Will Media Raise Key Questions About Hiroshima, and Nuclear Legacy, This Year? | The Nation

Greg Mitchell

Greg Mitchell

Media, politics and culture.

Will Media Raise Key Questions About Hiroshima, and Nuclear Legacy, This Year?

An allied correspondent stands in a sea of rubble before the shell of a building in Hiroshima, September 8, 1945. (AP Photo/Stanley Troutman)

Sixty-eight years ago last week the Nuclear Age began with the first successful test of an atomic weapon at the Trinity site in the New Mexico desert. The test and what surrounded it set the standard for much of what followed in the decades to come: radiation dangers, official secrecy and cover-ups, a nearly endless nuclear arms race, and the triumph of the national security state.

Two years ago, as the annual anniversary of the August 6 atomic bombing of Hiroshima approached, I wrote daily posts here, a Countdown to Hiroshima, relating what happened on the corresponding day in 1945. You can find them archived, beginning on July 25, 2011. I won’t do it again here this year, but you’ll find new versions every day over at my Pressing Issues blog—and I started earlier this year, with nearly two weeks already covered.

Every summer for the past thirty years I’ve written numerous artilces about this and related subjects—because the US media, with the exception of the fiftieth anniversary in 1995, fail to raise new, or even longstanding, questions. I’ve written three books on the subject: Hiroshima in America (with Robert Jay Lifton), Atomic Cover-Up (on the decades-long suppression of shocking film shot in the atomic cities by the US military) and Hollywood Bomb (the wild story of how an MGM 1947 drama was censored by the military and Truman himself).

For now, here’s a kind of summary of the debate of the use of the bomb in August 1945.

One of the persistent—and certainly the most influential—arguments in the media for dropping the bomb over two highly populated Japanese cities is that it saved hundreds of thousands, even millions, of American lives that would have been lost in the “inevitable” US invasion of Japan. Those numbers were grossly inflated from the start, many historians have shown, but any invasion would have been bloody enough. The significance of the Trinity success—which was by no means a slam dunk beforehand—was that it rendered any invasion extremely unlikely.

Why? There is no way any American president, and certainly not Harry Truman, would have gone ahead with an invasion—scheduled for several long months after the Trinity test—knowing that he had an A-bomb in his pocket. This helps account for why his surly mood at the Potsdam summit was transformed overnight by the news of the Trinity success.

The question—on the day after Trinity—was not use bomb or invade (which defenders of the bomb still emphasize), but rather how to use the bomb.  

Truman’s choices were: (1) inform Japan’s leadership that the United States now had such a device (the Japanese knew what that meant, having tried and failed in its own atomic program), (2) set up a dramatic demonstration shot, (3) drop a bomb or bombs over a sparsely populated part of Japan or a military base or (4) target large cities.

Those who continue to raise the specter of massive US casualties—often citing a family member who might have perished—should be required to argue that options 1, 2 and 3 (above) would not have produced a Japanese surrender in the months leading up to the scheduled invasion and that Truman, when more A-bombs became available in the fall of 1945, would have then chosen to invade rather than drop the new weapons on the Japanese.

Again one has to say: no American president, and certainly not Truman, would have ordered thousands of Americans to their deaths rather than use more of the weapons. Consider, for example, our current use of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan in place of large land forces.

So the issue was not bomb or invade but bomb or negotiate (or bomb and negotiate).

Now, many defenders of the bombing will say that the beauty of using the bomb against Japanese cities is this: it made the Japanese agree to unconditional surrender. This, of course, is nonsense. In fact, we accepted the very strong condition of letting them keep their emperor, which was always assumed to be the main sticking point in a surrender before Hiroshima.

In other words, we demanded unconditional surrender after Trinity—but accepted a key condition after Hiroshima.

But would the Japanese have quit very shortly—via the same “negotiations”—if Truman had tried one of the first three options outlined above? Of course, we will never know for sure. Certainly, there is evidence on all sides, and I’d need another 10,000 words here to even begin to discuss some of it.

One little known detail about Trinity is this: J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The Father of the Bomb,” was so surprised by the incredible visual effects of the July 16, 1945, test that he came to believe that a demonstration shot might well have convinced the Japanese to quit (though he never urged this path, feeling the momentum to drop the bomb over cities was unstoppable).

What we also learned at Trinity: the radiation threat was even worse than we feared. That didn’t stop Truman from speeding up the use of the bomb against cities.

The key historical fact usually ignored by defenders of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that the A-bomb wasn’t the only reason the Japanese quit: the foe the Japanese most feared, the Russians, had finally declared war against them, and were on march, two days after the Hiroshima blast.

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This was not a case of “getting in on the spoils”—we had demanded that the Soviets do this at Potsdam the month before and knew it was coming, bomb or no bomb. This has led to theories—which I have never embraced—that the main reason we dropped the bombs, knowing Japan was already defeated, was to keep the Soviets out of Japan, and intimidate them in the postwar era. I’d call this a reason, not the reason.

Be that as it may, there is no question that the Soviet declaration had a huge impact on the Japanese—as it would have if we had merely demonstrated the A-bomb or dropped it over a more remote area in Japan. Truman, in his diary, declared that the Russian attack alone meant “fini” for “the Japs.”

The key point is: We didn’t wait around to find out if the Japanese would have surrendered to us shortly (especially after we let them keep the emperor) to prevent the Russians from invading, or if a strong nudge via use of our bomb would have been required.

So, for me (if not most others in the media), the responsibility has always been on the defenders of the use of the bomb to marshal evidence that all of those other options Truman could have tried after Trinity—plus the Russian attack and letting them keep the emperor—would not have produced a quick surrender.

Yes, we do know that surrender came shortly after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but we also know the awful negatives of the decision Truman did make: the deaths of more than 200,000 civilians (mainly women and children) and lingering illness for thousands more, the staining of the United States with a moral stigma around the world (if not in our own country), plus the setting in motion of the sense of the weapon as desirable and usable, leading to a costly, forty-year nuclear arms race.

More from Greg Mitchell on the unanswered questions surrounding the Trinity test.

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