Letter From Eritrea | The Nation


Letter From Eritrea

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The incident that triggered the fighting came on May 6 of last year, when Tigrayan militiamen fired on an Eritrean patrol near Badme, killing four. This set off skirmishes that stopped briefly when Eritrea moved in regular armed forces to restore order on May 12. The next day Ethiopia responded with a declaration of war. What followed--amid frantic US efforts to head off a fight--thoroughly cemented the positions of the two combatants, and the "peace process" effectively stalled in its opening phase.

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Dan Connell
Dan Connell is a senior lecturer at Simmons College, Boston, and a visiting scholar at the Boston University...

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The stumbling block--embedded in the original Organization of African Unity peace plan drafted in June 1998 and carried forward in subsequent elaborations by the OAU and the UN with US support--hinged on Ethiopian insistence that Eritrea withdraw from disputed territory prior to mediation. Eritrea objected to this out of fear that a unilateral pullback would open the door to Ethiopian annexation. Yet Ethiopia, whose face had been bloodied in the fighting, could not accede to a pact that did not give it a way to save face. So how did such an unworkable position become an integral part of the "peace plan"?

Sources close to the June talks--Eritreans and Americans--say that mediators had nearly reached an agreement that included an Eritrean withdrawal when the Eritreans panicked at hints that Ethiopian "hard-liners" were about to pre-empt the process with an attack that would decimate Eritrea. Despite the dubious military analysis behind this, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice not only held a hasty press conference with Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa to announce a breakthrough on terms favorable to Ethiopia but flew to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to secure the support of OAU members meeting there, based on the mistaken assumption that Eritrea was about to sign on. The only ones not told were the Eritreans, who learned about the proposal through the media.

Both the form in which this was done and its substance militated against Eritrean acceptance. The fact that Ethiopia went on to deport more than 53,000 people of Eritrean descent--including the ambassador to Ethiopia and the OAU--rendered the risk of signing on to the agreement politically untenable in Eritrea and virtually insured further fighting. Yet the Clinton Administration doggedly insisted that no other option was acceptable for Ethiopia. Not surprisingly, the Eritreans viewed this as confirmation that the United States was siding against them and with the US ally in the region. Eritreans will not soon forget that it was the United States that rammed a proposal through the UN in 1950 to place the former Italian colony under Ethiopian rule rather than grant it independence--or that, until 1976, a large amount of all US aid to Africa went to Ethiopia in an effort to crush the Eritrean liberation war after it got under way in 1961.

In the latest conflict, however, the main winners seem to be Russia, which sold new combat aircraft to both sides, and Sudan, which negotiated a backdoor deal with Ethiopia to make common cause against Eritrea. Eritrean countermoves to aid ethnic opponents of the Ethiopian government could lead to that country's disintegration along the ethnic fault lines that are built into the state itself, as no one group is now positioned to unite the others in the event of a political crisis.

Yet the exit from this cul-de-sac has always been painfully simple, even if the precise steps to get there have not been. The only viable basis for a sustained cessation of hostilities is for both armies to withdraw simultaneously from all the disputed areas, place a neutral third force between them and bring in outside arbitrators to demarcate the border. Now that Ethiopia has retaken the village of Badme--at enormous human and material cost--and declared a victory in the border war, the peace plan's onerous requirement that Eritrea unconditionally withdraw from the disputed region is now moot, and following the plan would mean a monitored withdrawal of both sides. Although Eritrea is now willing to accept this, Ethiopia, which still covets access to the Red Sea, is suddenly dragging its feet. With as many as half its forces amassed near the southern Eritrean port of Assab, where there are no disputes over the border, this may be the real prize of an extended military campaign. It is critical that the United States exert the same pressure on Ethiopia that it formerly applied to Eritrea and that it take a strong stand in favor of the OAU agreement, which it has long touted as the preferred solution. Scandinavian states with a history in the region have offered to fund a peacekeeping force, and several African states have agreed to supply the personnel. However, there are many potential sticking points, not least of which is whether colonial treaties or more recent--and contentious--patterns of settlement will be used to determine the border.

Despite media reports to the contrary, Eritreans were not totally defeated. Their withdrawal from untenable positions along the border to more secure ground inside their territory is typical of the strategy used throughout their protracted war for independence--one designed to minimize losses while they protect their advantage for future combat. The Eritreans have indicated that if this crisis is allowed to fester without a durable solution--and another cease-fire in which both sides rearm without resolving the border issue is no solution--they will carry the war across the border into Ethiopia. In such a scenario, the entire region could go up in flames.

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