The Nation

The Meaning of the Armitage Leak in the Plame Case

One mystery solved.

It was Richard Armitage, when he was deputy secretary of state in July 2003, who first disclosed to conservative columnist Robert Novak that the wife of former ambassador Joseph Wilson was a CIA employee.

A Newsweek article--based on the new book I cowrote with Newsweek correspondent Michael Isikoff, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War--discloses that Armitage passed this classified information to Novak during a July 8, 2003 interview. Though Armitage's role as Novak's primary source has been a subject of speculation, the case is now closed. Our sources for this are three government officials who spoke to us confidentially and who had direct knowledge of Armitage's conversation with Novak. Carl Ford Jr., who was head of the State Department's intelligence branch at the time, told us--on the record--that after Armitage testified before the grand jury investigating the leak case, he told Ford, "I'm afraid I may be the guy that caused the whole thing."

Ford recalls Armitage said he had "slipped up" and had told Novak more that he should have. According to Ford, Armitage was upset that "he was the guy that fucked up."

The unnamed government sources also told us about what happened three months later when Novak wrote a column noting that his original source was "no partisan gunslinger." After reading that October 1 column, Armitage called his boss and long-time friend, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and acknowledged he was Novak's source. Powell, Armitage and William Taft IV, the State Department's top lawyer, frantically conferred about what to do. As Taft told us (on the record), "We decided we were going to tell [the investigators] what we thought had happened." Taft notified the criminal division of the Justice Department--which was then handling the investigation--and FBI agents interviewed Armitage the next day. In that interview, Armitage admitted he had told Novak about Wilson's wife and her employment at the CIA. The Newsweek piece lays all this out.

Colleagues of Armitage told us that Armitage--who is known to be an inveterate gossip--was only conveying a hot tidbit, not aiming to do Joe Wilson harm. Ford says, "My sense from Rich is that it was just chitchat." (When Armitage testified before the Iran-contra grand jury many years earlier, he had described himself as "a terrible gossip." Iran-contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh subsequently accused him of providing "false testimony" to investigators but said that he could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Armitage's misstatements had been "deliberate.")

The Plame leak in Novak's column has long been cited by Bush administration critics as a deliberate act of payback, orchestrated to punish and/or discredit Joe Wilson after he charged that the Bush administration had misled the American public about the prewar intelligence. The Armitage news does not fit neatly into that framework. He and Powell were not the leading advocates of war in the administration (even though Powell became the chief pitchman for the case for war when he delivered a high-profile speech at the UN). They were not the political hitmen of the Bush gang. Armitage might have mentioned Wilson's wife merely as gossip. But--as Hubris notes--he also had a bureaucratic interest in passing this information to Novak.

On July 6--two days before Armitage's meeting with Novak--Wilson published an op-ed in The New York Times on July 6, 2003, that revealed that he had been sent by the CIA to Niger to investigate the charge that Iraq had been trying to buy uranium in that impoverished African nation. Wilson wrote that his mission had been triggered by an inquiry to the CIA from Vice President Dick Cheney, who had read an intelligence report about the Niger allegation, and that he (Wilson) had reported back to the CIA that the charge was highly unlikely. Noting that President George W. Bush had referred to this allegation in his 2003 State of the Union speech, Wilson maintained that the administration had used a phoney claim to lead the country to war. His article ignited a firestorm. That meant that the State Department had good reason (political reason, that is) to distance itself from Wilson, a former State Department official. Armitage may well have referred to Wilson's wife and her CIA connection to make the point that State officials--already suspected by the White House of not being team players--had nothing to do with Wilson and his trip.

Whether he had purposefully mentioned this information to Novak or had slipped up, Armitage got the ball rolling--and abetted a White House campaign under way to undermine Wilson. At the time, top White House aides--including Karl Rove and Scooter Libby--were trying to do in Wilson. And they saw his wife's position at the CIA as a piece of ammunition. As John Dickerson wrote in Slate, senior White House aides that week were encouraging him to investigate who had sent Joe Wilson on his trip. They did not tell him they believed Wilson's wife had been involved. But they clearly were trying to push him toward that information.

