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Probing 9/11 | The Nation

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Probing 9/11

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Bruce DeCell was sitting at the far end of the third row in a Senate hearing room. He held a photograph of a smiling man in formal attire so the important people on the dais before him could see it. Next to the image was a name: Mark Petrocelli. A caption read, Tower I--92nd Floor. We Love You. We Miss You. Petrocelli was his 28-year-old son-in-law. He had worked for a commodities firm across the street from the World Trade Center. Days before September 11, he had been promoted from phone clerk to trader and was in Tower One that morning for his first meeting as a broker.

About the Author

David Corn
David Corn is Mother Jones' Washington bureau chief. Until 2007, he was Washington editor of The Nation. He has written...

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DeCell, a 53-year-old retired New York City cop who lives on Staten Island, was grim-faced as he watched--or witnessed--the second round of public hearings held by the independent 9/11 Commission, created by Congress to investigate what happened before and on that awful day. While Democrats and Republicans in Congress have been squabbling over whether to investigate the missing (so far) weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the 9/11 Commission has been getting on with its work. On this day in May, Bogdan Dzakovic, an aviation security expert and whistleblower, was testifying before the ten commissioners about airline security problems that existed on September 11--and continue. These weaknesses, he said, have often gone unfixed because federal authorities cave in to pressure from the airline industry. While Dzakovic spoke--"It's only a matter of time before terrorists figure out [the new security arrangements] and blow up fifty planes in one day"--DeCell had a thousand-mile stare, but he was intently listening. "If I did anything like this as a policeman," he muttered, "and killed 3,000 people, with this much evidence against me, I'd spend 100,000 years in jail."

DeCell wasn't just speaking about airline security screw-ups that permitted nineteen people to hijack four airliners and turn three of them into deadly weapons. He meant everything that had gone wrong on and before September 11. Bad intelligence. Inadequate law enforcement. Lousy immigration procedures. Insufficient air defense preparation. Poor emergency planning. After the attacks, there was no wholesale examination of all that, almost no responsibility assessed for mistakes. And there has been no government-wide review to determine whether post-9/11 changes in policies and procedures have been effective. The House and Senate intelligence committees did conduct a joint inquiry that examined the intelligence failures of 9/11, but the investigation's final report has been bottled up for months, with the Administration battling to keep parts of it classified. The 9/11 Commission's mission is to go beyond the joint inquiry, compile the authoritative account of 9/11 and issue recommendations that will help the nation avert a future catastrophe.

Six months after its birth, it is unclear whether this bipartisan commission is on a path to success. Washington is littered with the remains of blue-ribbon panels that were more bust than blast. This commission could be overwhelmed by its task. It could end up thwarted by an Administration more eager to stonewall than to share information. And its independence has been questioned. But it does have fifty staff members digging away and exploring various 9/11 questions. Perhaps it will be a rare exception: a Washington commission willing to confront Washington.

The commission's takeoff was not smooth. This past November, George W. Bush, who opposed the creation of the commission until he got the right to name its chairman, appointed Henry Kissinger. Under fire for refusing to reveal the clients of his consulting firm, Kissinger quit two weeks later. Bush then selected former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, a Republican with a reputation as a moderate but no obvious experience in national security matters. Congressional Democrats chose as co-chairman former Representative Lee Hamilton, who had chaired the House Intelligence Committee and the joint Iran/contra committee. The four other Democrats on the commission are lawyer Richard Ben-Veniste, former Senator Max Cleland, former Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick and former Representative Tim Roemer, who led the fight for the commission. The Republicans are former Senator Slade Gorton, former Navy Secretary John Lehrman, former Illinois Governor James Thompson and lawyer Fred Fielding--most recently in the news for being accused of having been "Deep Throat" during Watergate. It's a pretty typical composition for a Washington commission--mostly established and accomplished players, not mavericks, and several with strong ties to the current or previous Administrations--the targets, in a sense, of the commission. "It's been a problem throughout to get commissioners and staff who are truly independent," says Stephen Push, a co-founder of Families of September 11. And three of the commissioners--Ben-Veniste, Gorelick and Thompson--have had to recuse themselves from matters involving commercial aviation security because they are associated with law firms that represent airlines. "This is what happens when you pick talented people with expertise in Washington," says one commission source. "Do you want people who have no experience at all?"

The commission was nearly two months old before it had an executive director, and the person hired for the post--Philip Zelikow--symbolized the difficulty of assembling an independent outfit. Zelikow, an accomplished historian, worked with Bush National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in the National Security Council during the first Bush Administration. The two then collaborated on a book. And in October 2001, Bush appointed Zelikow to his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of prominent citizens who offer advice on intelligence topics and occasionally investigate controversies. "Philip is a certified Republican but not an ideologue," says a longtime colleague who is a Democrat.

Zelikow will be guiding an investigation that presumably will scrutinize the actions of Rice, his friend and co-author. And given the Administration's penchant for secrecy, it's reasonable to assume that the commission will sooner or later clash with the White House over access to secret information, perhaps the records of Rice's NSC. The White House, for instance, has previously refused to disclose information on at least two key briefings that Bush and his national security aides received before 9/11. Can Zelikow, a Bush I and Bush II appointee, go toe to toe with his former colleague if a battle ensues? "It concerns me," says one commission official. "Rice is one of the key people we need to independently evaluate and talk to." And Push remarks, "I'm not crazy that Philip Zelikow has such a close relationship to Rice and other people the commission is investigating."

Zelikow concedes that he has to prove his independence. He notes that he was retained at the initiative of the commission's Democrats, who were fully aware of his past. "My job," he says, "is to get the information. The commission has a heavy burden of demonstrating to a lot of suspicious and cynical people that we can get the information we need. We know that."

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