The attacks of September 11 might have been prevented had the US intelligence community been more competent. And the Bush Administration is refusing to tell the public what intelligence the President saw before 9/11 about the threat posed by Al Qaeda.
These are two findings contained in the long-awaited, 800-page final report of the 9/11 joint inquiry conducted the Senate and House intelligence committees, which was released on July 24. As is traditional in Washington, the contents of the report were selectively leaked before it was officially unveiled. And several news outfits noted that the report contained “no smoking guns” and concluded, as the Associated Press put it, that “no evidence surfaced in the probe…to show that the government could have prevented the attacks.” Those reports were wrong–and probably based on information parceled out by sources looking to protect the government and the intelligence community.
In the report’s first finding, the committees note that the intelligence community did not have information on the “time, place and specific nature” of the 9/11 attacks, but that it had “amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Osama bin Laden and his terrorist activities,” and that this information could have been used to thwart the assault. “Within the huge volume of intelligence reporting that was available prior to September 11,” the report says, “there were various threads and pieces of information that, at least in retrospect, are both relevant and significant. The degree to which the [intelligence] community was or was not able to build on that information to discern the bigger picture successfully is a critical part of the context for the September 11 attacks.” One Congressional source familiar with the report observes, “We couldn’t say, ‘Yes, the intelligence community had all the specifics ahead of time.’ But that is not the same as saying this attack could not have been prevented.”
The final report is an indictment of the intelligence agencies–and, in part–of the administrations (Clinton and Bush II) that oversaw them. It notes, “The intelligence community failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available information…. As a result, the community missed opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack. No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of information…. The important point is that the intelligence community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Osama bin Laden’s plan to attack the United States on September 11, 2001.”