PAKISTAN
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Obama in Afghanistan: Careful What You Wish For
Graham Usher: He says Afghanistan is the war America should be fighting. But on this much-ballyhooed listening tour, will he be hearing anything he doesn't already know?
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Getting Pakistan Wrong
Graham Usher: The US military's aggressive confrontation with the Taliban and its Al Qaeda cohorts in Pakistan is only making matters worse.
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Zimbabwe Reeling
Mark Gevisser: Peace among warring factions will come only when each side accepts that it can't win. And none of the players--least of all Robert Mugabe--has come to this realization.
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Bhutto's Tangled Legacy
Graham Usher: Will the PPP revive her power-sharing deal with Musharraf or join with Nawaz Sharif to re-establish constitutional rule?
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Benazir Bhutto: A Death Foretold
Graham Usher: For all her pro-American rhetoric, many in Benazir Bhutto's party held America responsible for the "judicial murder" of her father. Will Bhutto's assassination have a like impact?
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Trappings of Democracy in Pakistan
Graham Usher: As hopes fade for the rule of law in Pakistan, the Bush Administration signals it will settle for just the trappings of democracy. People are braced for disaster.
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Musharraf's Emergency
Graham Usher: If the United States is so keen on spreading democracy and fighting radical Islamists, why does it continue to back a leader who has suspended the Constitution and gone to war with legal activists?
Lahore
President Pervez Musharraf is walking a knife edge at home as he tries to keep a deeply polarized country from tearing itself apart, now that his military regime has pledged full support to the United States in its war against terrorism.
The first test for the regime came on September 21, when thirty-five religious parties called for a nationwide strike and demonstrations after Friday prayers to oppose the government's decision to join the US-led alliance. However, the demonstrations were small by Pakistani standards and largely involved mullahs and teenagers from the thousands of madrassahs, or religious schools, from which the Taliban draw many of their recruits. Most people stayed at home. Although the low turnout made it clear that the vast majority of the population is presently unwilling to support the Islamic parties' antigovernment campaign, the mood could change once US forces are based in Pakistan and military action begins.
Polls vary widely on the question of how much opposition there is to the government's decision to go along with the Americans; the most reliable estimates put it at around 25 percent. Musharraf has appealed to people not to react emotionally, but to put Pakistan's interests first. He said that Islamabad could not afford to be alienated from the international community by trying to defend the Taliban. He has also bluntly told the nation that if Pakistan had not committed bases and other facilities to US troops, India would have done so, which would have posed a severe threat to Pakistan's nuclear program and stance on the disputed territory of Kashmir.
Musharraf's problem is that he is head of a military rather than a political regime, and he has made little attempt to broaden the political base of his government or win over the silent majority, who support his stance. His political skills are severely limited. He has appeared only once on national TV since the September 11 attacks, has given no interviews and has remained largely closeted with his generals. "Pakistan's Islamic groups thrive when the only measure of public support is demonstrations in the streets, and their importance diminishes at times of elections,'' says Hussain Haqqani, a political analyst and former adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. "Musharraf is probably now regretting that he marginalized the mainstream political parties, leaving the Islamists as the only show on the streets," Haqqani added. "Now he has to demonstrate some political skills and limit the Islamists' capacity for violence."
The real threat to instability and Musharraf is the economy. Pakistan was in its fourth year of severe recession when the terrorists struck. Foreign investment in the recently ended fiscal year (July 2000-June 2001) was the worst in a decade, and GDP growth was only 2.6 percent, compared with last year's 4.8 percent. The crisis has led to a further crash in business and economic confidence. Pakistan's three stock exchanges were shut down after suffering massive losses in the three days following the attacks in the United States. Now the Bush Administration has announced that it is waiving sanctions and putting together an aid package, which means Washington has recognized the crisis.
Economists say Pakistan is asking for an immediate debt forgiveness of several billion of its $38 billion total foreign debt, resumption of US military aid and quick disbursement of loans from the United States and the World Bank to restore business confidence. On September 21 Japan announced a $40 million emergency loan, and the United States and the European Union are expected to follow. If Pakistan can garner international economic aid, Musharraf can point out the benefits of allying himself with the West.
American military operations against bin Laden and the Taliban are expected to be largely covert. Forces have already been sent to several Arab Gulf regimes and, according to Central Asian diplomats and wire reports, to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well, where authoritarian and highly controlled regimes can keep the US presence secret and completely out of the public eye. In Pakistan, which is expected to host the largest US military force because of its proximity to Afghanistan, such a feat will not be possible. That's when the Musharraf regime's alliance with the United States will be truly tested.
Ahmed Rashid is the author of Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale).
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