On one of my last nights in Kabul I retire to the spacious home of my acquaintance the intelligence contractor. Particularly fascinating is his insight into the mindset of Western diplomats and military officers.

"Mention defeat and they say, 'It is unthinkable!' Well, it is coming, so you better well start thinking about it," says the contractor. He guesses the West's project in Afghanistan has between three and five years, and he thinks negotiation with the Taliban is its "only hope" for a graceful exit.

Surprisingly, that view has gained traction in several countries with ISAF troops. British Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Howells suggested that talks might be useful, and some in the Canadian New Democratic Party have agreed. Then, in early October, US Senate majority leader Bill Frist said the war in Afghanistan could "never" be won militarily and suggested that some Taliban be allowed into the government. One rumor in Kabul was that the Taliban's military commander, Mullah Dadullah, might be offered the Defense Ministry.

But a few posts for some top leaders won't end the war. There are already many ex-Talib in the Parliament and ministries, and they push the Afghan government in fundamentalist directions. As for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, few believe he would settle for anything less than ruling Afghanistan himself. And what about the Al Qaeda network operating on the border northeast of Kabul, in Nuristan and Kunar? It's hard to imagine the Bush Administration placating these champions of international jihad with the offer of an Afghan ministry.

Negotiations may help the West save face as it disengages, but it is unlikely they will do more than that. Ultimately, the US-built state in Afghanistan seems unreformable, and its future looks calamitous. Yet the nation builders in Kabul remain in denial, each concerned with immediate performance and the next promotion rather than the big picture. My host the contractor illustrates this mentality with a historical anecdote.

"Did you know, the US government continued family postings to Vietnam as late as four months before it fell?" he asks. "You might have thought that someone would have smelled the rot earlier and asked, 'Do we really need to bring the 2-year-old to Saigon?' But no--that would have been pessimistic, bad for the career."

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