliances, purchase weapons, impress neighboring countries and suppress inconvenient minorities. There is no categorical reason to criticize Israeli policies any more than those of Iraq, the Philippines or China. What makes the argument bite hard on American life is the real paradox, unidentified either by Howe or by Podhoretz, that Jewish people in the Diaspora do have a general interest in resisting forces of bigotry and reaction, whereas, at least in the short term, the state of Israel does not. Indeed, Israeli leaders have an occasional interest in actually allying with such forces. And, sad to say, many of the policies of that state—especially in the Third World and on the West Bank—positively appeal to those who do not normally care for Jews. Let me attempt to give a few recent and important examples.

Perhaps the first time that the realization of such a collusion between Israel and the American right occurred to a large number of people simultaneously was when then Ambassador Rabin exceeded his diplomatic status to urge that Jewish-Americans vote for Nixon. But in 1972, there were many to argue that he had made a slip—even if an emblematic one. Now, that view would be very much harder to defend. An episode that threw the issue of Israel and the right into sharp relief took place in New York City in November 1980. It showed, like my earlier vignettes, that uncritical attitudes toward Israel have a way of rebounding on Jewish interests, and on the liberal politics that were once inextricable from them. (Nixon's anti-Semitism is now better known than it was in 1972.)

At a gala dinner for the centenary of Vladimir Zeve Jabotinsky, the right-wing Zionist ideologue, Prime Minister Begin pinned a Jabotinsky medal—one of a very limited number to be conferred —on the swollen breast of the Rev. Jerry Falwell. Many liberal Jews, most notably Rabbi Alexander Schindler, were outraged by this brash endorsement and said so in public. Was it not
Falwell's movement that had implied (at the least) that God was indifferent to the Jews? What was Begin, who if anything overstates the intimacy between Jews and scripture, doing with this character? The Rabbi soon got his answer. Writing in the *Jewish Week-American Examiner*, Herbert Zweibon, Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac (author of scurrilous attacks on the Institute for Policy Studies in *Mainstream* and elsewhere) were contemptuous of Schindler's soft-hearted caveat. Falwell's view of Jews or any other kind of American was not the point. What counted was his attitude toward Israel, and toward Zionism's American "friends."

They wrote of Falwell:

Even apart from the vital issue of Israel, at this time there is a far greater communality of interests among Jews and the Moral Majority than there is among Jews and the National Council of Churches. An America with a strong family that fosters traditional values is far more likely to be a comfortable place for Jews than an America where no values are upheld.

This, of a man who forced even Roy Cohn onto the record with a denunciation of anti-Semitism! The objection to the National Council of Churches, by the way, was not to its presumed anti-family and antitraditional stands so much as to its advocacy of "dialogue" with the P.L.O. So, better to cooperate with the most bigoted force in the country than with those who would share the Holy Land with its Arab inhabitants. Writing in *Commentary*, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab were hardly less complacent. They did not exult, as Podhoretz had already done, about Jimmy Carter's failure to get a majority of the Jewish vote in 1980. But they were as tender as could be to Falwell. He was, for instance, a great improvement on his frantically anti-Semitic predecessor, the "evangelist" Gerald Winrod:

For the Reverend Gerald Winrod to have accepted an award from a national Jewish conclave, as Jerry Falwell recently did, is unimaginable. Indeed, so sensitive is the Moral Majority to Jewish fears that it has requested a "dialogue" with representatives of every major Jewish organization "to make the Jewish community aware that we are not an anti-Semitic group and that we probably are the strongest supporters of Israel in this country."

(Love the "probably.")

Falwell, certainly, feels free to advise Israel and the Jews. He recently told *Jewish Press* magazine that "there is no question Jueada and Samaria should be part of Israel," adding that the sooner the Golan Heights and Jerusalem were fully annexed as well, the better for all concerned. What is depressing is to find Lipset and Raab writing an unequivocal "Q.E.D." under all this garbage, as if to say, "If he is uncritical of Israel, how can he be a bigot?" Picture for a second what *Commentary* would print if anybody on the left had spoken of the Jews as Falwell has done.

It's clearly on the left that *Commentary* sees the threat to Jewish interests. In a boring symposium published in the magazine's January 1980 issue, the editors asked readers to reconsider "axiomatic" Jewish attachment to what they termed "the standard liberal agenda." The pretexts for doing so were illuminating:

This axiom might seem to have been called into question by certain recent developments—the widespread support among liberals for quotas, the diminishing enthusiasm among liberals for Israel, the growing sympathy of liberals for the P.L.O., and the paucity of liberal protest against the anti-Semitism that surfaced in the wake of Andrew Young's resignation.

