The headline in Tuesday’s editions of London’s Guardian newspaper read: “No. 10 knew: Iraq no threat.”
The headline in London’s Daily Mirror shouted: “NO THREAT — Revealed: Email from Blair’s top man said Saddam was NOT imminent danger.” The lead editorial in The Independent newspaper declared, “Now we know that No 10 did order a rewrite of the dossier to justify war.”
For the most part, American media is doing a lousy job of following the British investigation of how Blair and his aides spun the case for war with Iraq. From a journalistic standard, that’s bizarre because the story of official deceit in Britain is also the story of official deceit in the United States.
When Bush was trying to con Congress into giving him a blank check to launch a war with Iraq last fall, the president’s efforts were hindered by his rather serious credibility gap. Veteran members of the U.S. intelligence community were signaling — from behind the scenes and, in some cases, publicly — that they did not buy the argument that Iraq posed a serious enough threat to merit military action. And senior members of the House and Senate, including then-Senate Intelligence Committee chair Bob Graham, who had been reading intelligence reports on Iraq since before Bush entered politics, were asking what had happened that would require a dramatic change in U.S. policy. Other members of Congress, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee members Russ Feingold, a Democrat, and Lincoln Chafee, a Republican, said the U.S. should focus on the war against terrorism, as opposed to squandering valuable resources on a fight to remove a secular Iraqi leader who had always been at odds with the Islamic fundamentalists of the al-Qaeda network.
Bush was even having trouble with some top Senate Republicans, who were talking about the need to attach some strings to the resolution authorizing the administration to use military force against Iraq.
The president was able to evade those restraints, and to thwart serious Congressional debate on the whole Iraq issue, by flashing around a so-called “intelligence dossier” prepared by the office of British Prime Minister Blair. Widely viewed as a more moderate — and, thus, credible — player on the international stage than Bush, Blair was supposed to be the sensible partner in the emerging “coalition of the willing.” And the report Blair’s office published on September 24, 2002, less than three weeks before Congress approved Bush’s request for authority to wage war, was taken seriously in Washington.