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The Bank of America Mortgage Settlement Fiasco | The Nation

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The Bank of America Mortgage Settlement Fiasco

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Despite Bank of America's failure to help hundreds of thousands of homeowners ruined by Countrywide, the bank claims it is on track to fulfill its obligations under the settlement. According to the one publicly available page of a quarterly compliance report the bank is required to file with the state attorneys general, as of the end of the second quarter of 2010, BofA had modified a total of 134,217 loans under the settlement, achieved an expected interest and principal savings for borrowers of $3.4 billion and provided $177.6 million in relief to people who had lost their homes to foreclosure.

About the Author

Alex Ulam
Alex Ulam is a freelance journalist who writes frequently on finance and urban planning. See his work at AlexUlam.com.

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These numbers look impressive, at first glance. But a September 2009 study by Citibank of the loans covered by the settlement projected that 50 percent of the modified loans are so untenable they will re-default within a year. The terms being offered are so bad that many lawyers are not bothering to seek relief, says Nathan Fransen, an attorney representing underwater borrowers northeast of Los Angeles. Fransen estimates that in the past three years he has worked with about 1,000 clients seeking modifications, half of them from Countrywide. He projects that for borrowers who get the five-year, interest-only payments, there is going to be major trouble down the line. "We haven't seen the effect yet," he says. "They took them out of one loan that was a ticking time bomb and put them into another loan with ticking time bomb features."

Bank of America officials concede that re-default is a major threat, projecting a rate of 20–30 percent. But they claim most of these defaults will be a product of growing unemployment, not unfair loan modifications. Housing counselors and attorneys tell a different story. They say the modifications BofA is offering under the settlement are not sustainable even for many borrowers with jobs. "As far as I know, none of our clients have gotten a modification under this program," says Sheri Powers, an attorney and director of the Unity Council, a nonprofit community development corporation based in Oakland. "The offers I have seen so far are basically a low-interest-only, fixed rate for five years, and then the loan converts to a principal and interest, which of course, depending on the total amount due, could be a huge jump in the person's total monthly payment."

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As it turns out, BofA has had good reason not to make its modifications affordable for mortgages now owned by a third party, such as the public employee pension funds that invested heavily, and disastrously, in Countrywide's mortgage-backed securities. From 2004 to 2007, the years covered by the settlement, Countrywide sold most of its first-lien subprime loans as mortgage-backed securities or loan packages, but it generally kept the lucrative servicing contracts. BAC Home Loan Servicing (formerly Countrywide Home Loans Inc.), Countrywide's servicing arm, acts as a bill collector, gathering mortgage payments from borrowers and distributing these payments to the investors who actually own the mortgages. Servicers earn a small percentage of mortgage payments, but what has made the business especially profitable are late fees and other ancillary costs such as property inspections, collected from borrowers in delinquency and in default.

Those revenues will be lost through the settlement with the state attorneys general, which requires BofA to waive outstanding late fees for delinquent Countrywide borrowers who receive a modification. But BofA can start the lucrative late-fee gravy train all over for all the borrowers who re-default on modified loans—a staggering number, if the Citibank projections prove to be accurate. When these financially exhausted borrowers finally go into foreclosure, any outstanding late fees can be tacked onto the bill BofA submits to investors.

Only about 12 percent of the first-lien loans initiated by Countrywide remain on BofA's books. Investors in mortgage-backed securities, including major pension funds like CalPERS (the California Public Employees' Retirement System), own the other 88 percent, and it is these investors who will bear most of the expense of complying with the settlement, in the form of permanently reduced principal and interest payments on their bond holdings. Believe it or not, this aspect of the deal was overlooked by the settlement. Richard Blumenthal, attorney general of Connecticut, one of the original parties to the suit, seems to have missed it entirely, claiming in his October 2008 announcement, "This settlement will cost BofA as much as $8.6 billion, but no cost, not a dime, to taxpayers."

In fact, as it turned out later, much of the settlement's cost would be covered by taxpayers. Bank of America is allowed to use federal incentives under President Obama's $75 billion Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) toward the loan modifications it is required to make as the mortgage servicer for the Countrywide portfolio. In total, of its entire Countrywide financial servicing portfolio—which goes beyond the loans covered by the settlement—BofA is eligible for as much as $4.5 billion in federal incentives for completed modifications, according to an analysis by the Center for Public Integrity as reported in Mother Jones. That's a hefty government rebate.

