The paper reinforces the positions already taken by several leading Democrats, including Representative John Murtha, the seventy-member Out of Iraq Caucus and Senators Kerry and Russ Feingold. Senator Dianne Feinstein was the latest to endorse its content. The document is being circulated by Democratic National Committee chair Howard Dean as well.

Seeking the hypothetical center ground requires Korb and Katulis to distance themselves from the peace movement, the only citizen force actually working toward the goal of withdrawal. To do so, the authors construct a phantom extreme of "immediate withdrawal," which they claim will permanently destabilize Iraq and the Middle East (as if current US policies have not already done so). As is common with Clinton-style politics, a solid centrist reputation is built by lampooning the progressive position.

All disrespect aside, there is a significant acceptance of the peace movement's message buried in this centrist proposal. It is not a proposal to keep US troops fighting until victory. There is a definite withdrawal timeline proposed and defended--eighteen months, starting immediately. Last year, peace groups collected tens of thousands of petitions for an exit strategy including a US declaration that no permanent bases are intended, a proposed paradigm shift to conflict resolution, selection of a peace envoy and power-sharing talks with Iraqi nationalist supporters of the insurgency. Kolb and Katulis examined the proposal carefully, and these concepts seem to have been incorporated into the document.

The proposal has weaknesses. First and foremost, it assumes that the new Iraqi government and armed forces will be sustainable if the United States begins to withdraw. There is no proposal for an interim peacekeeping force from neutral countries, as many Iraqi insurgent groups propose. There is no pledge to assure Iraqi sovereignty over Iraqi oil. There is an assumption that military withdrawal will be accompanied by a transition from "a highly centralized command to a market-based economy." In short, the proposal envisions a kind of devastated but safe post-Saddam Iraq integrated into the World Trade Organization, one requiring no more combat deaths.

The current Iraqi Parliament is by no means a solid pillar of the US occupation. Evidence is mounting that supporters of the Iraqi resistance have established a stronghold for their views even within the US-dominated "puppet" structure. Just this week, the Sunni vice president of Iraq, Tarik al-Hashimy, approved talks between the insurgents and American officials, but only on the condition that the guerrillas not stop the fight without a "final deal." President Jalal Talabani recently said he was negotiating secretly with seven insurgent groups. A report from reliable Iraqi sources indicates that a majority of the Parliament's 275 members will support a one-year withdrawal deadline if the question is put before them. Faced with this quagmire and election-year pressures, the option of peace, or the appearance of peace, seems to have been forced on the Bush Administration.

Iraqi army claims that it can "stand up" as the Americans leave are beyond credibility. If the US armed forces cannot end the insurgency, why would Iraqi security forces with sectarian loyalties and inferior weapons be any more effective? Could Shiite forces defeat the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr? Impossible. Would the modest Sunni security forces suppress the Sunni insurgents? No. Could the Kurdish peshmerga hold off the whole Iraqi resistance? No. As in Vietnam, "Iraqization" could become a fig leaf covering the US redeployment, but then only an agreement with the multiple resistance groups could prevent their demise.

Many in the peace movement are entitled to be affronted over the hawkish language of the Korb-Katulis strategy paper. But profound strategic questions are emerging for the peace movement as a whole, as a result of the movement's relative success. A planned US withdrawal is the majority sentiment in America, Britain and Iraq. Politicians are adjusting their positions accordingly, if only for the sake of survival. Political efforts to isolate and smear the movement, as well as counterintelligence operations, have failed. In perspective, the peace movement has contributed to constructing these formidable obstacles to continued war:

§ An antiwar constituency that affects close Congressional races this year and presidential calculations for 2008.

§ The inability of military recruiters to achieve their quotas.

§ Domestic discontent over presidential lies, secrecy and wiretapping.

§ A budgetary crisis aggravated by the rising costs of the Iraq occupation, including oil costs.

§ A moral stain on the US reputation around the world.

§ The steady erosion of the "coalition of the willing."

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