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The author provides a first-hand account of the demonstrations marking the fourth anniversary of Iran's pro-democracy student protests, which took place in Tehran on July 9, 2003, and looks at the political, economic and social problems in Iran. The hard-line Islamic vigilantes circled us. The "vigilantes," as they are commonly called by the Western media, are affiliated, paid for and organized by hard-liners in Iran's government, which makes them more accurately "thugs for hire." As I watched the government's display of force playing out before my eyes that evening--including helicopters circling overhead, elite units of antiriot police standing ready, and plainclothes Intelligence Ministry agents buzzing around on motorbikes, I remembered what Morad Saghafi, a leading Iranian prodemocracy intellectual, told me: "Politics is dying. Now, everything comes down to force." Over the past year, Iran's conservatives have used unelected power centers such as the hard-line judiciary, the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (who has virtual veto power over all matters of state) and the Guardian Council (an unelected body with" supervisory" responsibilities over Parliament), coupled with their control over security services, to veto key prodemocracy legislation in Parliament, jail leading dissidents and journalists with impunity, scrap presidential initiatives and intimidate protesters with violent crackdowns. As a result, Iranians increasingly talk of "outside solutions." On many occasions, people expressed to me the hope that America would "do something." Washington and Tel Aviv fear Iranian acquisition of the bomb, which they say is proceeding at a brisk pace. While it may be true that an Iranian version of the China model could forestall unrest, the strengthening of Iran's devastated middle class, weakened by twenty-four years of economic mismanagement, could sow the seeds for future revolt.
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