Editor’s Note: Part 1 of “Too Big to Bail: The ‘Paulson Put,’ Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown,” by Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson, appears in the next issue of the International Journal of Political Economy.
As children we were used to hearing from our parents that “it’s an ill wind indeed that blows no one any good.” As adults, we often found that hard to believe. Until this week, when Lindsey Graham, Alan Greenspan, John McCain and a bevy of scholars and publicists on the payroll of the Peter G. Peterson Institute started lining up behind a new version of Single-Payer Insurance.
For that, of course, is what nationalizing failed banks really amounts to. In sharp contrast to the bank rescue “plan” recently put forward by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, outright nationalization does impose costs on bank shareholders and managements. That is why former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the new Obama administration both shied away from the step.
But bank nationalization is just another version of Single Payer–call it Single Payer 2.0. Nationalization turns the Treasury–or we may hope, a specially constituted agency that actually knows what it is doing, on the model of the New Deal’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation or, more equivocally, George H. W. Bush’s Resolution Trust–into a financial HMO. The desperately ill banks, if not average Americans, get nursed back to health at government expense. Taxpayers foot the bill while the poor dears go cold turkey and embark on their daunting weight-loss campaigns to shed their toxic assets. And taxpayers, of course, fund the recapitalization that eventually allows the surviving banks to go out and start lending again.
As with single-payer health insurance, the great advantage of the scheme is its simplicity. It tackles the main problems head on. It gets the toxic assets–all of them–off the books of the banks at once. And it minimizes ultimate costs to taxpayers.
Here nationalization’s advantage is decisive: while the banks convalesce, the people of the United States take temporary ownership. That means that when the banks finally become healthy again, some trillions of dollars from now, the public’s shareholdings can be sold back to private investors at a profit, just as the Swedes did in the 1990s.
The difference with Hank Paulson’s TARP is night and day. This time the financiers actually get rid of their junk assets, because the government sweeps them all into a “bad bank” that it controls. And there are no tortuous arguments about how to value the distressed assets, because they are already owned by taxpayers. As Joseph Stiglitz has emphasized, the mare’s nest of management and stockholder interests that conflict with the public’s interest are swept aside.