Philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum teaches law and ethics at the University of Chicago and is the author of more than twenty books. Her latest, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (Oxford; $21.95), expands the thinking on the "politics of disgust" that she explored in Hiding from Humanity. She argues that opposition to gay equality is rooted not in legally defensible reason but in an anxiety of contamination and a fear of the body’s animal nature. She advocates instead a "politics of humanity," based on the capacity to imagine others as being persons like ourselves, pursuing ends not unlike our own, and worthy of equal respect and treatment under the law. —Christine Smallwood
What is the politics of disgust?
It’s an aversion to being sullied by something one views as degrading or foreign. The things that inspire that idea are typically reminders of our animality and bodily nature, particularly mortality and the weak decaying aspects of our bodily nature. In Hiding from Humanity I used the idea to criticize first of all theories, like the theory of Lord Devlin, that say that disgust is a reliable way of thinking about what should be legally regulable. Disgust tends to extend itself to groups of people to whom the person then imputes disgusting properties–these people are smelly, they have germs, they’ll contaminate me. You can see the role of disgust in racism, anti-Semitism, the subordination of women, etc. All these groups have been characterized as hyper-animal, hyper-bodily, therefore disgusting. It’s unusually unreliable as emotions go, because it embodies a shrinking from some aspect of our nature.
The politics of humanity is a politics that says, We’re going to think of these people as our fellow citizens and equals and try to imagine them as people with projects they’re pursuing that are similar to ourselves. Respect is, of course, crucial to maintaining the equality of people in society, but respect doesn’t sustain itself. You need this quality of imagination to give it life, to stabilize it.
Why can we trust ourselves to imaginatively identify with others but not to imaginatively oppose them?
I don’t think any emotion should be trusted on its own without being constantly in dialogue with moral principles. At every point, whether it’s anger or fear or any emotion–even compassion, which can, of course, lead you to favor your family against other people–you should always be asking, Is this consistent with the idea of a society of people who are free and equal? Disgust, though, is different because it has this singular type of irrationality. It’s not noncognitive; it has an idea. But the idea repudiates some aspect of ourselves. It embodies a kind of self-loathing. In the case of compassion, compassion can be uneven; it can target people in a partial way. Or anger can be wrong about the facts. But disgust always has this edgy irrationality about it. It’s a way of fleeing from yourself. Whether it’s useful in evolutionary terms, that I leave to evolutionary scientists. Probably it is. That doesn’t mean that in the law we should rely on it. The imagination of humanity, of course, can be unreliable too. But all we’re really asking is that people see the other people as people. And I think that’s actually not so unreliable. What we see is that when people know that their children or their children’s friends or some relative is gay or lesbian, they immediately change. Then they can’t see them as slimy slugs. They’re just people. They may not like those people, but they still see them as people.