Shortly after Novak spoke with Armitage, he told Rove that he had heard that Valerie Wilson had been behind her husband's trip to Niger, and Rove said that he knew that, too. So a leak from Armitage (a war skeptic not bent on revenge against Wilson) was confirmed by Rove (a Bush defender trying to take down Wilson). And days later--before the Novak column came out--Rove told Time magazine's Matt Cooper that Wilson's wife was a CIA employee and involved in his trip.

Bush critics have long depicted the Plame leak as a sign of White House thuggery. I happened to be the first journalist to report that the leak in the Novak column might be evidence of a White House crime--a violation of the little-known Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which makes it a crime for a government official to disclose information about an undercover CIA officer (if that government official knew the covert officer was undercover and had obtained information about the officer through official channels). Two days after the leak appeared, I wrote:

Did senior Bush officials blow the cover of a US intelligence officer working covertly in a field of vital importance to national security--and break the law--in order to strike at a Bush administration critic and intimidate others?

And I stated,

Now there is evidence Bushies used classified information and put the nation's counter-proliferation efforts at risk merely to settle a score.

The Armitage leak was not directly a part of the White House's fierce anti-Wilson crusade. But as Hubris notes, it was, in a way, linked to the White House effort, for Amitage had been sent a key memo about Wilson's trip that referred to his wife and her CIA connection, and this memo had been written, according to special counsel Patrick Fitzgerald, at the request of I. Lewis Scooter Libby, the vice president's chief of staff. Libby had asked for the memo because he was looking to protect his boss from the mounting criticism that Bush and Cheney had misrepresented the WMD intelligence to garner public support for the invasion of Iraq.

The memo included information on Valerie Wilson's role in a meeting at the CIA that led to her husband's trip. This critical memo was--as Hubris discloses--based on notes that were not accurate. (You're going to have to read the book for more on this.) But because of Libby's request, a memo did circulate among State Department officials, including Armitage, that briefly mentioned Wilson's wife.

Armitage's role aside, the public record is without question: senior White House aides wanted to use Valerie Wilson's CIA employment against her husband. Rove leaked the information to Cooper, and Libby confirmed Rove's leak to Cooper. Libby also disclosed information on Wilson's wife to New York Times reporter Judith Miller.

As Hubris also reveals--and is reported in the Newsweek story--Armitage was also the source who told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward in mid-June 2003 that Joe Wilson's wife worked at the CIA. Woodward did not reveal he had learned about Wilson's wife until last November, when he released a statement recounting a conversation with a source (whom he did not name). Woodward acknowledged at that time that he had not told his editors about this interview--and that he had recently given a deposition to Fitzgerald about this conversation.

Speculation regarding Woodward's source quickly focused on Armitage. Last week, the Associated Press disclosed State Department records indicating that Woodward had met with Armitage at the State Department on June 13, 2003. In pegging Armitage as Woodward's source, Hubris cites five confidential sources--including government officials and an Armitage confidant.

Woodward came in for some harsh criticism when he and the Post revealed that he had been the first reporter told about Wilson's wife by a Bush administration official. During Fitzgerald's investigation, Woodward had repeatedly appeared on television and radio talk shows and dismissed the CIA leak probe without noting that he had a keen personal interest in the matter: his good source, Richard Armitage, was likely a target of Fitzgerald. Woodward was under no obligation to disclose a confidential source and what that source had told him. But he also was under no obligation to go on television and criticize an investigation while withholding relevant information about his involvement in the affair.

Fitzgerald, as Hubris notes, investigated Armitage twice--once for the Novak leak; then again for not initially telling investigators about his conversation with Woodward. Each time, Fitzgerald decided not to prosecute Armitage. Abiding by the rules governing grand jury investigations, Fitzgerald said nothing publicly about Armitage's role in the leak.

The outing of Armitage does change the contours of the leak case. The initial leaker was not plotting vengeance. He and Powell had not been gung-ho supporters of the war. Yet Bush backers cannot claim the leak was merely an innocent slip. Rove confirmed the classified information to Novak and then leaked it himself as part of an effort to undermine a White House critic. Afterward, the White House falsely insisted that neither Rove nor Libby had been involved in the leak and vowed that anyone who had participated in it would be bounced from the administration. Yet when Isikoff and Newsweek in July 2005 revealed a Matt Cooper email showing that Rove had leaked to Cooper, the White House refused to acknowledge this damning evidence, declined to comment on the case, and did not dismiss Rove. To date, the president has not addressed Rove's role in the leak. It remains a story of ugly and unethical politics, stonewalling, and lies.

