Pakistan, the Taliban and the US (Page 2)

By Ahmed Rashid

This article appeared in the October 8, 2001 edition of The Nation.

September 20, 2001

Lahore

At present, 3,000-4,000 Pakistani Islamic militants are fighting with the Taliban in their offensive against the anti-Taliban alliance. Thousands of Pakistani and Kashmiri militants also train in Afghanistan for the war in Kashmir. Pakistan's knowledge of the Taliban's military machine, storage facilities, supply lines and leadership hierarchy is total. Pakistan also has the most comprehensive information about the role of foreign militants, their bases and their numbers. The United States is now asking the ISI to turn over all this information to the CIA.

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If the army decides to commit fully to Washington, Musharraf will have to do even more. He will have to evacuate Pakistani military advisers from Afghanistan, withdraw Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, condemn the Taliban and force them to expel thousands of Pakistani fighters, in addition to a cutoff of fuel and other supplies, at the very moment when they will be preparing to resist a US invasion.

Musharraf will also have to crack down hard on Pakistan's Islamic extremists, who provide bin Laden's Al Qaeda with logistics, communications and other support. He may also be obliged to ban those Pakistani groups, like Harakat ul-Ansar (Volunteers Movement) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed), that are listed by Washington as terrorist organizations and could pose a threat to US forces. The largest Pakistani party fighting in Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), is on the US terrorist watch list. All these groups have received tacit state support in the past; stopping their activities will be a major problem for Musharraf.

If Musharraf decides to fall in line with US policy, he will receive widespread support from the majority of Pakistanis--especially the urban, educated middle class--who are tired of the country's dire economic crisis and the chronic lawlessness largely caused by Islamic extremists, and who are concerned about the rapid "Talibanization" of Pakistani society. In early September neo-Taliban Pakistani groups in the Northwest FrontierProvince prevented UNICEF from carrying out a polio immunization campaign for children because they considered it un-Islamic. The same groups have smashed TV sets and forced women to stay at home, as the Taliban have done in Afghanistan.

At the same time, Pakistan could negotiate major concessions from the United States for its support--the lifting of US sanctions against Pakistan imposed in response to Islamabad's 1998 nuclear tests, a partial write-off of the country's $38 billion international debt, more loans from the IMF and the World Bank, greater US pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute on terms acceptable to Pakistan, and the re-establishment of a close military and intelligence relationship with the United States to counter Washington's growing military and economic links with New Delhi. However, many Pakistanis fear that the United States may just use Pakistan, as it did in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, and then walk away once the US mission is over, establishing a closer military alliance with India and leaving Pakistan in chaos. That fear is not only expressed by Islamic groups but also by Pakistani liberals.

What the military is most concerned about is a backlash from Islamic parties and conservative Islamicists within the officer corps, who will accuse Musharraf of kowtowing to the Americans. Maulana Samiul Haq, who heads a string of madrassahs that many Taliban leaders attended in the early 1990s and that are now attended by Central Asian Islamic militants, has warned Musharraf that there will be a huge public backlash if Pakistan bends to US demands. "I am sure the Pakistani Army will not allow this to happen, and Musharraf will be mindful of the sentiments of his under-command. There will be a strong public backlash also,'' Haq said on September 14. Haq's provocative comments reflect moves by Islamic fundamentalists to increase pressure on Musharraf from within the army. Several senior generals and former ISI chiefs known for their hard-line Islamic views have been even more provocative, claiming that the attacks in the United States were carried out as part of an Israeli-Jewish conspiracy in league with the CIA in order to give Israel a free hand to crush the Palestinians and defame Muslims.

Musharraf is deeply concerned about US intentions toward the Taliban, and the Pashtun ethnic group in particular, from whom the Taliban are drawn and who straddle the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and what the future state of Afghanistan will look like. The United States is likely to target the Taliban leadership and its military formations and encourage an anti-Taliban uprising in the Pashtun belt in the south and east of Afghanistan, which is the Taliban heartland.

There is already growing US and international support for the Loya Jirga (tribal council) peace process in Afghanistan, headed by former King Zahir Shah, now in exile in Rome. The LJ process is almost certain to become the main political alternative for Afghanistan and will probably be backed in coming months by the United States and NATO. Pakistan does not support the LJ and would insist to the United States that Islamabad continue to have a major say in the formation of any future government in Kabul. If Pakistan is fully on board with Washington, Islamabad will be able to influence the outcome of the US attack and may retain influence in determining the future Afghan government. If it balks, Washington is unlikely to listen to Pakistani demands.

Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place, and the way he goes could determine the future viability of the Pakistani state. This is a moment of reckoning for Pakistan. It has to decide whether it wants to be part of the international community or go it alone, at the risk of turning into a pariah nation and possibly even state collapse.

About Ahmed Rashid

Ahmed Rashid, the Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, is the author of two recent bestsellers, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale) and Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (Penguin). more...
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