"You have been negotiating all my life," 21-year-old Mima Haider of Lebanon told delegates at the United Nations climate negotiations in Cancún. "You cannot tell me you need more time." But that’s pretty much what they did tell her, and the rest of us. True, some important agreements were reached in Cancún. Rich countries reaffirmed their legal obligation to help poor ones fight climate change, and even promised sizable sums toward that end. The Cancún Agreements oblige rich countries to contribute $30 billion in new aid between now and 2012—growing to $100 billion a year by 2020—to a Green Climate Fund. This fund will help developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions and install protections against floods, droughts and other climate impacts that disproportionately punish the global poor.
But on the key questions determining whether children in rich and poor countries alike will inherit a livable climate—how much will emissions be reduced, and when?—negotiators kicked the ball down the road. The Cancún text did recognize that "deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are required…to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius [2C] above pre-industrial levels." And it is significant that, for the first time, developed countries will not be the only ones that must make cuts. In a major concession to Washington, developing countries—including China, India and other rising powers—will henceforth also be required to reduce emissions, if only to below business-as-usual trajectories. But these are general statements of intent. Decisions on implementation—how steep the cuts will be, how this burden will be shared between developed and developing countries, and how all this will be enforced—were explicitly put off until the next round of negotiations, scheduled for December 2011 in Durban, South Africa.
No wonder many media outlets chose the word "modest" to describe the Cancún deal. Still, it could have been much worse. Going into the talks, expectations were very low; outright failure seemed a possibility. That compromises were reached on a range of second-tier issues revived many participants’ faith in the UN process. After the catastrophe in Copenhagen in 2009, when a majority of mainly developing countries angrily rejected a deal that the United States, China and other big emitters had hammered out in secret, the UN’s role was in question. Some in rich countries complained that the multilateral, consensus-seeking approach was too unwieldy to make progress. Many in developing countries countered that only the UN process enabled democratic decision-making. In Cancún, thanks to the Mexican hosts’ diplomatic skills, negotiations went more smoothly and yielded results, giving the UN process a new lease on life.
Those who see the Cancún glass as half full hope the trust and momentum achieved there will make it easier to tackle the knotty issues that await in Durban. As always, the dance of the two climate superpowers, the United States and China, will be crucial. After an acrimonious standoff in Copenhagen, both sides’ negotiators showed surprising flexibility in Cancún. China accepted that it, too, had to limit emissions and even accepted a degree of outside monitoring. In a compromise proposed by India, projects to reduce emissions in developing countries financed by international sources will be internationally verified while domestic projects will only be domestically verified. For its part, the United States not only accepted the latter stipulation but agreed that rich countries must cut emissions more and sooner than developing ones, even as they supply $100 billion a year to the Green Climate Fund.