A NOTE OF SELF-PROMOTION: Hubris covers much more than the leak case. It reveals behind-the-scene battles at the White House, the CIA, the State Department, and Capitol Hill that occurred in the year before the invasion of Iraq. It discloses secrets about the CIA's prewar plans for Iraq. It chronicles how Bush and Cheney reacted to the failure to find WMDs in Iraq. It details how Bush and other aides neglected serious planning for the post-invasion period. It recounts how the unproven theories of a little-known academic who was convinced Saddam Hussein was behind all acts of terrorism throughout the world influenced Bush administration officials. It reports what went wrong inside The New York Times regarding its prewar coverage of Iraq's WMDs. It shows precisely how the intelligence agencies screwed up and how the Bush administration misused the faulty and flimsy (and fraudulent) intelligence. The book, a narrative of insider intrigue, also relates episodes in which intelligence analysts and experts made the right calls about Iraq's WMDs but lost the turf battles.

And there's more, including:

* how and why the CIA blew the call on the Niger forgeries

* why US intelligence officials suspected Iranian intelligence was trying to influence US decisionmaking through the Iraqi National Congress

* why members of Congress on both sides of the aisle who doubted the case for war were afraid to challenge the prewar intelligence

* how Cheney and his aides sifted through raw intelligence desperately trying to find evidence to justify the Iraq invasion

* how Karl Rove barely managed to escape indictment with a shaky argument.

And there's more beyond that. In other words, this is not a book on the leak case. It includes the leak episode because the leak came about partly due to the White House need to keep its disingenuous sales campaign going after the invasion. Feel free to see for yourself. The book goes on sale September 8. Its Amazon.com page can be found here.

This was posted at my blog at www.davidcorn.com.

Armitage Was the Original Leaker in Plame Case

The first piece of news from HUBRIS: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War, my new book (co-written with Michael Isikoff of Newsweek), has hit. Richard Armitage was the original leaker in the Plame case. The details are in a Newsweek story based on the book. Click here. I'll have more to say about this here and elsewhere on Sunday morning.

Right is Left in Connecticut

Connecticut Rep. Chris Shays, a Republican, is to the left of Joe Lieberman on Iraq.

A longstanding hawk on the war, Shays announced yesterday that the US should set a timetable to withdraw the bulk of its troops. "The only way we are able to encourage some political will on the part of Iraqis is to have a timeline for withdrawal," Shays told reporters yesterday after his 14th trip to the region. As chairman of the House Government Reform subcommittee on national security, Shays will lay out the details of his plan in a series of hearings next month, titled "Iraq: Democracy or Civil War?"

Shays finds himself in a tough re-election battle with Democrat Diane Farrell, so electoral politics may have influenced his change of heart. But either way, his call for withdrawal puts Shays ahead of most of his party--and Lieberman as well, who clings to an increasingly unpopular stay-the-course position.

In recent days, Lieberman has ratcheted up his criticism of opponents of the war. Doesn't Joe know that 60 percent of Americans now fall into that category.

"If you take the position that Ned Lamont is, and a few other Democrats are, that we've got to announce that Congress, politicians have to tell the generals that it's time to get everybody out of there, then I think as bad as the place is, Iraq now, it's going to be infinitely worse, it will be an all-out civil war," Lieberman told Don Imus on Wednesday, virtually parroting RNC talking points.

Lieberman is not a Republican. He's not a Democrat. He's a neoconservative. Perhaps if he loses in November, the Weekly Standard will offer him a column.

Doing the Right Thing

One year after Katrina, another hurricane season is upon us, this time as a flurry of "anniversary" specials, documentaries, packaged articles, book anthologies and multimedia web features. As New Yorkers who've endured September 11 and now Oliver Stone's World Trade Center well know, mass media revisitations of trauma -- whether documentary or fictionalized -- can be curiously apolitical. All too often, the disaster memorial takes a living, hurting wound, washes it clean and stitches it up, only to consign it to the archive of film history. Thankfully, this is not the case with Spike Lee's essential When the Levees Broke -- a ragged, uneven, boiling documentary that aired this week on HBO (with rebroadcasts on August 29 and September 1).

