Ongoing merger talks between two of the Big Three American automakers over the past month have underscored the dire straits facing General Motors. Besieged for years by rising oil prices, declining sales compounded by the global credit crunch and mounting losses, GM now faces a liquidity crisis. The merger is GM’s latest attempt to save itself from insolvency, but it would be a foolhardy final move for the company that has long been an icon of American industry and the source of well-paid blue-collar jobs for millions of working Americans.
The past year has been a bleak one for GM. The company recorded an overall loss of $15.5 billion in the second quarter alone and has been burning through its remaining cash reserves at an alarming rate. This week Moody Investor’s Service downgraded GM’s credit rating deeper into junk status, and earlier this month the company’s stock fell to under $5 per share, its lowest mark since 1950, fueling talk of impending bankruptcy. GM’s potential merger partner, Chrysler, has hardly fared better. It has endured a 25 percent slump in sales in the past year and has a product line heavily weighted toward increasingly unpopular SUVs, minivans and pickup trucks.
In September, Congress committed $25 billion in loan guarantees to the auto industry, and there has been much talk recently of additional government help as the Big Three continue to flounder. Securing more federal funds is one likely rationale for merging GM and Chrysler, which together would control about 33 percent of US market share, but many industry experts and labor analysts agree the merger would be a terrible idea. Similar product lines and redundant workforces would make more plant closures and job cuts likely, while increasing pressure for further concessions during the next round of bargaining with the United Auto Workers. And it is doubtful that combining the two ailing giants, both of which have been slow to transition away from a business model dominated by large, fuel-inefficient vehicles, would yield a net financial gain. Gary Chaison, professor of industrial relations at Clark University, thinks the merger is another example of misplaced priorities. For years, he says, GM has “approached its marketing problem as an industrial relations problem” by pleading poverty due to unmanageable labor costs and locking the UAW into a cycle of concessionary bargaining. “Now this merger talk is approaching it as a financial problem.”
If the merger is a bad idea, further government intervention presents a more viable solution. GM is badly in need of a federal bailout, but if the government extends a lifeline it should not be because the automaker, like some bloated Wall Street bank, has become “too big to fail.” Instead, it should be because GM and what remains of the domestic auto industry is too important–to the ailing factory towns of Michigan and the Rust Belt and to the future of American industry in the age of globalization.