There are many striking aspects to that "question." (For one thing, how do you call an axiom into question? For another, how do you characterize the departure of Young from his post as a "resignation"?) The first three ingredients or clauses restate the same point in different ways—loyalty to Israel is assumed to take precedence. The very last reflects back upon the very first. It is implied, as if it were pointless to debate the matter, that affirmative action is bad for all classes and sexes of Jews. This bold assertion is then juxtaposed, as if naturally enough, with wanting liberal support for Israel. Tautology intervenes for a second to match sympathy for the P.L.O. with hostility to Israel. Then we learn that Young is responsible not only for his own firing but for any prejudiced remarks that might have been made about it. Earlier I quoted Howe to the effect that subliminal and intuitive factors were important in perceptions like these, and I think that the editors of *Commentary* really have no choice but to agree.

As Prof. Bernard Avishai showed in a striking and incisive article in *Dissent* (Spring 1981), *Commentary's* neo-conservative politics will not help most American Jews one bit. And most Jewish intellectuals can survive spurious appeals to their emotions. They can see, often more clearly than their Christian or secular counterparts, that Begin is a mediocre fanatic and that Falwell is lumpen demagogue. Yet there has been a certain reluctance to face these conclusions, and to reject the phony logic that has led to an alliance between the most vocal proponents of Zionism and the New Right.

As Howe and Rosenberg rightly said, Israel is a state. A state, moreover, that occupies and governs the territories of others—by right of conquest. Here is the root of the matter. It is impossible to find excuses for military rule without experiencing a certain coarsening—a certain identification with the overdog. With at least a certain part of your mind, you see the world from the point of view of the policeman, the intelligence agent, the paid informer and (but it's true) even the torturer. You find that it's lonely being a cop, something that liberals don't understand. The intellectual ramifications of this are probably, in the medium and long term, incalculable. But among them are:

(1) The Third World changes shape. No longer a desperate and exploited area, it becomes minatory, arrogant, mob-like and greedy, impelled by a hatred of achievement and led by people who would rather shout than work. The best literary analogue here is Saul Bellow, who managed to write a whole book on Jerusalem without meeting or alluding to an Arab and, in *Mr. Sammler's Planet*, seemed to have rehearsed this shudder of distaste on the streets of New York. He has added his name to the rightist Committee for the Free World. From Teddy Kollek via Ed Koch to Midge Decter? Think about it.

(2) Next, it becomes harder to criticize American foreign policy. Never mind which Arab royal house is the temporary favorite in Washington; Israel will depend upon, and act as executor of, a rugged and adventurous American posture. It will also be a major customer and laboratory for military equipment. At least you can be sure that Israel won't be an Islamic republic by next Thanksgiving. Those who put Israel first, therefore, must mute their criticisms of the arms trade and the Rapid Deployment Force. They must also subcontract their consciences when
it comes to Israel's own arms trade—with Somozia before he was overthrown, with Duarte, with Botha and even with the anti-Semitic caudillos of Argentina. Once you make a fetish of "security," you will mean the to end.

(3) A related point. If there is one issue that still unifies liberal and radical disquiet, it is the spread of nuclear weaponry. Yet, in the one area of the world that needs such technology least, it has been Israel that has set the pace. There has been a certain lack of forthrightness among liberals on this point; a willingness to make allowances. But it was agreed by many liberals that Israel acted judiciously in blasting Iraq's nuclear reactor off the map. Note here the official Israeli justification—that an Iraqi bomb would be "a mortal threat to the Jewish people." Where in the Holy Land could a thermonuclear weapon explode without wiping out countless Arab Palestinians? I don't mean to say that Iraq might not run that risk. I mean to show up the sectarian nature of the Israelis' rationale, and the dismal way in which it was echoed by pro-Begin parrots in less exposed positions.

(4) Having reproved the Third World for its ungrateful and demagogic conduct, those formerly liberal figures who have swallowed their doubts about Begin are also berating Europe. In many of the articles that deplore the spread of "pacifism and neutralism" in Europe—or, if you prefer, the first stirrings of reluctance at the prospect of being expendable in the next war—one finds an apparently irrelevant paragraph. This paragraph attacks European governments for their role in the Middle East and their view that the P.L.O. cannot be excluded forever from negotiations. Whatever the objection to this policy, it can hardly be on the ground of "pacifism and neutralism." A policy of "Israel first" leads quite speedily and smoothly to a policy of "America first." Jews will not be the only ones to suffer if such a program succeeds in global terms. And as for liberalism . . .