There are indications that Bank of America's slow progress on loan modifications is intentional. Many service providers on the front lines of the crisis were unaware of the settlement more than a year after it took effect. Take Walter Dees, a team leader in the housing department of Clearpoint Credit Counseling, a HUD-approved counseling agency in Los Angeles. Of the hundreds of Countrywide borrowers he's tried to obtain loan modifications for, "not one of them has mentioned anything regarding the attorneys general modification," he says.

Why don't borrowers know about the settlement? If they received a notification letter like the one Bank of America officials gave me after weeks of prodding, they would have no clue they were one of the covered homeowners. Nowhere in the letter is there explicit mention of the settlement. There's no mention of borrowers' rights, such as waiving of late fees for those who qualify for modification. And the letter fails to mention the settlement's most attractive modification option: principal write-down, the only measure that could make a significant difference to borrowers who have seen the value of their homes decline by 50 percent or more.

Bank of America's opaque public outreach apparently passes muster with the California attorney general. An official in the AG's office who declined to be named told me the notification letter "is not necessarily going to reference the settlement." He went on to express concern about the plaintiffs themselves, the very people the settlement was designed to protect. "There is a moral hazard problem with all of this, which is that you don't want to encourage borrowers who can afford their loans to default, or borrowers who don't believe they were victims of fraud to default," he says. "So there is a fine line that had to be walked in figuring out how to publicize, announce and communicate with borrowers."

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The settlement's most fatal flaw may be its failure to cover second liens. Bank of America still owns a large number of Countrywide's second liens outright, including its once popular Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs). Today the bank is the largest holder of second-lien loans in the country, which are valued at $145 billion. (Second-lien loans, which are tacked onto the original first-lien mortgage, include home-equity loans used to finance everything from home improvements to hospitalization to coverage of 15–20 percent of the purchase price of a house.)

Brown alleges that Countrywide employees broke the same laws in selling those loans as they did in selling first liens. According to the California lawsuit, Countrywide loan officers "further[ed] their deceptive scheme" by "urging borrowers to encumber their homes up to 100% (or more) of the assessed value; and placing borrowers in 'piggyback' second mortgages in the form of higher interest HELOCs while obscuring their monthly payment obligations."

A settlement that covered second liens would have improved the prospects for victims of Countrywide's predations. Federal officials and mortgage analysts have identified second liens as a major factor in at least half the mortgages in danger of default. Such a loan works against borrowers in several ways. Not only does it stick them with a greater debt burden; it also stands in the way of principal reduction on the first mortgage, since a second lien must usually be wiped out before principal can be written down on the first loan.

The attorneys general seem to have left this gaping loophole for pure expediency. "We do allege misconduct related to the origination of second liens and HELOCs," says the California AG official. "However, for purposes of settling the case, we wanted to craft a settlement that, while not perfect, would have the most effective chance of saving homeowners as quickly as possible. We were in a situation where the housing crisis was expanding by the moment. They [Bank of America] could have dragged out the negotiations for two years, during which time innumerable residents of California and other states could have lost their homes to foreclosure."

Earlier this year Bank of America finally indicated some willingness to address the second-lien issue. On January 26 the bank announced to much positive press that it was the first servicer to sign up for a resuscitated federal effort known as the Second Lien Modification Program, which the Obama administration had been trying to get off the ground since spring 2009.

In March, facing additional legal action over Countrywide's predatory lending practices, Bank of America reached another settlement, this one with Massachusetts. Under that deal, the settlement Brown negotiated was expanded—Bank of America would now offer principal reductions to about 45,000 severely underwater Countrywide borrowers. Notably, BofA will offer these principal reductions only to borrowers who qualify for HAMP, under which the bank gets bailed out by taxpayers.

The Countrywide settlement, says Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, a statewide organization that advocates for low-income communities, has failed to protect homeowners who were the victims of predatory lending on an epidemic scale. "Fraud and predatory lending really created this crisis we are in, and nobody is taking that into account," says Stein. "That was a concern we had with the original settlement. They don't admit any fraud."

Now state attorneys general might finally have an opportunity to help the thousands of defrauded Countrywide borrowers who have fallen through the cracks. On October 8 Bank of America announced that it was temporarily suspending foreclosures in all fifty states in response to revelations of false or fraudulent documentation and at least one BofA "robo-signer" who approved thousands of foreclosure papers without proper review. Even so, BofA appears confident that it has done nothing wrong. "We will stop foreclosure sales until our assessment has been satisfactorily completed," states a BofA press release. "Our ongoing assessment shows the basis for our past foreclosure decisions is accurate. We continue to serve the interests of our customers, investors and communities. Providing solutions for distressed homeowners remains our primary focus."

It's up to the attorneys general, in their newly announced investigation, to hold BofA to its word.

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