Clocking in at four, uninterrupted hours, it is perhaps too unfocused and unwieldy to intervene politically in the way that Al Gore's An Inconvenient Truth did. But unlike that reasonable film, Lee's work seethes with anger. Dissent is the one connective thread, tying together the 100+ talking heads who range from Mayor Ray Nagin to CNN anchor Soledad O'Brien to the unforgettable Phyllis Montana Leblanc, a resident of the 9th Ward who drops the documentary's most biting one-liners. Often considered an "opinionated" filmmaker, what shines forth in When the Levees Broke is in fact Spike Lee's ability to listen. His remarkable ear captures the humor, sadness, looniness, hostility, suspicion, resignation and optimism that underlie and differentiate the common outrage of New Orleans' residents.

In its most affecting moments, the film also lingers on their silences and stumbles, the moments of inarticulateness when the full scope of the disaster (which, as the film points out, outstrips September 11 in so many ways) exceeds any one person's ability to achieve sense. In one such instance, Garland Robinette, the radio host who conducted the oft-replayed interview in which Mayor Nagin angrily denounces the lack of federal aid, listens to a tape of the broadcast. Robinette begins to explain, "This is the thing that people have to understand, that America can no longer..." He never finishes the thought. "Sorry...it's been a long few months," is all he can muster through the sobs.

In another such moment, University of New Orleans student Paris Ervin recounts how, months after Katrina struck, police discovered his mother's corpse under her refrigerator, even though FEMA had concluded the house was free of victims. Distressed by FEMA's incompetence and the months of waiting for an official DNA test to establish her identity, he too breaks down before returning to conclude dryly, "According to the medical logs she did drown, in her own home."

Moments like these mitigate Lee's frenetic, sometimes obtrusive editing and transcend the genre of cable news from which much of the familiar footage is culled. At its best, When the Levees Broke recontextualizes and enlivens such stock material. The bloated, floating corpses that became emblems of government neglect are given names, histories, struggles to survive that ended tragically. "That guy's name was Eddie," says one witness. "He floated on beer cans for three days...I wanted to feed him but I couldn't swim," explains another of a neighbor whose body has yet to be found.

Lee himself does not attempt to arrive at a sensible, singular conclusion. This restraint is the film's strength, and if it also constitutes its weakness, then it is not in the way most mainstream critics have identified. Lee has been criticized for reducing "Katrina to a black problem," as Nicholas Kulish wrote in the New York Times. While Lee's eye -- and the medium of film in general -- accentuates racial difference, it is also surprisingly attentive to the economic and physical vulnerabilities that shaped the fate of Katrina's victims. Casually but insistently, the film emphasizes how the elderly, the sick, the disabled, the obese, the very young and mostly, overwhelmingly the poor bore the brunt of Katrina's fury. Dilapidated wheelchairs abound, but vital medication is absent. To suggest that When the Levees Broke is only a "race film" is to ignore this stunning visual evidence.

Kulish and others have condemned one sequence in particular in which Lee "presents the utterly unfounded charges that the failed levees were blown up to flood poor black neighborhoods." But this scene is in fact one of the film's best, not because it endorses such theories, but because it unpacks the long history of neglect and enmity (from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 to recent redevelopment schemes) that makes such racial paranoia, if not factually accurate, at least understandable. A less confident director might have instantly dismissed such conspiracy theories, and the result would have been a less probing, less complicated film.

Where Lee falters is not in his multi-faceted account of race and class, but in his examination of the politics and economics that set in play this unnatural disaster and continue to mangle New Orleans' reconstruction. The usual suspects are, of course, deliciously skewered: George Bush's sinister disinterest, Michael Brown's incompetence (he gets roasted by Soledad O'Brien who asks how her 23-year-old research assistant can have better intelligence than FEMA), Chertoff, Cheney, Condi and her Blahniks, Barbara Bush (the "President Momma" as Al Sharpton puts it), the insurance industry, the Army Corps of Engineers. But others, like Nagin who has consistently sided with business and property interests in the reconstruction, are largely absolved or made into heroes. With the exception of a brief query into Louisiana's oil and gas industry, the film seems to suggest that Hurricane Katrina happened because bad people made bad decisions, rather than because of the systematic gutting of urban infrastructure and the heartless pursuit of neoliberal economics.

