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'Changing to Organize' | The Nation

'Changing to Organize'

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On Labor Day 1995, for the first time in decades, the major media were filled with stories not about broken strikes and corrupt union leaders but about the promise and possibility of labor's revival. John Sweeney, Richard Trumka and Linda Chavez-Thompson had launched their campaign for leadership of the AFL-CIO pledging to organize on a massive scale, "to open up and reinvigorate the labor movement at every level." There was talk of building a national organizing fund, recruiting thousands of new young organizers and organizing millions of workers in new occupations and industries.

About the Author

Kate Bronfenbrenner
Kate Bronfenbrenner is the director of labor education research at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor...

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The spotlight is once again shining on Marc Rich. This time, Rich is represented by former Clinton counsel Jack Quinn, while Republicans Dan Burton and Arlen Specter are leading the charge, raising questions about trading with the enemy, tax evasion and influence-peddling. Just nine years ago, similar questions were raised in hearings before the Committee on Government Operations in the Democrat-controlled Congress. Back then Republicans kept silent; Rich was represented by former Nixon attorney Leonard Garment and William Bradford Reynolds, assistant attorney general in the Reagan Justice Department. The committee was investigating how Rich, America's most-wanted white-collar criminal, received more than $65 million in government grain-export subsidies, which he used to sell wheat and barley at enormous profit overseas, and how he had captured a lucrative deal to sell more than $20 million in nickel, zinc and copper to the US Mint.

Until we began research for our book Ravenswood: The Steelworkers' Victory and the Revival of American Labor, we, like most Americans, had never heard of Marc Rich. In 1990, 1,700 aluminum workers, locked out of their plant in a small town in West Virginia, discovered that their company was ultimately controlled by the elusive Rich. Over the next two years, their union, the United Steelworkers of America, mounted an ambitious strategic campaign [see David Corn, "The Union and the Billionaire," February 24, 1992]. The Steelworkers' investigations, which led to the hearings, revealed the vastness of Rich's holdings. It was said that Rich owned "49 percent of the world"--from oil tankers to zinc mines to aluminum smelters to luxury hotels. Despite having a controlling interest in almost every metal and agricultural commodity on the world market, there was very little that Rich owned outright. This arrangement enabled him to establish profitable relationships with businesses and governments that might otherwise have been squeamish about associating with him.

The Steelworkers were also shocked to discover that the Justice Department was not actively pursuing his case. The union quickly got a taste of Rich's ruthlessness. Early in the campaign, the local and national union leaders received a series of death threats, delivered by phone and in person, saying, "You'd better stop or you're going to get hurt.... You don't know who you're up against."

By tracking Marc Rich drawing public attention to his dealings around the world, the union interfered with his ability to do what he did best--trade, invest and make deals behind closed doors. It prevented him from purchasing smelters in Czechoslovakia and Venezuela and a luxury hotel in Romania and from returning to the United States to visit his family. The Steelworkers not only won a victory for their members in West Virginia--they, unlike most others, held Rich accountable for his actions.

Rich engineered his pardon from President Clinton in the same way he has managed his business empire--in the shadows, just below the radar of law enforcement, the media and the public, and buttressed by the best lawyers that money can buy. Yet the pardon should in no way absolve him of his crimes. The battle will likely move to civil court and to the IRS. But it's also important for civil and political leaders to take a firm stand against Rich. When he first fled to Switzerland, he bought himself respectability through his philanthropic efforts. Now that he's returning home, the philanthropic community--as well as public officials, government agencies and political parties--should refuse Rich's money until he has made appropriate reparations to the government and until we can be sure that the money he offers has been acquired through legitimate means. His millions may have bought his pardon, but they should not buy him redemption or shield him from public scrutiny.

In the months following Sweeney's victory as the new AFL-CIO president, "changing to organize" became the mantra of a newly energized labor movement. For the first time, the federation had an organizing department, a director of organizing and an organizing fund to support large-scale, multi-union campaigns in key industries. The AFL-CIO also launched Union Summer, bringing in hundreds of college students to assist in a wave of new organizing campaigns.

These initiatives were not limited to the AFL-CIO. Across the country, local and national unions engaged in an aggressive effort to improve significantly their organizing capacity and success. This entailed shifting staff and financial resources into organizing, mobilizing leaders and members to support organizing campaigns, and developing and implementing more effective organizing strategies and tactics. By 1999 the combination of organizing victories and employment expansion in unionized industries resulted in a net gain of 265,000 union members, the first such gain in more than twenty years. The great American decline in union organizing seemed to have finally bottomed out.

But the good news was not to last. This past January, the government released union density figures for 2000 that once again told a story of decline. For last year was a presidential election year, and just as in the past, unions shifted enormous resources, including organizing staff, to the election campaign, leaving fewer staff and resources for organizing. Overall, organizing activity was down, and there were none of the massive victories that had dominated the 1999 organizing cycle. To make matters worse, in the last weeks of 2000 there was a series of plant closings and mass layoffs in unionized manufacturing and retail companies, raising the bar even higher if the number of newly organized workers was to offset those lost to the sudden downturn in the economy.

Even leaving aside the unusual events of last year, it is clear that despite all the new initiatives and resources devoted to organizing and all the talk of "changing to organize," American unions are at best standing still. They will need to organize millions, not hundreds of thousands, of workers each year if they are to reverse the tide and begin to regain their influence and power in American society.

Why is this so difficult? Why has it taken so long for new organizing initiatives to bear significant fruit? After spending the past fourteen years conducting a series of studies analyzing the factors contributing to union organizing success, I find the answers to these questions to be painfully obvious. Building capacity for organizing is one thing. Changing the structure, culture and strategy of the large, entrenched, democratic institutions that American unions have become is quite another.

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