(5) Because the Soviet Union supports the Arab cause, and because it shamefully persecutes its Jews, it becomes harder to resist the conclusion that the "main enemy" is the U.S.S.R. This has opened a whole flank in the liberal community to doubts about détente and rearmament.

(6) Many Jews and many Israelis are secular, and support secular politics. Yet, as Israel falls more under the domination of the lugubrious orthodox parties, this consensus too comes under pressure. Rabbi Meir Kahane has the legal right to live in Hebron and carry a weapon. An Arab born there has neither right. This consequence of the Law of Return may be an unintended one. But many American liberals only objected when Begin proposed to alter the law's definition of a Jew. Secular consistency, an important component of liberalism, can only be harmed by double standards like these.

Can I substantiate any of these offensive assertions and innuendos? I believe I can. One particular political voyage has called in so many ideological ports as to be symbolic.

In 1967, Martin Peretz, now editor in chief of The New Republic, broke with his friends on the left about Israel. Since then, he has made the P.L.O. a touchstone issue, moving gradually from this single disagreement to a general repudiation of his former comrades.

I cannot believe that this has no bearing on the sad declension of The New Republic. The cult of "antiterrorism" has taken a sturdy hold on that once-proud magazine, and has spilled over from gung-ho attitudes on Israel to a pastiche of Reaganism in general—at least in the area of foreign policy.

In discussion with me, Peretz has pointed out that his magazine criticizes Begin quite often. He has also argued (correctly) that in many cases a shift to a more conservative position predates an attachment to Zionism (cf. the justly forgotten nouvelles philosophes in France). Peretz certainly visualizes his general political perspective as comparable to that of Daniel Patrick Moynihan—apparently tough abroad and seemingly tender at home. In fact, as has been the case with Moynihan, such a stance leads to aggression abroad and, at best, negligence at home. It melts into the zombie world of Carl Gersham and the Social Democrats USA, who act as coat-holders to Jeane Kirkpatrick, who in turn acts as valet to Reagan. And, when Kirkpatrick wishes to combine her new role as government spokesman with her old job as reactionary pamphleteer, in whose pages does she receive hospitality? I'm afraid you saw this coming. Writing in The New Republic of November 11, Kirkpatrick could find nothing to criticize in the Reagan Administration's foreign policy except the faint possibility that it might treat with the P.L.O. I yield to anybody in my admiration of the lady, but I must thank her for supplying a perfect statement of the Begin mentality and its international complexity:

The P.L.O. preaches a brand of Palestinian nationalism and radical politics that links the struggle for the destruction of Israel to El Salvador, Africa, the Middle East—indeed, everywhere.

The italics are mine. Perhaps they are otiose. Indeed everywhere. Only connect, says Kirkpatrick, and you will see that the vernacular of her Zionism commits you against revolution worldwide.

Peretz is not new to this line. He published pro-South African material from Arnaud de Borchgrave. He helped to start Claire Sterling's campaign on "the terror network." Constantine Menges, then a clown from the Hudson Institute and now a government full-timer on Central America, got his first serious airing in the pages of The New Republic. J. B. Kelly and Elie Kedourie, both of whom preach jihad against the Arab and Iranian world, have also been honored guests in the magazine's pages.

There is only one thing that this salad of persons has in common, and that is an unsparing commitment contra mundum to Israel's imagined interests. I do not, therefore, think that it is paranoiac to identify The New Republic's rightward lurch as largely a function of the Middle East conflict.

So, some small ironies in conclusion: In October, The New Republic published an endorsement of Mayor Koch's dismal re-election campaign in New York City. The magazine decried his black critics as "anti-Semitic." Among those who found this hard to take was The Village Voice's Newfield, who wrote a letter of protest and was smartly called to order by Peretz. Those who use guilt by association are seldom invulnerable themselves.