As an unofficial companion to When the Levees Broke then, I heartily recommend reading, cover to cover, Unnatural Disaster, The Nation's collection of essays on Hurricane Katrina edited by Betsy Reed. Largely focused on the reconstruction, this fine volume begins to answer the question that Lee's film so forcefully asks: What will it take to do justice to New Orleans?

Plan B: A Semi-Sweet Victory

The Food and Drug Administration finally approved over-the-counter sales of the "morning-after pill." Sweet victory, right? Not exactly.

The approval is only for women ages 18 and older, and the drug will only be sold from behind pharmacy counters, according to the Center for Reproductive Rights.

New York State Senator, Liz Krueger, urging the passage of a bill that would make emergency contraception available to women of all ages, released a statement yesterday saying, "If the government were serious about reducing unintended pregnancies, they would follow the science and recognize that the medicine is equally as safe for those under the age of 18 as it is for those older. This sends the wrong message about the safety of this product. This is politics trumping science."

In fact, the President of the Center for Reproductive Rights, Nancy Northup, says that her organization filed a lawsuit against the FDA alleging "that the agency never intended to fairly consider the scientific evidence that Plan B is safe and effective for women of all ages and that high-level officials engaged in an intricate cover-up that culminated with today's decision."

According to Krueger, "The New England Journal of Medicine reported that as many as half of all unwanted pregnancies may be prevented with unfettered access to emergency contraception, which does not interrupt, disrupt or harm already existing pregnancies, but instead prevents pregnancy before it has been established."

So, while the FDA's recent decision represents some progress in standing up to the Bush Administration and right-wing extremists, the agency still needs to hear that its job is to take action based on sound science, not paternalistic notions of women's health.

Wal-Mart's Rainbow Connection

Citing Sam Walton's legacy, and vowing to shop elsewhere, a coalition of grass-roots organizations -- with a broad base of support -- is furious with Wal-Mart. That's, of course, nothing new, but this time the recriminations aren't coming from the progressive labor and community activists concerned about issues like living wages, community benefits agreements, health care and sex discrimination. The folks mad at Wal-Mart this week are the right-wing Christian groups like the American Family Association and the Family Research Council. Wal-Mart has for years been viewed as friendly to conservative Christians, banning racy men's magazines, and refusing to carry books that might offend fundie customers (like Jon Stewart's America: The Book, with its imaginative rendering of naked Supreme Court justices) or George Carlin's When Will Jesus Bring the Pork Chops?

But this week, Wal-Mart has disappointed the cultural hard right by announcing that its membership in the National Gay and Lesbian Chamber of Commerce. This mild nod to cosmopolitan capitalism inspired howls of pain, with the Family Research Council calling it "outrageous" and an "offensive move," "an affront to the millions of traditional families that patronize Wal-Mart."

It's fun to see these intolerant cretins suffer. But let's take a look at the context. Probably taking advice from its highly paid flacks from Edelman, an elite PR firm -- and from the Clinton Administration alums now working for Wal-Mart, who are, of course, triangulation experts extraordinaire -- the retailer has been working to distance itself from its right-wing customer base, probably reasoning that many fundies live in places where they have no choice but to shop at Wal-Mart, while folks in more liberal, densely-populated areas need to be courted, after all the bad things they've heard and read about this company's practices. That's, most likely, why Wal-Mart recently decided to carry Plan B, the morning after pill, after being, for years, the only national pharmacy chain refusing to do so. It's also why Wal-Mart has been going green. Steps like this represent a triumph for the progressive groups that have been seeking to reform Wal-Mart; they also show how politically savvy Wal-Mart is.

The labor-backed groups criticizing Wal-Mart need to tread carefully here, and play well with others, because the retailer is trying to win over every imaginable stripe of liberal and progressive, hoping to paint labor as an isolated "special interest" group. This strategy doesn't have to succeed; the labor critique of Wal-Mart has impressive traction right now and has been winning substantial victories. But to keep up the momentum, unions will have to treat their allies with respect and listen carefully. That's not something that has always come easily to them.

An Optimistic Voice in Israel

Israel's military defeat in Lebanon has created new opportunities for peace – that's what Israeli Knesset member and peace movement leader Yossi Beilin told Terry Gross on the NPR show "Fresh Air" on August 23. Beilin, chairman of the left-wing Meretz party, has served in different Labor governments, and was one of the architects of the 1991 Oslo Accords and the 2003 Geneva Accord.

