There are many ways to view the conflict between the United States and Osama bin Laden's terror network: as a contest between Western liberalism and Eastern fanaticism, as suggested by many pundits in the United States; as a struggle between the defenders and the enemies of authentic Islam, as suggested by many in the Muslim world; and as a predictable backlash against American villainy abroad, as suggested by some on the left. But while useful in assessing some dimensions of the conflict, these cultural and political analyses obscure a fundamental reality: that this war, like most of the wars that preceded it, is firmly rooted in geopolitical competition.
-
The New Geopolitics of Energy
Michael T. Klare: The Pentagon has now placed resource competition at the center of its strategic planning.
-
Architect of War(s)
Michael T. Klare: Dick Cheney's Mideast tour suggests another catastrophic military adventure in the Persian Gulf is still in the cards.
-
Beyond the Age of Petroleum
Michael T. Klare: Welcome to the Age of Insuffiency: As oil prices hit new highs and supplies sink, our way of life will drastically change.
-
Targeting Tehran
Michael T. Klare: As the Bush Administration steps up its campaign against Iran, opponents have a dual responsibility: to contest the strategic context for escalation and to bar specific acts of aggression.
-
Ominous Signs of a Wider War
Michael T. Klare: The naming of Adm. William Fallon to replace Gen. John Abizaid as head of Centcom is an ominous sign that Bush is preparing for a wider war.
-
Ending Nonproliferation
Michael T. Klare: President Bush's dangerous deal to deliver nuclear technology to India is a significant breach of the nonproliferation treaty and will make nuclear war more likely.
-
Defusing the Iran Crisis
Michael T. Klare: A peaceful resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran is possible if world leaders work to eliminate the obstacles to intelligent compromise.
To fully appreciate the roots of the current conflict, it is necessary to travel back in time--specifically, to the final years of World War II, when the US government began to formulate plans for the world it would dominate in the postwar era. As the war drew to a close, the State Department was enjoined by President Roosevelt to devise the policies and institutions that would guarantee US security and prosperity in the coming epoch. This entailed the design and formation of the United Nations, the construction of the Bretton Woods world financial institutions and, most significant in the current context, the procurement of adequate oil supplies.
American strategists considered access to oil to be especially important because it was an essential factor in the Allied victory over the Axis powers. Although the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the war, it was oil that fueled the armies that brought Germany and Japan to their knees. Oil powered the vast numbers of ships, tanks and aircraft that endowed Allied forces with a decisive edge over their adversaries, which lacked access to reliable sources of petroleum. It was widely assumed, therefore, that access to large supplies of oil would be critical to US success in any future conflicts.
Where would this oil come from? During World Wars I and II, the United States was able to obtain sufficient oil for its own and its allies' needs from deposits in the American Southwest and from Mexico and Venezuela. But most US analysts believed that these supplies would be insufficient to meet American and European requirements in the postwar era. As a result, the State Department initiated an intensive study to identify other sources of petroleum. This effort, led by the department's economic adviser, Herbert Feis, concluded that only one location could provide the needed petroleum. "In all surveys of the situation," Feis noted (in a statement quoted by Daniel Yergin in The Prize), "the pencil came to an awed pause at one point and place--the Middle East."
To be more specific, Feis and his associates concluded that the world's most prolific supply of untapped oil was to be found in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But how to get at this oil? At first, the State Department proposed the formation of a government-owned oil firm to acquire concessions in Saudi Arabia and extract the kingdom's reserves. This plan was considered too unwieldy, however, and instead US officials turned this task over to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), an alliance of major US oil corporations. But these officials were also worried about the kingdom's long-term stability, so they concluded that the United States would have to assume responsibility for the defense of Saudi Arabia. In one of the most extraordinary occurrences in modern American history, President Roosevelt met with King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi regime, on a US warship in the Suez Canal following the February 1945 conference in Yalta. Although details of the meeting have never been made public, it is widely believed that Roosevelt gave the King a promise of US protection in return for privileged American access to Saudi oil--an arrangement that remains in full effect today and constitutes the essential core of the US-Saudi relationship.
This relationship has provided enormous benefits to both sides. The United States has enjoyed preferred access to Saudi petroleum reserves, obtaining about one-sixth of its crude-oil imports from the kingdom. ARAMCO and its US partners have reaped immense profits from their operations in Saudi Arabia and from the distribution of Saudi oil worldwide. (Although ARAMCO's Saudi holdings were nationalized by the Saudi government in 1976, the company continues to manage Saudi oil production and to market its petroleum products abroad.) Saudi Arabia also buys about $6-10 billion worth of goods per year from US companies. The Saudi royal family, for its part, has become immensely wealthy and, because of continued US protection, has remained safe from external and internal attack.

Buzzflash
del.icio.us
Digg
Facebook
Newsvine
Reddit