Kirkpatrick would perhaps not have written, and Peretz might not have published, such an overwrought piece unless she and he had at least suspected that the American right would chivvy the Jews into the sea for a few petrodollars (as the French right dumped Israel as soon as Iraq looked like a better bet). What return will Israel get for its role as a ditto to American foreign policy? More pertinently, what
do American Jews and liberals stand to gain from being discreet on the point? § Kirkpatrick, Podhoretz, Kristol and the others were at best indifferent to the fate and (later) the revelations of Timmerman, who now makes his home in Israel and cares for Zionism and the Jewish people not less than many who live elsewhere. He has stated that he sees his new country set on a course of fanaticism and disaster. I would be a hypocrite if I claimed to agree with Timmerman on all points (the phrase "the Jewish Mediterranean" in his memoir seems to me especially insensitive as a description of the view from Tel Aviv), but he does remind us of an important fact. For many liberals, loyalty to Israel simply means loyalty to the Israeli government. As I. F. Stone has pointed out, dissent in Israel receives very little coverage in the United States. The substantial number of Israeli Jews who oppose their government's policies of annexation and discrimination receive no encouragement from their better-placed counterparts. They are ignored, or occasionally slandered, by precisely the same people who drone on endlessly about Israel being pluralistic and democratic.

It would be a good thing if Israeli and American liberals saw more of one another. They might learn from common experience that nobody stands to gain from an alliance between the American right and the most chauvinistic elements in Israel, and that euphemisms about "security" only serve to conceal the deadly errors that are being made in its name. The friends of the Jews are not Falwell and his Lynchburg ranters, nor the racist hooligans of Gush Emunim and the Jewish Defense League, nor the international arms dealers who shop on both sides of the street, nor the hucksters peddlers like Koch, nor the sunshine patriots like Podhoretz.

Howe's implied question still requires an answer. If it comes to a choice between Israeli policy and liberalism, which will American liberals choose? The choice has been put off for a long time, and many sincere people obviously would prefer to postpone it indefinitely. But, meanwhile, a small but significant part of the spectrum has chosen the first option and, thereby, consciously abandoned liberalism altogether. (Numbers here are not decisive: in Israel, extremists like Geula Cohen and Kahane have very few followers but have succeeded in creating a polarization favorable to the right.) If this sad division succeeds in reawakening the critical faculties of others, then the vital coalition of the left might still be salvaged.

PALESTINIAN PARALLELS

The 'Zionist Analogy'

Before the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the Palestine Liberation Organization was criticized by many Arabs for including so many divergent factions. P.L.O. leaders generally responded to this charge by arguing that the Zionist movement also embraced numerous factions, yet this did not interfere with the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus, what might be called the "Zionist analogy" was born, and it has exercised a surprising influence upon the P.L.O., an organization whose name is almost synonymous with anti-Zionism.

The analogy has firm roots in the history of the Jews and the Palestinians. A large number of Palestinians have been dispersed in a way that has much in common with the Diaspora. The Palestinians lack a territorial base for the economic, political and cultural activities associated with nationhood—just as the Jews lacked such a base prior to the establishment of Israel.

Moreover, the expatriate Palestinians have many of the traits traditionally associated with Diaspora Jews. For example, most Palestinians live in cities. They have a higher proportion of literate, educated and technically trained or skilled people than the general populations of their host countries. Many of them are prominent in the professions, the arts, trade, finance, banking and industry; many own small businesses.

The Palestinians and their host countries live in a state of constant tension. The response of these countries to the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees has ranged from friction, rivalry and hatred to direct repression and persecution. In some cases, the Palestinians have been the targets of campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation." Adding to the problem is the fact that the Palestinians have resisted both cultural and political assimilation, and refused to subordinate their own aims to the revolutionary, nationalistic or socialistic goals of other peoples.

Following the 1973 war, the P.L.O. leadership adopted a "territorial solution" that was strikingly similar to the one propounded in the early 1900s by Ber Borochov, the left-wing Zionist ideologue. This meant the advocacy of an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The establishment of such a state, it was assumed, would "normalize" the situation of the Palestinians and enable them to pursue their social, economic, political and cultural development like the other Arab peoples in the Middle East.

Extremist elements within the P.L.O. argue that just as the establishment of the state of Israel provided a base for further territorial expansion, resulting in the incorporation of all of the original Palestinian Mandate under Israeli rule, the creation of a Palestinian state would provide a base for continuing the Palestinian revolution and ultimately regaining Palestine for the Palestinians.

On a tactical level, the Zionist analogy suggests to the Palestinians that their objectives can be furthered by forming opportunistic alliances, which encourages them to seek help from Western Europe and the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and the Warsaw Pact nations, the U.S. oil companies and the prince of Qatar, the U.S. State Department's Arabists and Congressional lobbies. Similarly, the P.L.O. believes that it can mobilize all Palestinians just as the Zionist movement mobilized Jews throughout the world—right wing and left wing, rich and poor, moderate and

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