The Israeli government and military today are facing popular anger and strong criticism over their failures in Lebanon. Beilen recalled that the government faced similar criticism after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. But that war, he pointed out, opened the way to a historic peace treaty with Egypt -- the Camp David agreement of 1978 – and a peace between the two countries that continues to this day.

That treaty was possible, Beilin argued, because after 1973 Egypt "felt there was there was a kind of symmetry" with the Israeli military, rather than feeling "they had been totally defeated," which had been the case with the 1968 war.

But, Terry Gross asked, who should Israel negotiate with? Hamas and Hezbollah don't recognize Israel or its right to exist. "I would negotiate with everybody who is ready to negotiate with me," Beilin replied. "Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas is ready to negotiate with Israel, which leaves us with the government of Lebanon, with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, and with the Syrian government. All of them are speaking about an agreement with Israel." He suggested convening an international conference with those participants.

But withdrawing from Lebanon, and then withdrawing from Gaza, did not bring peace. Haven't these experiences turned Israeli public opinion against peace negotiations? "I don't think so," Beilin replied. What Israelis have lost faith in is unilateral withdrawals. In contrast to the "non-agreements" around the withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza, "We have had a peace agreement with Egypt since ‘75, with Jordan since ‘94, and these are big achievements," he said. "People are disenchanted about unilateralism. . . . They understand now that peace agreements do not have substitutes."

The crucial example: Syria. It's possible that the entire Lebanon war, and the arming of Hezbollah, could have been avoided if Israel had signed a peace treaty with Syria in 1999 – "and paid the price of the Golan Heights to have this peace." That would have had "a huge impact on Lebanon," which Syria has more or less controlled. Israel at that point had a Labor government headed by Ehud Barak; at the end of 1999, he decided not to sign a peace treaty with Syria, and instead to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally. The consequences of those decisions are now clear.

But when Hamas controls a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislature, and when Hamas doesn't recognize Israel or its right to exist, how can you have a negotiated peace with the Palestinians? "Here the procedure is quite clear," Beilin replied. "Hamas is telling the world that it is ready for Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Israel. Once he ends his negotiations, he will have to bring that agreement either to a referendum or to a meeting of the Palestinian national council. If there is a majority for such an agreement, it will become a reality. . . . This is the way Hamas can stick to its ideology, but enable others to negotiate." In the end, the leaders of Hamas "will not be the ones to shake our hands, but they will benefit from an agreement with Israel."

But hasn't the war strengthened the determination of Hamas and Hezbollah to seek the destruction of Israel? Beilin insisted that "There is a big difference between the two groups. Hezbollah is not a potential partner." Hamas is different, and "at the end of the day, if Hamas gives Mahmoud Abbas the mandate to negotiate, there is a possibility of getting an agreement. This is not the situation with Hezbollah."

But hasn't the rise of Islamic extremism throughout the region reduced the chances for a negotiated peace? "I would like to reject the idea that what we have is a war of civilizations or war of religions," Beilin said. "Everywhere you have extremists, but also moderate people and pragmatic people. Wisdom also requires creating the coalition of sanity, those people who want to live and want their kids to live. These are the majorities everywhere."

The strategic key for Israel, he said, is "to put an end to the war situation in the inner circle" – Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians – "so that war here will not create a pretext for those who want to fight forever." Beilin gave credit for that idea to Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister who was assassinated in 1995 by an Israeli fanatic who opposed his signing the Oslo Acccords. Rabin "wanted peace in the inner circle before Iran became a nuclear power, and before the hatred of Israel in the Arab world would make anyone who made peace with us be seen as a traitor. He was right." But "it's still not too late."

Finally Terry Gross asked Yossi Beilin how optimistic he was feeling now. After a pause, he said, "I believe there is an opening which wasn't there before. The question is whether it is big enough to change the situation. . . . It is more than a matter of optimism. It is a matter of creativity, of doing something." Here he refused to call himself an optimist, which he defined as a person "who believes that the situation will be better tomorrow." Instead, he concluded, "I believe it is my task to make it so."

