This would not be such a worrisome prospect if global petroleum output can expand sufficiently between now and 2020 to satisfy increased demand from both China and the United States--and in fact, the DOE predicts that sufficient oil will be available at that time. But many energy experts believe world oil output, now hovering at about 84 million barrels per day, is nearing its maximum or "peak" sustainable level, and will never reach the 111 million barrels projected by the DOE for 2020. If this proves to be the case, or even if output continues to rise but still falls significantly short of the DOE projection, the competition between the United States and China for whatever oil remains in ever diminishing foreign reservoirs will become even more fierce and contentious.

The intensifying US-Chinese struggle for oil is seen, for instance, in China's aggressive pursuit of supplies in such countries as Angola, Canada, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela. Until recently China derived very little of its petroleum from these countries; now it has struck deals with all of them for new supplies. That China is competing so vigorously with the United States for access to foreign oil is worrisome enough to American business leaders and government officials, given the likelihood that this will result in higher energy costs and a slowing economy; the fact that it is seeking to siphon off oil from places like Canada, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela--which have long sent a large share of their supplies to America--is the source of even greater concern, particularly if it results in a permanent shift in the global flow of oil. From a strategic perspective, moreover, US officials worry that China's efforts to acquire more oil from Iran and Sudan have been accompanied by deliveries of arms and military aid, thus altering the balance of power in areas considered vital to Washington's security interests.

Initially, discussion of China's intensifying quest for foreign oil was largely confined to the business press, but now, for the first time, it is being viewed as a national security matter--that is, as a key factor in shaping US military policy. This outlook was first given official expression in the 2005 edition of the Pentagon's report on Chinese military power. "China became the second largest consumer and third largest importer of oil in 2003," the report notes. "As China's energy and resource needs grow, Beijing has concluded that access to these resources requires special economic or foreign policy relationships in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, bringing China closer to problem countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela." Again, the implications of this are obvious: China's growing ties to "problem states" constitute a threat to US security and so must be met with countermoves of one sort or another.

Two trends have thus joined to propel this new swing of the pendulum: a drive to refocus attention on the long-term challenge posed by China and fresh concern over China's pursuit of oil supplies in strategic areas of the globe. So long as these two conditions prevail--and there is no repeat of 9/11--the calls for increased US military preparation for an eventual war with China will grow stronger. The fact that Bush has seen his job-approval rating plummet in the wake of Hurricane Katrina might also tempt the Administration to play up the China threat. While none of this is likely to produce a true rupture in US-Chinese relations--the forces favoring economic cooperation are too strong to allow that--we can expect vigorous calls for an ambitious US campaign to neutralize China's recent military initiatives.

This campaign will take two forms: first, a drive to offset any future gains in Chinese military strength through permanent US military-technological superiority; and second, what can only be described as the encirclement of China through the further acquisition of military bases and the establishment of American-led, anti-Chinese alliances. None of these efforts are being described as part of an explicit, coherent strategy of containment, but there is no doubt from the testimony of US officials that such a strategy is being implemented.

Elements of this strategy can be detected, for example, in the March 8 testimony of Adm. William Fallon, Commander of the US Pacific Command (PACOM), before the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It's certainly cause for concern to see this continuing buildup [by China]," he noted. "It seems to be more than might be required for their defense. We're certainly watching it very closely, [and] we're looking at how we match up against these capabilities."

To counter China's latest initiatives, Fallon called for improvements in US antimissile and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, along with a deepening of military ties with America's old and new allies in the region. With respect to missile defense, for example, he stated that "an effective, integrated and tiered system against ballistic missiles" should be "a top priority for development." Such a system, in all likelihood, would be aimed at China's short-range missiles. He also called for establishment of a "robust and integrated ASW architecture" to "counter the proliferation of submarines in the Pacific."

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