Ronald as Gas Guzzler

I hate Hummers. They're the best example of America's lack of commitment to cleaner and more efficient vehicles. They guzzle gas--averaging nine miles per gallon--helping keep the country dependent on foreign oil. They're loud, anti-social and obnoxious. They hasten global warming's impact by emitting more than three times the amount of carbon dioxide produced by an average car. And they make the roads less safe--as do all SUVs. Their hulking mass and consequent lack of maneuverability actually increases the number of accidents on the road. And studies show that passengers in cars that collide with SUVs are 3.4 times more likely to be killed. To top it off, small business owners who purchase Hummers receive a $100,000 tax break under Bush's Economic Stimulus Plan, while purchasers of the Toyota Prius hybrid receive a break of only $4,000.

But what's really annoying about Hummers is that faux-macho pretension they project. They make a certain kind of insecure guy feel good about himself for all the wrong reasons. Don't agree? Courtesy of Slate, check out Hummer manufacturer General Motors' latest Hummer ad, which plays adroitly on male feelings of inadequacy. The Spot: A man waits in the checkout line at the supermarket. He's buying organic tofu and leafy vegetables. Meanwhile, the guy in line behind him is stacking up huge racks of meat and barbecue fixings. Tofu guy, looking a bit insecure, suddenly notices an ad for the Hummer H3 SUV. Eureka! In a series of quick cuts, he exits the supermarket, dashes to the Hummer dealership, buys a new H3, and drives off--now happily munching on a large carrot. "Restore the balance," reads the tag line.

What got me writing about Hummers today was reading that America's fast-food giant, McDonald's, has teamed up with GM to give away toy Hummers -- 42 million of them, in eight models and colors -- with every Happy Meal sold to a little boy for the next month. (The girls get Polly Pocket fashion dolls.) That's right: The fast-food chain that helped make American children the fattest on Earth is now selling future car buyers on the fun of driving a supersized, smog-spewing, gas-guzzling SUV.

As Fark.com quipped, "McDonald's is teaming up with Hummer, for those who'd rather not have to choose between being fat and being obnoxious." But as the Hummer folks see it, this is just another brand awareness campaign. "I do it as an extension of advertising," Martin Walsh, general manager at Hummer, told Ad Age. "Any time you get your brand in front of people, that's an extension of advertising." (The McDonald's website even links to a site called HummerKids.com. However, when you click on HummerKids.com, you're really taken to Hummer.com. Not a kid's site. )

To highlight the foolishness of Mickey D's new efforts to promote the Hummer brand to its young customers, the Environmental Working Group (EWG) has introduced Ronald McHummer's Sign-O-Matic. A nifty interactive tool, the Sign-O-Matic lets you write your own slogan about the Hummer giveaway and display it as if it were on a McDonald's marquee--the downloading possibilities are rife. Then, send a copy of your work along with a message to the president of the fast-food chain, Ralph Alvarez. Take this creative opportunity to express your disdain for McDonald's perplexing decision to team up with one of America's most regressive products. Click here to see and vote on your favorite signs. Check out and circulate Code Pink's Top Ten reasons not to buy a Hummer. See the Sierra Club's HummerDinger site for more resources. Finally, don't miss artist Dave Ward's anti-Hummer ad campaign on Flickr.

[FULL DISCLOSURE: The EWG is a current Nation advertiser. I'm plugging their campaign because I think it's worthy, not because the group has a (very minor) economic relationship with the magazine.]

Democrats for McCain

It was only a matter of time before some Democrats began jumping ship to join the all-but-announced McCain for President campaign.

The first casualty is Nicco Mele, the former webmaster of the groundbreaking Dean for America campaign. According to the Hotline, Mele, whose firm Echo Ditto represents over twenty Democratic and progressive causes, has agreed to become one of McCain's key online strategists.

The move has caused a fury in the blogosphere since it was reported last night. Mele recently posted this blog in his defense:

A lot of people are asking me about John McCain. When I worked for Common Cause, I worked on the McCain-Feingold bill and worked closely with Sen. John McCain's office. After Sen. McCain lost the Republican primary in 2000, I traveled with him as part of a group of campaign finance reform staffers as we criss-crossed the country working to secure support for the McCain-Feingold bill. I have long admired Sen. McCain's work on campaign finance reform and his independent streak. If Sen. McCain runs for president, he's got my support.

But Mele and other Democrats tempted to follow his lead should realize that the straight-talking McCain of 2000 is not the Bush-coddling McCain who wants to win in 2008.